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INTRODUCTION
For several years the amount spent by Government has
grown both in real cost terms (that is excluding the effects
of general inflation) and as a share of national output. In
recent years it has been the government aim to reduce the
share of government spending in national output by both
trying to cut back expenditure and to rationalize the
provision of services by increasing their efficiency in both
the allocation and production side.
One of the most important issues in this context has been to
control expenditure which was not directly decided by
government itself. Between 1969 and 1974 total government
expenditure rose by 33% in real terms. This growth
reflected several factors: efforts to stimulate demand in
the face of rising unemployment in 1973, the cost of large
sector pay settlement following lengthy strikes, increases
In subsidies to alleviate rapidly rising inflation, new
programs in social spending and increase in industrial
support.
The stimulation of domestic demand more or less coincided
with and aggravated, the deterioration in the balance of
payment produced by the Opec oil price rise, and the current
balance of payment deficit reached i 4 billion in 1974.
To avoid a possible collapse in the external value of pound,
spending plans were began to be cut.
In 1979 a new, Conservative administration took office;
It did not raise total spending to stimulate demand in the
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recession which began shortly after it took office and after
honouring the previous administration' s commitments to
paying a number of major catching up awards, public sector
pay was tightly controlled and total spending was planned to
remain broadly flat in real terms. The new policy resulted
In a considerable slow down in public expenditure growth
which was around 8% per year between 1979/84. Public
expenditure cuts prove to be very difficult to be
Implemented for several reasons. The two main limitations of
this policy are represented by pressure from client groups
to increase expenditure and by the fact that about 53% of
total spending cannot be directly controlled by government
since it represents local government and nationalized
industries expenditure.
Pressures exists to raise virtually every programme: for new
and better equipment; to reduce hospital waiting time and to
Improve community services and so on.
The Treasury's 1984 Green Paper on long term prospects
acknowledged the extent of such pressures and argued that
the way to approach them was first to set up the budget
constraint and then to establish priorities between
competing claims. The Treasury's Green Paper has been built
on a financing constraint based on targets. i.e. targets on
spending were set out on the assumption that lower taxation
was preferred by citizen to higher public expenditure.
The Green Paper has been criticized by several authors
on the ground that it does not represent electors' feelings
towards public sector expenditure; this depends, in my
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opinion on the value judgments and, perhaps, political views
of the commentators, elements which are clearly very
difficult to be assessed and rationalized. Anyway, this new
policy view had and is still having important consequences
in public spending administration and it is on these
consequences that ,I think, it is important to concentrate.
As I have already mentioned about 53% of public expenditure
cannot be directly controlled by the central government.
This implies that in order to cut back the whole expenditure
indirect instruments have to be used to induce lower level
spending centers to follow the government's spending cuts.
The effectiveness of these measures highly depends on the
degree of freedom the spending agencies possess and on the
information available to central government on resources,
needs and effective objective of the agencies it is trying
to control.
I will focus my attention on one particular and
controversial aspect of these indirect controls measures
which involves the relationship between central and local
government. In recent years, namely from 1981 onwards,
central government, in order to cut back their expenditure
has continuously changed the way in which grants to local
governments are allocated. While the aim of these devices
was fairly well understood, the effectiveness of these
systems and their implications have not been by now
completely studied.
Most commentators infer from the inability of the grant
system to cut back expenditure its failure, but this
conclusion is, in my opinion, too simplistic. The grant
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system allocation has to be assessed in the more general
context of the relations between central and local
government.
The environment in which Government has to work is a very
difficult one; on one hand, in fact, it has to give local
authorities with a grant sufficient to provide a minimum
level of services is provided; on the other hand it has to
prevent high spending. Those two objective are incompatible,
at least in the short run if local governments are better
informed than the central government about their needs,
preferences and resources. The grant system has to take
account of these circumstances and can be used as a device
to acquire relevant information from local authorities. To
study this very complicated problem, the best way is, I
think to start by studying the underlying model and the
behaviour of the agents involved. Only after this
preliminary study has been carried out it is possible to
compare the optimal theoretical policy with the one observed
and assess it.
The result of this exercise is the main theme of my work and
the main conclusion is that Central Government's behaviour
reflects the underlying problem. The grant system updating
is a signal that Central Government is aware of not
possessing all the relevant information to implement an
optimal policy rule. The system might have failed to reach
its objectives, but what it is important to assess is
whether an optimal alternative solution does exist at all.
The work will be organized as follows:
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Chapter one, after reviewing briefly the economic reasons
for the existence of two level of government will examine
some models aimed at explaining the rationale for the
existence of grants from central to local governments.
I will try to explain why from a theoretical point of view,
some services have to be provided locally. The main reason
is, in my opinion that the local authority is better
Informed than the Central Government about the needs and
preferences of people within each locality.
This causes an asymmetry of information problem in the
Central — Local government relationship. Government has to
take account of this problem in setting the grant system and
this is the main reason why a first best policy cannot be
implemented in this context.
The system of grant has then to take account of this
important element and its effectiveness has to be judged not
only in its aim at reducing expenditure but also as a device
to learn the true preferences and needs of each local
authority. Chapter one ends up with a very simple model that
explain which would be the first best optimal strategy in a
world in which all the agents share the same information.
Chapter two is devoted to a review some of the models
in the asymmetry of information framework while in chapter
three and four I will present the theoretical model. I will
assume that local authorities are utility maximisers and I
will present the grant allocation rule in both a static and
a dynamic framework. At the end of chapter four I will
examine some of the possible failures of the optimal system
5
to reach its objectives due to the assumption of possible
alternative behaviours.
Chapter five deals with the empirical evidence for
local authorities behaviour under different assumptions. The
aim of those empirical estimates is to derive a set of
parameters to test the consistency of the optimal
theoretical model with the actual system by which grants are
allocated. Some tests will be devised for both assessing the
validity of a life cycle behaviour and of some of the
possible behavioural assumptions alternative to standard
utility maximisation.
Chapter six will deal with the summary of all the
Issues by showing how the history of the changes in the
grant system can be interpreted as the response of Central
Government to the asymmetry of information problem it has to
face.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the economic rationale behind
the provision of goods and services by local authorities.
The functions of the public sector are indeed to ensure the
efficient allocation and use of resources, to establish an
equitable distribution of income and to maintain the economy
at a reasonable high level of employment with reasonable
price stability. This analysis takes for granted and accepts
the assignments of tasks between central and local
government as concerns the stabilization policy and the
distribution of income first suggested by Musgrave (1959)
and widely described and justified by Oates (1972). I shall
instead concentrate on the assignment problem as concerns
the efficient allocation of resources with particular
reference to the provision of services. The classical
analysis suggests that with respect to allocation efficiency
a federal state is preferred to a unitary one.
Before examining the different models aimed at
explaining and justifying the rationale for the existence of
different levels of government, it is important to point out
the differences in the economic and political definition of
federal state and federalism. Federal state and fiscal
federalism have a broader meaning in economics than in a
political sense.
While in politics a federal state is characterized by a
federal structure, this is not the case for economics.
In his pioneering study of federalism , Kennet C. Wheare
(1959) defined federalism as:
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the method of dividing powers so that the general and
regional government are each, within a sphere, co—ordinate
and independent.
This definition has been widely used in political studies
which concentrate on the structure of and the relations
between different institutions with different sovereign
powers. For economic modelling this definition is not
suitable since the aim to the analysis is concentrated on
different aspects. Those considerations suggest Oates (1972)
to modify the definition of federal government in the
following way:
"A public sector with both centralized and decentralized
levels of decision—making in which choices made at each
level concerning the provision of public services are
determined largely by demands of those services of the
residents of the respective jurisdiction.
It is clear from this definition that it makes little
difference to the economists whether or not decision—making
at a particular level of government is based on delegated or
constitutionally guaranteed authority.
What matters, in fact, is simply that decisions regarding a
particular jurisdiction reflect to a substantial extent the
characteristics of the constituency of that jurisdiction.
This definition implies that, in economic terms, most, if
not all the systems, are federal such that the problem of
9
fiscal federalism concerns the economists in any country.
1.1 THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALLOCATING RESOURCES.
Musgrave and Oates' analyses place emphasis on the
rationale for the existence of an active role of local
governments in the efficient allocation of resources.
First of all, it is recognized that the local government can
more effectively set up policies to cope with monopolies and
externalities that limit their 	 sphere of action within a
local authority jurisdiction. While both these aspects are
very important in the achievement of a first best Pareto
optimal allocation of resources and have important social
aspects 1 , most of the literature in this area has been
concentrated on the role of local government in providing
public goods and services 2 . I will briefly examine some of
these arguments in turn.
1.1.1 LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS.
Which are the criteria an economist would suggest in
deciding the degree of decentralization in the provision of
a public good? I think that one can agree with Topham's
1 Any environment policy and pollution control device is
clearly more effective at a local rather than central
government level. For reasons that will be clear later,
however, those policies share with the local public goods
problem the same asymmetry of information problem.
2the implicit assumption being that public goods are a kind
of externality in the sense that they cause an externality
on the consumption side.
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suggestion that public goods should be supplied in the
cheapest and most efficient way 3 where by cheapest it is
meant at the smallest resource cost and by efficient it is
meant that public services should be provided according to
consumer's preferences.
As the intuition suggests, pure public goods should be
supplied over as large a population as possible. In this
context I will adopt Samuelson's (1954) definition of public
goods , that is
a pure public good can be defined as a good which is non
rival in consumption and for which exclusion is impossible
or too costly or it is not desirable from a social point of
view.
Such goods are freely available to all who live within the
Jurisdiction boundaries. The more people that contribute to
their costs the better; they reduce the tax bill of other
contributors thereby and anyway the consumption by
additional taxpayers does not detract from the consumption
of these public goods by existing members of the society.
But not all public services are public goods; some are
impure in the sense that they can be crowded and congested;
some others spread their benefits only in a subset area of
the national territory. The more people that share a given
facility which is crowdable, the lower the benefit any
individual derives from it. If this is the case, the
See Topham (1983) pag. 130
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existence of both club and local public goods must be
recognized. In this context a local public good is defined
as follows:
a local public good has the essential characteristics that
it is assumed to be specific to a particular geographical
location. This good spreads its benefits with spatial
restriction and so the benefit is confined to one community
(possibly with some spillover). Given their spatial
restriction most of those goods are con gestable, that is
they are not available at zero cost to new residents.
Two problems arise in this context, namely finding the
optimal size of people to which the congestable good should
be provided and the most efficient way of providing it. In
the next sections I will briefly review the literature on
those aspects.
1.1.2 THEORY OF CLUBS AND OPTIMAL JURISDICTION.
The theory of clubs provides the theoretical
foundations for the study of allocative efficiency for an
important class of impure public goods. Club goods theory
can be used in determining the need for exclusionary zoning,
the efficacy of busing and the optimal size for alliances,
communities and cities. The majority of economic articles
examining clubs have appeared since James Buchanan seminal
piece "An Economic Theory of Clubs" even though the problem
had already been studied by Pigou (1946) and Knight (1924).
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I will show how club theory can be used to derive the
optimal conditions for the provision of local public goods.
Local public goods share with club goods features like the
possibility of being congested and, to some extent, the
exclusiveness even though, while it is possible to exclude
outsider from the benefit of a local public goods it is
difficult to devise methods to exclude insiders at least
from an efficient point of view. To understand this argument
It must be recognized that jurisdictions hardly share with
clubs the voluntary aspect. Clubs are by their nature
voluntary, that is each member decides voluntarily to
participate. Local jurisdictions are fixed in a way and
their participation is to some extent compulsory 4 . Another
important consequence to this analysis of this non perfect
correspondence between clubs and jurisdictions is that local
authorities as set up by Government do not correspond to the
optimal club size as set up by economic theory. This causes
spillover problems among jurisdictions and thus the need for
Central Government intervention in order to correct them. It
is possible to set up a formal model in order to show how
the optimal size problem can be solved. The model I will
present is quite general and it can be used for a large
class of allocation problems with commodities having
different characteristics as we shall see.
4This argument is counterbalanced by the consideration that
people, by moving, can decide which local authority to be
member of such that being a member of a certain jurisdiction
is a voluntary choice.
This intuition lies at the heart of Tiebout's model of
"voting with the feet" i.e. revealing preferences for local
public goods by choosing where to live.
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An heterogeneous community formed by s individuals will be
considered. Heterogeneous community in this context means
that differences in preferences among individuals are
allowed to exist. Only two goods are produced in the
economy, namely:
x which is a private good
y which is a crowdable local public good.
We can define the quantity of a local public good enjoyed by
any individual i as:
Y i  Y
where y is the quantity produced.
Define:
Y.
	
h = E '	 h s s	 since	 E y s sy
	
Y	 i
where s is the number of individual in the community.
h is the congestion index which can be interpreted as a
crowding measure of the good we are examining. This index
determines the degree to which any individual in the " club"
can enjoy the commodity that is produced. High values of
this index decrease the level of utility that each
individual receives from good y.
Utility for the s thindividual can be defined as:
	
U	 = u (x , y , h)
	
8	 8 8	 8
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>0U,
x 8
h = E
Y.1
Y
the model is closed.
i = 1, s
U" <0
x8
Ti' > 0	 U" < 0I,	 Y
8	 8
U P  0h
Only two goods, as I have already pointed out are produced
in this economy. The production function in this simplified
economy is assumed to be:
F(x,y) = 0
This is an implicit production function that relates the two
goods produced and assures by definition that production is
efficient.
By using the definition of private goods, namely:
x = E x .	 i = 1, s
1
and the public congestionable definitions:
y i  Y
By using the Pareto optimal definition of equilibrium, i.e.
a point for which it is impossible to increase the utility
of an individual without decreasing the utility of someone
else in the economy we can solve our problem and find the
optimal conditions by a standard lagrangean technique i.e.
by maximising the utility of the s thindividual subject to
the conditions previously stated and the further constraint
that the utility of all other individual are not decreasing.
The formal setting will be:
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Max U (x, y, h)8	 8
subject to:
U (x ,y .,h) = U j = 1 , s-1
J
The Lagrangean for this problem can be written as:
	
s-1
— 	s
L = U +E al U . — u,(x., y., h) 1+ I3(x - E x.)
8	 J	 J	 J	 J	 J	 11	 1
8	 8 y.
yE X. ( — y ) — p F(x, y) —p (h —E
The First Order Conditions for this problem can be written
as:
a u
a L =	 8
13 = 0
a x	 a X8	 8
a u .
a L =	 1a	 /3 = 0	 i * s
a x. • i ax
1	 i
	
a u	 Pa L	 8
	
= a y
	 A + - =0
a y . 
	 .	 s	 y
	
a u	 Pa L	 i
= a	 A ±— = 0	 i 0 s
a y i	 i
	
a y	 i	 yi
a u	 2_ I	 a u i
a L	 8
=	 +	 ai ä h	 p = 0a h	 a h
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i =1
= 0
s — h
a u
a x
a u
a h
a u .
a x .1
a u
a yi
a F
a y
a F
a x
111z
a F
= p - p a x
a L = 7 x	 a F P	
Y 1.
a y	 i-,	 i —P ay	 2
r
h	 a F
=Ex  — p	 — Pi	 Y	 ay
a L
a x = Y — Y.
From these conditions and assuming a s = 1 we can
derive that:
a L
a x
and:
a u
	
a u
a h	 a h
a u.a u s	 a 
u 1
a x
	
a x . 		 a x.
8	 1	 1
From the Arrow — Entoven conditions we can derive
that:
A . (y — y i ) = 0
and that can be the case if:
i) A.
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a Fa ui
a y i
a u i
a x .1
[31
(s—h)
a u iE ayi
ä u.1
a x i
ay
_
a F
ax
ii) y = y i
Let us examine the second case first. If y i = y this implies
that h = $ and the model will give the usual Samuelsonian
condition. The interpretation of those conditions is,
however, a bit different. In this case each individual has
not a full use of the public good since y i s y . The
congestable aspect of the public good reduces the utility
that each individual can enjoy from it but it does not
affect the marginal optimal conditions since at the margin
there is not congestion cost.
If X = 0i
a u .
au	 1i
=
au	 au
a x .	 a x1	 i
by substituting into [1]
by using the previous conditions we can finally write:
[2]
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a u
a y
a F
a y
a F
a x
; i = 1,2, -,s	 [4]
a u
a x
This model can be interpreted in terms of the
utilization rate, h and in terms of' the number of
individuals that are allowed to use a certain facility. If
It is interpreted in terms of utilization rate the model
suggests that any individual will use this facility up to
the point at which his marginal utility from using it is
equal to the marginal cost.
If we want to interpret the model in terms of optimal
size club number, we can write that
	
a u .	 a F	 a u.	 a u.
	
1	 1	 1
a y i	 ä y	a
y.	 a yi
s 
	
8u	
_	 +
a F	 8 u 	 + h 	
	
.	 a u
	
i	 1	 1
a x
	
a x 	a x	 a x.
	
i	 i	 1
The left hand side element is the marginal gain in utility,
evaluated in terms of marginal utility of the private good
of the marginal member derived from club inclusion and this
element is expected to be nonnegative. The right hand side
Is represented by the marginal cost resulting from the
entrant's entire utilization of the shared good in which the
first term is the reallocation of the private good required
to maintain the private good's marginal benefit to the
entrant both before and after membership and the second
element is the associated crowding cost. It is as well
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clear that in this model h can be also interpreted as an
a u .
index of rivalness of the good. If	 = 0, from [1] we
a h
have the usual condition that the good is a pure public
good, while if h = 1 the good is a private one.
This simplified example shows that when goods can be
congested or their benefits are spatially restricted it is
optimal to provide them to a restricted number of
individuals. This is the usual argument used to justify
local provision of local public goods. While it is evident
from this model that the optimal size of the "club" can be
different from the nation-wide population the model does not
imply that those goods and services have to be provided by
decentralized rather than central governments. The club
theory provides the optimal club size but does not imply
that it would be more efficient to provide the goods by some
peculiar institution within the club. The club theory is
just the starting point for the development of the federal
theory in the provision of goods and services.
As I have shown in the previous analysis the club theory is
consistent with the hypothesis of different tastes among
individuals in the same community. This observation offers
the first justification for the federalism.
Assume that government treats individuals within the nation
boundaries equally, regardless of tastes and income. If
those services are either crowdable or restrict their
benefits to a peculiar area there is room for a second level
government whose size should correspond to the optimal
facility club size. In fact, if Government provides an
20
average level of the public crowdable good in any
jurisdiction, this policy cannot be Pareto maximising, i.e.
the provision of output in each jurisdiction is not Pareto
efficient given that tastes for that good vary across
jurisdictions.
This is very briefly the underlying theory of the
decentralization theorem as stated by W. Oates:
"For a public good — the consumption of which is defined
over a geographical subset of the total population, and for
which the costs of providing each level of output of the
good in each Jurisdiction are the same for the central and
the respective local government — it will always be more
efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments
to provide the Pareto Efficient levels of output for their
respective Jurisdictions than for the central government to
provide any specified and uniform level of output across all
Jurisdictions"
The central point of the previous analysis relies on
the assumption that the Central Government will provide the
same level of output in each jurisdiction. This assumption
is sometimes justified on very naive grounds or on a median
voter approach. I think that a more comprehensive model
which takes account of all aspects I have been presenting
can now be developed. I will show what is the rationale
behind the average level production and that under quite
reasonable assumptions the provision of public goods by
local authorities is preferred from an efficient point of
21
view to the Central Government provision.
1.1.3 STIGLER'S APPROACH.
In his seminal article in 1955	 Stigler discussed the
rationale for the existence of different levels of
government and clearly stated the criteria to be followed in
assigning tasks to the different levels of government. In
Stigler's view the system of local government can be seen
as a competitive market in which different firms ( the local
authorities) produce different goods( public goods, services
and regulatory policies) for the market. The market in
Stigler view is not confined within the boundary of a
jurisdiction since people are allowed to move freely within
the boundaries of a country. Stigler focuses his attention
on the reasons why some polices are ineffective at local
government level and points out three major reasons:
a) in the context of regulatory polices, when the object of
such a policy can be nullified by the competition of
other local authorities which do not apply the same
policy. If mobility among jurisdictions is possible, in
fact, people can avoid to adapt to any rule by moving to
those localities which do not apply it.
b) when the source of revenue of the activity can escape
financial responsibility by migration to another unit. In
analogy with a perfect competitive market in which firms
are price takers any local authority cannot successfully
adopt a price discrimination policy in the provision of
services; it does not have, in other words, the ability
22
to redistribute income.
The reason for this failure depends on the purely
competitive organization of local services which would
make impossible for a local government to obtain money
from the rich to pay for the services provided to the
poor, except to the extent that the rich voluntarily
assumes this burden. While in Pauly model this was made
possible by the assumption of an altruistic function and
a fixed community of people5 , if people can freely move
it is best to assign to central government the role of
redistribution.
c) when the policy is incapable of efficient performance
upon a local scale. This argument is to some extent
similar to the problem of economies of scale in a private
industry. In this respect it is efficient to provide at a
national level those services which are indivisible such
as, for example, a wide range of public goods; some
services have to be provided at national level if their
implementation requires the coordination between
different authorities and that could be, for example, the
case for transport.
In all other cases it would be more efficient to provide a
service at local level rather than a central one. The reason
for this conclusion depends on the assumption of the
underlying model that Stigler had in mind, namely that
individuals could freely move across Jurisdictions without
5In Pauly model it is also assumed that people cannot move
across Jurisdictions: they have to live near the poor people
and this decreases their utility.
23
that the argument for federalism would appear to
existence of a particular kind of uncertainty.
any cost or constraint and that they were perfectly informed
about the different services provided by different local
authorities.
Tresh interprets and formalizes Stigler's model in a
very appealing way. Following Stigler's approach he suggests
the local government is
of the people living in
is not. This assumption
it is almost impossible
require the
The model
assumption that while
well informed about the preferences
its jurisdiction, central government
is quite reasonable in a way since
to think that at a national level
that I will present is based on the
the preferences of people in any community are perfectly
known. Someone could probably argue that also local
authorities cannot be perfectly informed about citizens'
needs but it cannot be denied that they could be better
informed than the center.
In Stigler's model jurisdictions, like firms in the
private markets are in competition and this assures that the
marginal benefit from services being equal to the marginal
cost. This argument is analogous to Tiebout's hypothesis of
"voting with the feet", that is to choose to locate in the
jurisdiction offering the preferred basket of local public
goods is quite evident. Even in a world with no perfect
mobility and preference revelation problems I think that the
assumption of local jurisdiction being perfectly informed
can be interpreted as an extreme simplifying hypothesis to
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represent local authorities being better informed about
local needs.
The model can be developed as such:
—society is faced with the problem of providing the optimal
amount of a local public good. For exposition clarity
suppose that this public good has to be supplied only in a
certain region, that is only a subset of the population
wants it.
—
All the other goods are private and there is no other
problem requiring government intervention for allocating
reasons.
—
The distribution of income is optimal and it is determined
at a national level.
In a first best world of perfect certainty either the
national government or a local jurisdiction comprising
individuals of a m subgroup with:
6
m = 1,g
could provide the proper level of the public good which can
be labelled x .
s
The optimal quantity to be provided will be determined
In accordance with the standard First Order Conditions:
s
z m
MRS x ,I	 = MRTx , 1
s	 s
61.e. the subgroup comprises g persons.
[
Li NIVERS1
OF YORK
LIBRARY
m=1
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where 1 is the purely private good.
Suppose however that the local jurisdiction knows its
citizens well in the sense that it can determine any
on
individual	 MRSx, 1 with perfect certainty whereas the
g
national government knows each of these people less well in
the sense that he observes each individual's MRSX,1as a
g
random variable:
m	 m
MRSg,1= MRSg,1	 +a
where a is a random variable with E (a) = (3 or, possibly, 0
Under these conditions the social welfare will be
maximised, in general by having the local jurisdiction form
and decide the appropriate level of x g rather than letting
the national government determine x according to theg
F.O.C.:
g., m
Z
MRS X , 1	 = MRT g, 1
g
m=1
If (3  0 the government rule is clearly biased, implying
—
either over or under provision of X. Even if a= 0, however,g
so that MRSX ,1 1s an unbiased estimate of' the true marginalg
rate of substitution a risk averse society will prefer local
provision of x so long as the subset m = 1, g is smallg
enough to violate the population condition of the ARROW LIND
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theorem. Expressed in form of indirect utility function:
m (-,	 "1	)g • I , xV	 g >
 E [mV (-g) , Im ,x— j ]g
Assuming risk aversion, person m would be willing to pay a
risk premium for local rather than national provision.
Proponents of federalism could have this type of uncertainty
in mind when they argue that local governments best know the
Interests of their own citizens. The sheer geographic
distance from the central government of most of the people
within a given society is bound to affect adversely the
transmission of information thus the need for providing
services at a local basis.
2. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF GRANT PROVISION.
After describing the main reasons why some services
have to be provided at a local government level, I will now
deal with another important problem which is related to the
issue of subsidies from central to local government. The
theory I have reviewed so far does not provide any insights
about the need and the extent of local public expenditure
finance. Had we to apply the benefit principle as put forth
by Musgrave it would seem that local governments should
raise the money necessary to provide services using their
own resources, that is by local taxation and loans.
This argument, however, is not so straightforward and
does not consider the issue in all its aspects. As I have
27
already pointed out,the political jurisdiction 7 is seldom
exactly identified with the "optimal" economic jurisdiction.
This cause	 benefits inflows and outflows of which local
authorities should take account when defining the optimal
quantity of local public goods to be provided 8The
literature suggests some reasons why grants to local
authorities should be provided:
— grants designed to encourage sub central authorities to
take account of external effects of their services
(spillover grants).
— grants designed to correct fiscal imbalances between the
various tiers of governments (revenue sharing grants).
—horizontal equalization grants.
My discussion will be merely concentrated on the
economic reasons behind the provision of grants without
stressing on the different ways grants can be given (either
in lump — sum form or as a price subsidy i.e. in matching
grant form) and the different effects they can have on
expenditure 9 .
7that is the local authority as set up by the central
government.
8The non perfect correspondence between political and
economic jurisdiction causes an externality problem. The
grant provided to correct for spillover is then given to
make local authorities internalize this externality.
9These issues will be, in fact treated at length in chapter
three and four.
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2.1 GRANTS TO CORRECT FOR SPILLOVERS.
This section considers grants designed to encourage
local authorities to take account of any external effect
their services may generate on other jurisdictions.
Since the optimal jurisdiction in economic terms seldom
corresponds to the "political jurisdiction" 10 it is possible
for an authority services to spill out benefits to citizens
in other areas and vice versa. The local authority, by
taking account of the benefits to its own citizens does not
provide the optimal quantity of local public good. In the
previous section I showed that optimality requires the
following condition:
	
a u .	 ä u.
	
1	 1
s — h
	
a y i	
+ 	 	
a h
	
a u .	 a u .
	
1	 Y Z
	
1
	
a x .	 a x .
	
1	 1
be satisfied. It is clear from this formula that the optimal
amount of good y to be supplied is equal to the sum of
marginal benefits from using y adjusted by the number of
people using the facility and the degree of congestion.
Suppose that, although the local public good is used by
s individuals the local authority which has to provide this
0.
facility is formed by s < s individuals.
10The reason for this non correspondence arise from the
different goals that economics and politics have and in the
consideration that in real world local authorities provide a
considerable amount of services with their own peculiar
characteristics as concern benefit spread and congestion.
T
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A8
(s — s) —
+ 	
In this case the quantity of good y provided by this
locality will be pushed up to the point were:
au.	 ,•	 a u.
s - h
a y,	 a h
	  + 	
a u. •
	
au
i =i a xi
Since the local public good spreads his benefits to an
optimal population s, it is clear that good y will be under
provided because the locality under exam mistakenly
understate the marginal benefits of that good. Such a
mistake is equal to:
a x
a u.	 a F
ä h	 a y
a u . 	 a F
a x. ax
In order to encourage this locality to provide the optimal
quantity of the public good, it is necessary to provide it
with a grant that will reduce its effective marginal rate of
transformation thus encouraging an increase in the
production of y. The problem can in theory be solved by
using a grant and in the following discussion I will use a
matching grant. The analysis I will present is simplified by
assuming that the only type of externality in the economy is
represented by a non correspondence between optimal
population size and political jurisdiction; this externality
is confined to only one region and there is only one public
good to be provided; no interactions between different sub
governments will be considered.
If those assumptions are relaxed "specifying an efficient
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set of subsidies could become a monstrously complicated
problem, although still conceptually soluble" 11 .
This extremely simplified case is then just an example of
how a matching grant could be used to bring local
authorities to an efficient level of' provision.
2.1.1 THE OPTIMAL MATCHING GRANT
Suppose that a grant meets a fraction g of the cost of
producing y. The new optimal conditions will be given by:
a F
ay
where G = g	
a F
a x
It is possible to show that g to make the local authority
provide the optimal quantity of y will be:
11 See Oates, 1972 ,pag. 120
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g can be interpreted as the fraction of the total marginal
valuation of y attributable to outsiders and represent the
subsidy that must be offered to local authorities to
perceive correctly the benefits of the services they
provide.
The previous analysis shows that determining the right
level of grants is not a quite straightforward matter. In
order to set up the optimal grant provision the central
government should know the production function of each local
public good and the indifference map of the sub central
authority. While the assumption of knowing the production
function a priori can be reasonable, it is clear from the
discussion put forth in the previous section that the
indifference map of each locality can hardly be known with
precision by the central government. Indeed, as I have
argued before, it is the quite reasonable assumption that
the marginal rates of substitution are not well known at a
central level that makes it efficient to provide local
services at a local level. This at least implies that "a
lengthy trial and error process is necessary to fix the
grant to the efficient level" 12 .
The use of grants to correct for spillovers is consistent
with Pigou's analysis and recommendations when dealing with
externalities. Coase (1960) has suggested that externalities
( of which spillovers are just an example) can be optimally
solved by using a voluntary bargaining scheme between the
12See King (1984) p. 136
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affected parties. The gainers from external benefits are the
A
(s — s) people living in other authorities who have an
Incentive to bribe the producers ( the local authority) to
supply more, until the Pareto optimum point is reached. This
suggestion is based on two very strict assumptions:
a) the bargaining process is developed at no cost;
b) participants are willing to reveal their true preferences
without indulging in strategic behaviour.
While those two conditions can be probably met when few
authorities are involved in the process for large sets of
the population decision processes can be very expensive and
a strategic behaviour in order to free ride is observed and
for those reasons I think the Coasian approach could not be
used to solve the spillover problem.
2.2 GRANTS TO CORRECT FOR VERTICAL IMBALANCE.
A broad purpose of grants is to compensate grantees for
any mismatch there may be between their aggregate current
expenditure needs on the one hand and their aggregate tax
raising capacity on the other hand; such a mismatch is
sometimes termed vertical fiscal imbalance. Expenditure of
local authorities shows an upward trend depending on
different causes;to give a flavour of these different
arguments we can recall Niskanen and Machay and Weaver study
and Baumol' disease. On the resources side, however, while
central authorities' revenue is usually raised in forms of
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13buoyant	 taxes, local authorities sources of revenue, at
least if the British case is considered 14 are mainly taxes
which lack buoyancy.In order to finance the increased
expenditure local property tax rate has to be increased and,
money illusion makes the electors feel the local tax bill
Increases to an unsustainable level. To correct for this
vertical fiscal imbalance different systems can be
envisaged. I will recall here the Domestic tax relief
introduced in England in the sixties and the tax base
sharing. The domestic tax relief was a grant aimed at
keeping domestic rates at an acceptable level; the tax base
sharing allows local authorities to share with the central
government the buoyant tax on income. By this system a
percent of revenue raised with income tax is redistributed
to local authorities, often on the basis of the so called
derivation principle 15 . This system is widely used in
federal governments 16 whose different history is then
reflected in the way they are financed.
13By buoyancy it is meant the property of a tax to increase
Its revenue when income goes up. The progressive tax on
Income is just the most common example.
In Britain up to April 1990 the main form of local taxes is
represented by a property tax. With the new fiscal year the
rates introduced in 1601 will be replaced by a per capita
tax the so called "community charge".
15The derivation principle links the percent taxation
redistributed to the contribution of each region in raising
the total amount of taxes collected at central level.
16I have here implicitly used a political definition of
federal government.
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2.3 GRANTS TO ACHIEVE HORIZONTAL EQUITY
The final class of grants I am considering are widely
used to neutralize either partially or wholly any
differences that may arise in tax resources or spending
needs between different areas of a nation. Following Pigou's
suggestion everybody should be treated the same if they
happen to be in the same situation. Discriminating on the
ability to pay by charging people using the same service
different sum of money is plausible, but it does not seem
fair that citizens should be charged differently according
to where they live. A difference in charge across
authorities can arise for the following main reasons:
a) per capita resources of different localities may differ.
b) expenditure needs may differ.
In this case Central Government intervention is sought for
equity reasons and it is argued that a grant has to be given
to local authorities in the form of a matching grant aimed
at reducing the unit cost of providing services.
The multi level system of government has thus developed
a great debate among local public finance experts about
which is the best form by which grants should be distributed
and the problem is still unresolved. In Britain a unitary
grant has usually been adopted, even though a great debate
exists about the actual form of it. Unitary grants
compensate simultaneously for inequalities in tax bases and
inequities in the local need to spend by a system that
distributes a large amount of the resources to local
authorities with low tax base, high tax effort and high
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expenditure needs such that each local authority will be
able to spend the same proportion of resources on a given
service for the same level of service performance.
I will not go in further detail on the technical
aspects of unitary grant since I think it should be clear
from the previous discussion that a quite important gap
exists between the theory justifying local governments
existence and actual grant distribution. While it is
recognized that local governments do exist because they are
better informed about preferences and needs, the actual
implementation of the system usually assumes that Central
Government can observe all the relevant parameters to
allocate grants. In the next three chapters I will try
instead to model the optimal grant system in an asymmetry of
information framework, the most appropriate to deal with the
problem.
The different models I will present in chapter three and
four are linked to the "principal and agent literature" with
particular reference to transmission of information optimal
mechanisms. This area is quite new and has received a great
deal of attention in recent years. I will summarize the main
issues and the most important contributions in chapter two.
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CHAPTER TWO
1. INTRODUCTION
A large and interesting class of problems in economics
involve delegated choices in which one individual or one
organization has the responsibility for taking decisions in
the interest of one or more others. A usual claim in
economics is that everything works because each agent
realises that he could not do better for himself than by
accepting the ruling settings and maximising his objective
function using those constraints.
Of course, this is only true under certain carefully
specified conditions: no one agent may, for example, have a
significant effect on the trading opportunities of others.
Under those circumstances it is argued that not only are
markets 1 efficient and the amount of information required
in the economic system to work efficiently is very low - no
one needs to know or care about the intentions, constraints
or information pertaining to anybody else - and they insure
that the information is truthful - no one else has the
incentive to pretend that his preferences are different to
what are in actual fact revealed to be.
On the other hand markets do not "work" in some important
cases. Problems, for example, arise if one agent's action
gives rise to externalities or if there are "large" non
convexities in the system.
This work will be focused on the incentive problem,
1 The term market is here used in a very broad sense; it
extends to any kind of relationship involving different
economic units.
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that is on situations in which individuals transact their
business in such a way as to create an incentive to
misrepresent important aspects of their own characteristics
on their actions, The essence of the incentive problem which
I shall examine here is a kind of master—servant
relationship, the type of relationship that may exist
between a patient and his private physician, a firm and its
employee, an insurance firm and their clients or a central
planning board and its satellite agencies. As it is clear
from these examples, a wide range of economic problems fit
this framework. As Cowell (1988) points out, "those
circumstances should not be the cue for throwing up hands in
despair". Private or government agencies can take steps to
protect their interests if markets do not work and can
formulate schemes to circumvent these problems.
Designing a good system of incentives is a problems that has
been recognized for a long time. In principle such a system
ought to encourage them for carrying out socially desirable
policies. In the next sections I will review some of the
common solutions offered by the literature to the asymmetry
of information problem.
2. INCENTIVE MODELS.
The common feature which links together all the
"incentive" models is the presence of a master — servant 2
2In this first part I shall refer to the model as
master — servant relationship to stress the difference between
this broader class of models and the principal and agent
literature.
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relationship in which the roles of the two parties have to
be clearly specified. The master has a specific purpose he
wants to achieve and has the power to devise rules for the
servant in order to achieve his purpose. An objective
function to be maximised is the usual representation of the
master's problem. The master, however, has to choose between
a bounded set of optimizing rules, i.e. he cannot choose any
rules he likes. There are two basic reasons why the set of
rules is bounded:
a) he does not have all the information that would give him
a completely free hand;
b) the servant is not a slave, that is his cooperation must
be obtained voluntarily.
In economic terms this means that the servant has his own
objective function whose arguments can differ from the
master's objective function. The servant is also allowed to
have some freedom of action. Essentially he may choose
whether or not to take up the deal on the term offered by
the master: in most models this element is represented by a
minimum reservation utility level that must be granted to
the servant in any event. This participation constraint
limits the set of enforceable rules that the master may
choose to lay down and in some extreme cases it is itself
the cause. for the presence of "market failures".
When dealing with incentive problems, great care should be
devoted to explain how information is spread throughout the
model because the principal classification method for models
dealing with incentive schemes derives either from the kind
of information asymmetry (i.e. where the information
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asymmetry arises, what are the elements that are not known
by both parties) or the time information is available to the
"informed" party. This review is organized by focusing on
the first of these two aspects.
According to Cowell (1986) and using the asymmetry of
information as classifying aspect it is possible to
distinguish between:
1) Private information models.
2) Unseen action models.
Private information models (otherwise called "adverse
3
selection"	 models) reflect situations in which the servant
knows something that could be kept hidden from the master.
Even if this private knowledge is announced, it is always
possible for the servant to give a misrepresentation to his
own advantage as long as the servant is relatively sure that
the master will not be able to discover his cheating.
Unseen action models (otherwise called principal —
agent models) reflect situations in which we can suppose
that some action taken by the servant cannot be directly
observed: what can be observed is the outcome which is
determined in part by the unseen action and in part by
random events independent of the action taken by the
servant.
In	 this	 case	 exogenous	 uncertainty	 (not jut	 the
3 The term adverse section is here borrowed from insurance
market studies and it is intended to apply to situations in
which one party has got some information relevant to the
optimisation process of other economic subjects but it is
his selfish interest not to discover it.
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misrepresentation that is endogenous to the problem) has an
essential role to play since otherwise:
—
the master could deduce the action from the observed
outcome;
—
the problem would essentially be reduced to the "private
knowledge" case since the servant would know the relation
between actions and outcomes but the master would not.
The master is facing a true moral hazard problem. The
failure to induce the "optimal" effort level by the servant
derives solely from his limited ability to monitor the
servant's effort. This problem is often referred to as the
"principal and agent" problem.
The standard distinction between private knowledge and
unseen action model is not, I think, the most useful one
because it does not focus the attention on the problem of
information asymmetry which characterizes these models. Most
of the differences between models and the results that can
be derived depend, in fact, on the time at which the
informed party acquires the information relevant to the
problem; it is thus more useful to follow this second
classification.
Strong and Walker (1987) classify the different
situations that can arise with reference to information. The
different types of models are then distinguished according
to the timing and distribution of information between the
principal and the agent. I have summarized their
classification in table one.
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DI STRIBUTION
Private to the agent 	 Public
A	 B
C	 D
E	 F
G	 H
Pre contract
Pre effort -
pre payoff
Pre effort
Post effort
post payoff
TABLE ONE
This classification is fairly general since it can
gather together private knowledge and unseen action models:
by using this scheme the differences between the two
situations will depend on the role played by the agent.
If agents are "active" in the Laffont - Maskin (1980)
definition the model will be labelled a "principal and agent
problem in the Cowell definition; on the other hand when the
agent's role is confined to sending signals, the model will
be labelled a "private information problem". This approach
is quite useful since it highlights the role that timing and
distribution of information plays in the results obtained
using different models. Timing and distribution are key
elements in the asymmetry of information literature.
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Indeed the possibility of forcing the agent to reveal his
private information, 4 essentially depends on the assumptions
about the timing of information 5 . This is the reason why
the private information literature, being confined to type A
models in which the agent has pre—contractual information
which has to pass onto the principal does not offer first
best solutions. Even though risk aversion 6 might play an
important role, it is timing that does not allow us to
achieve a first best solution. This point will be made clear
by reviewing the different models.
This survey will be largely confined to two party
static games, that is the framework will be one in which
there will be only one principal and only one agent. The
model I will be using to describe the relationship between
central and local government is an extension to a dynamic
framework of a private knowledge model, but since in the
peculiar case I will present dealing in a dynamic context
does not add relevant difficulties to handling the problem,
I have preferred to explain all the models in a static
context where comparing the different methods of dealing
with the asymmetry problem comes more easy. I shall explain
why in the different models the information asymmetry arises
and under which circumstances optimal incentive structures
might be devised to overcome the problem. I will first
4thus allowing the possibility of achieving a first—best
Pareto optimal allocation.
5This is the reason why most of those "special cases" can
only be applied in a principal and agent framework.
6In the Arrow — Pratt definition.
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present the optimal solution in a world with perfect
certainty and then I will show how the optimal conditions
change according to the assumptions on the amount and timing
of information.
2.1 PRINCIPAL AND AGENT THEORY.
In this first part of the review I will concentrate on
models in which the agent has an active role. I will review
models labelling them "principal and agent" but it should be
borne in mind that some of those model could fit into the
private knowledge literature depending on the classification
scheme adopted.
Principal and agent theory is intended to apply to any
situations with the following structure: one individual
called the agent (A) must choose some action from a given
set of actions {xi. The particular outcome Y which results
from his choice depends also on which element from a given
state of the world actually prevail at the relevant time, so
that uncertainty is intrinsic to the situation. The outcome
Y generates utility to a second individual, the principal,
denoted by P.
A contract is to be defined under which P makes a payment to
A in exchange for his effort. A's utility depends both on
this payment and on the value of the action X. It is usually
assumed that the principal P has a Von Newmann—Morgenster
utility function U(Y — S) which is not directly dependent on
the state of the world that will prevail and which is
bounded and continuously differentiable to any required
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order. In particular U'>0 and U"<0 so that the risk loving
behaviour is ruled out. In general, in order to simplify the
matter risk neutrality is assumed, i.e. 	 U"= 0. The agent
is generally postulated to have a Newmann Morgenster
utility function depending on the reward received and his
effort. In general the agent's utility function can then be
written as U(S,x) with U'> 0	 ; U" s 0 U' < 0 ;	 U" >S	 8	 X	 X
0. The agent, like the principal can be either risk averse
or risk neutral. The main purpose of principal-agent theory
is to characterize the optimal contract under various
assumptions about the information P and A possess or can
acquire and thereby to explain the characteristics of such
contracts which are actually observed. The main goal for the
principal is thus to set up an optimal strategy among the
different possibilities opened to him. Optimality of a
strategy is here defined relative to the information the
agent has at the time the strategy is used. This information
can also be different from the initial information as it is
signalled by the agent; this aspect is particularly
important in a context where there is one principal and many
agents or in a dynamic situation but it is worth to remember
this point in this context as well in order to see how these
models work.
All the individuals playing an active role in these models
are assume to update their beliefs about unobservable
parameters by using Bayesian rules and the sequence of past
signals of other agents. Using this definition of optimal
strategies we define a perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept
for any mechanism. A mechanism in this context is defined as
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a set of rules which specify the game to be played by agents
in allocating resources and a specification of how
allocation is determined given the plays of agents during
the game.
Equilibrium allocations of mechanisms are allocations which
depend on the actual, realized values of the parameters of
the environment. Preferences orderings of agents over
mechanisms therefore are naturally defined using expected
utilities, based on the initial information structure.
Efficient mechanisms are defined as mechanisms which cannot
be improved upon by the set of all agents.
The central assumption characterizing those models is
that the payment schedule can depend only upon variables
which both parties can observe. In formal terms, the problem
can be set up as follows:
MODEL ONE
Define:
Y = output
S = reward to the agent
x= effort of the agent
a = random variable
y(x,a) = production technology
Without serious loss of generality the set of states of the
world (a) is given the closed unit interval [0,1]. It is
assumed that y(x,a) is continuously differentiable to any
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required order with 7y'	 •x  0	 y"s 0	 and, for
X
convenience,	 y' > 0 so that higher values of a representa
more productive states.
The principal's problem is to fix an output target yi
for the state i and a reward S i for the agent that is
optimal under the previous definition. The utility function
of the agent is here defined in very general terms as:
U(S,x).
Utility is assumed , as I have already pointed out, top be
increasing in S:
a u
	
a 
2
U
as
	 >0	
a s 2
	 <0
and decreasing in x:
a u
	
a
2
U
a x
	 <0	
a x 
2 <0
The utility function for the principal is represented by;
U = E(Y, ․ ) =	 p. U(Y. — S.)
Lf	 1	 1	 1
where p i is the probability of ai.
In the principal and agent literature it is usually assumed
that A knows his effort x and can observe Y and a.
P is assumed to know the technology process, 	 y(x,a), the
utility of the agent, U(S i ,x i ) and can observe the outcome,
Y. The differences in the different models proposed by the
Sy' refers to the first derivative of y w.r.t. x. This
X
notation is used for the other derivative if not otherwise
stated.
since E p i = 1
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literature	 arise	 on the	 timing	 and	 the	 additional
information that P is assumed to have or to observe.
2.1.1 THE PRINCIPAL KNOWS x OR a.
The first class of problems I will review corresponds
to type D models in table 1. It is important to start with
those models since the assumptions about the timing of
information in this special case will allow us to highlights
what are the consequences of information asymmetry. I will
start by assuming that P can observe either x or a. In this
case P is always able to deduce the other ex post; an
optimal solution can be found since there is no information
asymmetry problem here. To make this point clear consider
the solution of mode one under the hypothesis that the
principal knows the effort x of the agent. In this case it
is always possible for the principal to set up an optimal
contract by defining a set of state contingent Y. as to
secure the agent a minimum utility level in each state .
To stress the importance of this point suppose that the
effort x for the agent has been fixed to x° and consider how
the reward to the agent should be set up.
The principal's objective in this model is to maximise the
expected value of his own utility subject to the constraint
that the reward the agent receives produces a nonnegative
utility. It is clear from this model that a first best
solution can be reached in this case and no incentive
problem arises. The formal proof is as follows: by assuming
that P knows x, x can be fixed to an arbitrary level x°
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and the optimal solution is found solving the following
maximisation problem:
Max	 p . U (Y - S . )i
S.t. U A(S , x°)	 0
S i  0
The Lagrangean for the problem can be written as:
=Z	 Up i LIP y(x°,ai ) -	 +	 p . A (S , x°) - 0
The First Order Conditions can be summarized as follows:
a
a) =	 PU P: [ Y(x 0 , a ) - S i + p. u it '(s i , x°)8
a S
a
u
Ab) (Si , x°)
a p
p is the conventional Lagrange multiplier which is
independent from a.
Condition (a) implies that:
U P ' y(x°,a ) - S
1
U A  (S i , x°)s 1
p is always positive then the second constraint must be
satisfied as an equality which means that the agent receives
his reservation utility in each state of the world. Since
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U' (cx.
 j)
U' (a.)
a
the effort S is fixed and independent of the state of the
world that will happen.
At the optimum:
U P, y(x°,a ) - S U A ' (SS• x°)
1
P
U	 '
s
oy(x	 ,cx ,) - S	 U
A
' (S
s	 j
jJ
, X()
which can be rewritten, using a simpler notation as:
The implications of this condition is that both P and
a's marginal rates of substitution between two states are
equal. Rees (1985) investigates extensively this case and
gives insights into optimal output sharing given different
assumptions about the risk attitudes of the parties. I will
Instead immediately introduce the case in which both x and S
are to be chosen optimally.
To simplify the matters I will assume that x is to be chosen
before the state of the world a is known so that it will
not depend upon it. In this case, a first best Pareto
optimal action x for A and an associated optimal payment
schedule S will be then defined for any state of the world.
The contract between P and A would then specify the schedule
S in exchange for A choosing x. A does have an incentive to
cheat on the contract and given that he will receive S he
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will be able to choose some x = x * . However, if P can
costless observe x then the contract can contain a forcing
clause to make it sufficient unattractive for A to cheat.
If P can observe x, the previous maximisation problem can be
rewritten as:
Max	 p. UP (Y — S. )
S 1	 1, x
s.t. U
A (S , X ° )  0
The Lagrangean for the problem can be written as:
=	 p i
 u[ 	 — S i ] +	 p.	 U A (Si , x i ) — 0 ]
and the First Order Conditions can be summarized as follows:
a
a)
b)1
= — p	 U P:
u
A	 (S .	 ,
y(x,a i )
x . )
— p U A ' (S	 ,	 x.)
as
a z
a p
a
c	 )1 — p .	 U P '	 y(x ,a )	 —x S y(x i ,a i p U
A
“S ,X.)
xi	 ia x
Again p is positive and independent from a then the agent
receives his reservation utility in each state.
Condition a 1 ) implies that:
U P ' y(x i ,a ) — is
p
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U P ' y(x ,oc i ) — S.)s. U
A (S. , x.)
s
U' ((X.)
P	 1
U' (a.)
a
U' (a
p	 j) U' (aa	 j)
then at the optimum:
(2a)
U P ' y(x .,a .) — S .) 	 UA'. (S j , x .)
J
which can be rewritten, using a simpler notation as:
Summing up c 1 ) for i leads to the following expression:
[p . U P J y(x ,a. ) — S .) y ' (x ,a )+ pt. U A '(S ,	 )] =0 (3)iiix 	 x	 1	 1	 x	 1	 i
Since p i
 is independent of the utility I can rewrite the
previous expression as 9 :
[ u ' [ 	 ,a i ) — S i	y' (x ,a )+ p.	 U'' (S., x	 =0 (4)x 	 i	 x.
which can be rewritten as:
[ U P ' y(x)) y'+ P. U A '(x)] =0	 (4a)X .	1
The optimal conditions (2a) and (4a) can be interpreted as
before: the new element is represented by condition (4a)
which relates to the optimal choice of x and can be
since E p i = 1
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interpreted as follows: in any state of the world
U'Ey(x)]*y 1 can be interpreted as the marginal value product
of x measured in terms of P's utility. U 1 (x)*p can be
interpreted as the marginal cost measured in terms of P's
utility. At the optimum the usual condition that the
marginal cost should be equal to the product value holds and
in this context it can be written as:
ply (x )11,y1(x)
P.
(x)
p can be interpreted as how much P has to give up in terms
of his utility to yield A one extra unit of this utility
(this is, in fact the marginal rate of substitution); 1.P(x)
gives the quantity of utility A would like to receive to
supply the marginal bit of x.	 iNy(x)]*y'(x) + p*U'(x)	 is
the net marginal value product of x expressed in P's
utility. Because x must be chosen before the state of the
world is known, the marginal value product and the marginal
costs can only be equalized in expected values terms, that
is on average across the states.
2.1.2 THE PRINCIPAL AND AGENT PROBLEM.
This section reviews type C and E models by showing how
the different assumptions about the time information is
available can change the optimal strategies.
P is assumed to know the technology used by A to produce the
output in which he is interested but he knows neither the
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effort, x, nor the state of the world, a,	 which will be
prevailing. In this situation a true moral hazard 10 problem
arises and it is necessary for the principal to set up a
strategy which forces the agent to behave in an optimal way,
given the new constraint. The optimal solution will usually
imply that the effort value chosen by the agent is not
optimal.
The lack of observability of x and a means that P has to
design a contract such that the agent does not cheat; in
formal terms this is done by adding to the problem a new
constraint, the so called Incentive Compatible Constraint. P
11
must take account of the change in the environment 	 he is
facing: since the value of x cannot be directly observed it
will depend on the maximisation procedure of a's utility
function and this procedure which cannot be controlled by
the principal will affect the final equilibrium an its
existence. Thus the first problem which arises when dealing
with these models is the proof of the existence and
uniqueness of a solution, if y(x) is not restricted to some
finite interval an optimal solution to the problem may no
exist 12 . One approach is thus to restrict y(x) to a finite
interval and this is quite a reasonable assumption since it
is possible, on theoretical grounds, to restrict the output
to a minimum in the worst state of the world and to a
maximum amount in the best state. Since the technology is
10Moral hazard is here intended in the same sense as in
insurance market literature.
11 The definition of environment used here is borrowed from
Harris and Townsend (1981).
12See Mirrleess (1976) for a formal proof.
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given, the state of nature and the effort can have a greater
influence on output but there are clearly limits to effort
and its productivity (which can be reasonably represented in
this context by the state of the world). Another approach
developed by Mirrlees(1976) gets around this difficulty by
modelling y as a random variable itself. Those assumptions
allow us to simplify the matter but they usually imply that
an unique optimum might be obtained only when particular
conditions are met 13 . Grossman and Hart (1983) show by
decomposing the principal's optimization problem into a cost
versus benefits problem that an optimal solution can be
found.
The existence problem has been further developed and
generalized by Page (1987) to a large class of incentive
schemes. One of the striking results in the optimal
incentive schemes literature is that, in general, they will
lead to a departure from the optimal risk sharing solution;
a trade—off between the gains from sharing risk and the need
to control A's choice of x which is intrinsic to the problem
will in general affect the optimal solution.
2.1.3 TYPE C MODELS.
The central assumption for these models is that the
agent does not know the state of the world at the time the
contract is signed up bu he will know it before delivering
his effort. Model two is designed to formally develop this
13 The formal proof of this statement can be found in Grossman
and Hart (1983) and Rees (1985).
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approach. The first striking difference from the previous
setting is related to the specification of A's utility
function. In this context it is assumed that A's utility is
separable in reward and effort.
MODEL 2
Define:
Y = output
S = reward to the agent
x= effort of the agent
a = random variable
y(x,a) = production technology
The production function for this problem corresponds to that
of model one while the utility function for the agent is
specified as follows:
U(S,x) = S — f(x)
which is clearly increasing in S since:
a u
	
a
2
U
as
	 >0	
a s2
	 <0
and which is assumed to be decreasing in x, that is:
au
	
a
2
U
<0	 <0
a x
	
a X
2
It is important to stress the peculiar assumption that
characterizes the utility function for the agent: additivity
as long as separability in effort and reward is assumed
throughout the analysis. The problem faced by the principal
can be written as:
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Max
	 p. UP (Y - S.)	 [PA]
S , x	 1
s.t. S. -f(x ,a )  0	 (1)
1	 1. i
fS. -	 (x.,cc • ) 
	 S. - f(x.,c( .)  0	 (2)	 (all i,j)1	 1	 1	 J	 1	 j
Two	 constraints	 characterize	 the	 problem:	 the	 firs
constraint means, as before, that the agent will receive a
reward which will give him at least a nonnegative utility,
that is the agent will have a nonnegative utility whatever
the state of the world. The reason for this assumption is
quite obvious: since the agent will know before choosing the
effort the state of the world he would not be willing to to
any effort which would make him worse off. The second
constraint, which is also called the the incentive
compatibility constraint means that the agent will always
have the incentive not to cheat i.e. to reveal truthfully
the state of the world which has occurred. The problem can
be formalized 14 as follows:
Max	 p . U P (Y - S.)	 [PM]
Sx 1	 1, 
s.t. S. - f(Y.,(x.)  0	 (la)
1	 1	 1
S .
 -	 af(Y . ,.)
	
S. - f(Y	  0
1	 1	 1	 1	 (2a)	 (all i,j)
The Lagrangean for this problem can be written as:
14See Sappington (1981), appendix A for a formal proof.
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- f(Y . ,a . )- S . -f(Y . ,cc . )] +1	 1	 j	 1	 j=	 p i U P ( Y.-S.) +
JO
a
= - P. U P '(Y - S8	 i
	
a s	
1
.
+ pi
= - p . U( Y.(Y - sY V (Y ,a .) - V (Y ,a i ) +i 
= (la)
a
2 f
<0
i	 i
a f
>0
a a
it follows that:
ay aa
Si - f(Y . ,a ) - 0
The First Order Conditions can be summarized as follows:
a
= (2a)
Let us assume that:
a > ai-1
and:
a) 0 s Y*1 < Y 	 Y*
2
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b	 0) if Y* =	 i < m	 Y	 0*. >	 i > m1	 1
c) for i = m	 S* - f(Y * ,a ) = 0i	 i	 i
d) for i >m+1	 S* - f(Y * ,a ) = S 9.` - f(Y * ,a )i	 i	 i	 1-1	 i	 i
For any level of output 11.* the optimal problem can be
reformulated in a rather different way. Let us assume that
the principal is risk neutral such that his utility function
can be written as:
p. (Y i - S.)
then his problem can be formulated as:
Min	 p. S.1	 1
(lb)fs.t. S. - (Y. ,a. )	 01	 1	 1
S. -f(Y.,a.)  S. - f(Y.,a.)	 01	 1	 1	 3	 1.	 3 (2b)	 (all i,j)
The Lagrangean for this problem can be written as:
S. -f(Y *.	 • )]
J	 J
x..[ S. —
13	 1	 1	 1
j
j
Z
p . [ S . - f(Y *ra i ) - 01	 1
=	 p i S i +
The First Order Conditions can be summarized as follows:
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aa S
pi ii	 P.
= pi
a
= (lb)
a
= (2b)
a 1./
then at the optimum:
For fixed Y * it is possible to show that 15 in this case
conditions c) and d) holds for m = 1 i.e. the agent receives
his reservation utility level in state one (the worst state)
and he receives the same utility level in all other states.
This condition assures he does not cheat.
The optimal solution for this problem will then be one in
which for any state of the world the agent will receive at
least his reservation utility level and has no incentive to
cheat. If there were no incentive compatible constraint the
agent could have a strong incentive to cheat, but this is
not sufficient to say that he would be better off. The
principal would be better off without the incentive
compatible constraint only in special cases since it usually
end up paying more than the optimal amount.
I will now examine what kind of inefficiencies arise in this
information asymmetry context. To see where inefficiencies
15See Sappington (1981) appendix b for a formal proof.
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arise it is necessary to define what is an efficient
allocation. With reference to SAppington (1983) I will
define an efficient allocation by referring to the state
contingent output. Here is the definition:
The value of output which is efficient in state a is the one
at which the agent's marginal disutility form generating an
additional unit of output coincides with the principal's
valuation of such output i.e.
a U	 a U A
a Y	 a Y1	 1
(PEC)
a u a U A
	
as . 	 a S.
	
1	 1
This is equivalent to the optimal conditions derived for
model one, where, given the presence of uncertainty about
the actual realization of the state of the world the
equalization was on an expected basis.
In the same way it is possible to define a first best
contract as the one that results in the realization of an
efficient outcome whatever state of nature is ultimately
realized. By recalling the optimal conditions derived before
it is possible to note that conditions c) and d) imply that:
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f(Y
m+1
 , a
m+1
)	 1	 m= l
f(Y	 , a	 )	 <	 1	 m = 1in
By the equivalence between the [PA] problem and [PAll
problem
f(Y	 , a	 )	 1
m+1	 m+1
is equivalent to
a u
A
a U
a Y	 a Y1
a U P
	
a u
A
as .	 a s.1
which is the optimal condition for a first best contract.
This proves that the contract will force the agent to
produce an optimal output only in the better states of the
world. In state a. , for example, the output falls short of
the optimum.
From the previous discussion it is then possible to
argue that the solution derived to solve the principal and
agent problem does not satisfy the requirements for a first
best optimal contract since, in order to force the agent not
to cheat, the optimal condition is attained only for the
states in the most favourable output states.
The principal and agent model solution can be simply
described by using a diagram and by making some simplifying
assumptions.
Let us simplify the problem by assuming that there are
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U)
only two possible states of the world, namely a l and a2 with
a > a 1 , that is a2 is a more productive state.2 
U
P
Y
FIGURE ONE
The Principal's indifference curves can be represented by
straight lines increasing SE.
The utility curves for the agent are increasing NE and
depend both on the effort and on the state of the world
which will occur. Allocation which satisfy condition [PEC]
are shown by the vertical lines labelled C. Consider first
an allocation such A for state 1 and B for state 2. This
allocation does not satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint and the agent will always report that state 2 has
happened. To make the agent not cheat he must be indifferent
between telling the truth or lying. This can be achieved if
the two rewards chosen for him lies on the same indifference
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curve. For example, in figure one, the combination C D is an
incentive compatible allocation that can solve our problem.
It is clear that output in state 1 is not chosen optimally
and that in state 2 the agent receives a reward which is
greater than his reservation utility.
The same result holds if we set up the reservation utility
level for the agent to any level, but the inefficiency
diminishes by lowering this reservation utility level.
2.1.4 TYPE E MODELS.
Harris and Raviv (1979) observed first that, by
lowering the reservation utility level inefficiency
diminishes. Using this device in the contract allows to show
that if A is risk neutral P can achieve a first best
allocation and no incentive problem arises. The argument is
developed on the basis that if A is risk neutral, a contract
which specifies the reward as a function of the final output
is at least as good as one which makes the reward contingent
also on the effort, the state of nature and the output. If
this is true, it does not matter if the principal cannot
observe x or a, so long as he is able, as it has been
assumed, to observe Y. However, while this statement is
true, a further consideration is necessary in this context.
If the contract depends only on output, irrespective of A's
utility, this latter utility is not bounded; in other words
the first constraint disappears.
This argument is perfectly correct, but it is worth
demanding under what circumstances the reservation utility
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level can take any value i.e. is not bounded below. This is
the way type E contracts are set out.
The only reason why the agent can accept a binding contract
which can give him a disutility is that when he chooses his
effort he does not know what the realization of a will be.
These considerations provide the link between Harris and
Raviv's model and Sappington one. As I have pointed out
before "optimality" for the P-A contract depends on the
reservation utility 16 set out for the agent. Sappington
shows that it is possible to reach a first best allocation
when there is not limited liability for the agent; that is
his reservation utility can be negative. This is quite
important because optimality does not just depend on the
attitude to the risk of the agent but crucially on the type
of contract and the relevant balance of power between the
two parties as well: risk neutrality in this context is, in
my opinion, a useful device to model different real - world
environments with respect to timing in information and
relative contractual power. This is farm more clear if we
observe that when the agent is risk neutral but his
reservation utility is bounded (and, for example, the
assumption that a party cannot be forced to incur disutility
from his effort is quite reasonable), an optimal contract
cannot be set up.
16The term reservation utility corresponds here to "limited
liability" in Sappington paper.
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2.1.5 THE USE OF INFORMATION ABOUT x OR a.
Suppose we assume that x, that is the agent's effort,
though not observable in its actual realization, can be
observed with an error. Models in this category are halfway
between C and D and E and F. The possibility for P to have
information about x and a can be used to improve the
incentive scheme of the contract.
In formal terms we can suppose that the principal can
observe a random variable:
= x + a
with:
E(a)= 0 ;	 (a) > 0 on some interval [a , a I0
(a) = 0 elsewhere
(I), probability density for a.
If we can assume that a does not depend on a and that
the a distribution is bounded, it is possible to show that
the principal can set up a first—best contract by setting
out rules which forces the agent not to cheat.
This can be done by using a system of penalties which come
into force if the principal observes some 0 < x+a
o
. The
assumption of a bounded distribution for a assures that no
problem of hypothesis testing is incurred by the principal
17 . If the penalty is very high, A will choose everywhere
x since the case	 x	 > x is ruled out by the assumption
17The principal has to choose a critical value for 6 such
that an observation 0 < 0 *
 would imply x < x *. Hence P
has to weight the type I and type II errors from the
standard hypothesis testing theory.
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about the behaviour of A's utility. A case of more interest
is represented by a problem in which x can be inferred
through the observation of another variable —z— whose
distribution depends on both x and a.
In this special case, a further distinction can be made
and it is related to whether z can be observed at no cost.
Consider first the case in which z can be costless observed.
z is assumed to depend both on the effort and the state of
the world in which it will happen. In this context it is
possible to define a probability distribution for z given
any x. Holmstrom (1979) and ShaveII (1979) have shown it is
always optimal to incorporate such information in the
contract because the benefit of this extra information
outweighs the cost of the extra uncertainty that the
presence of an extra random variable adds to the problem.
The formal setting for this problem is shown in appendix
one. The only difference with respect to model two is that
now the realization of the output is affected by two random
variables whose joint distribution determines the actual
output. The optimal condition characterizing this problem
can be interpreted by considering that incorporating z in
the problem the principal does not get more information on
the most likely value for x, rather it provides a method for
the principal to design a better contract for his agent.
In other terms, the principal, by using the information
about z reduces the probability of giving A an high reward
for low effort in good states and vice versa.
The incorporation of z in the contract, thus, improves the
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incentive properties of the contract even though it does not
solve the underlying uncertainty problem.
In terms of efficient contracts as defined before the ratio
between the marginal product value and its marginal cost 18
will be closer to one than in the previous situations; now
that the principal can discriminate among some realizations
of states he has not to offer so high a reward for output in
better states. In other terms, in higher output states in
which efficiency was already reached at the cost of a
division of output more favourable to the agent, the
principal is now able to obtain the same effort from the
agent by offering a lower reward.
The second case, when a variable z can be observed by
paying a fee has been extensively examined by Gale and
Hellwig (1983) in an application of the incentive compatible
scheme to the debt contract problem. The asymmetry of
information arises because the firm can costless observe the
state of the nature on which its revenue depends, which in
turn affects the probability for the investor to have his
money back and the interest payment on his loan. The
investor is initially uninformed about the state of nature
which, in this case, is represented by the actual condition
of the firm but he can become informed by paying a positive
fee which is again state — contingent.
The variable z of the previous model is represented here by
the cost of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be seen as a costly
18Marginal product value and marginal cost should be intended
in the light of PEC condition set up before.
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way of acquiring information about the firm to which the
investor lent his money; before the receiver can pay the
creditors of a bankrupt firm he must evaluate the firm; this
corresponds to discovering the true value of the state, a.
The presence of asymmetry of information here causes the
level of investment to fall short of the optimal one when
both parties are perfectly informed.
Credit rationing is thus the "measure" of inefficiency.
Anyway, Gale and Hellwig are able to show that the presence
of bankruptcy can improve the contract; the credit rationing
and the interest rate would be higher in situations in which
no bankruptcy costs were involved.
The conclusion is thus that the presence of variables from
which information can be acquired usually improves the basic
contract even if it does not solve the problem.
2.2 TYPE A MODELS.
In this section I will review models that are usually
included in private information with active agent
literature. Under my classification those models can be,
instead, treated as principal and agent problem. The common
features and assumptions characterizing these models are:
— the agent possesses some information prior to choosing an
action which, if known by the principal would influence the
choice of action he would like the agent to make.
The agent is then required to pass some message to the
principal which depends on the "private information" he
has. Since the chosen effort, outcome and payoff to the
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a i -1
agent all depend on the message he transmits, the agent has
well an incentive to misrepresent his information.
— A knows the state of the world variable, a, before taking
any decision.
— He has to transmit to his principal a message which is
represented by the value a.
then we are speaking of type A models in table 1.
The principal, on the basis of the a he receives will
instruct the agent to take a consequent action x(a) in
exchange for a payoff S(a). Given this environment the
principal must take into account the incentive A May have
to report a false a. Assuming that P is risk neutral and
that a can be observed with
<	 a,1
the formal model relevant in this context is equivalent to
model two.
In this second case, however, no risk sharing is
possible between A and P. Since A perfectly knows the state
of nature before the contract is set out, he will never
accept contracts which do not provide for sure at least his
reservation utility; in other words the first constraint in
model two will by no means be eliminated: the special case
examined by Shavell and Harris and Raviv will never be
implemented in this context.
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The equilibrium allocation shown in fig. 1 applies in this
context as well. The gain to the agent from receiving in
state 2 a larger reward than in a situation in which the
principal were fully informed can be interpreted here as the
rent he commands from the monopoly of his private
information.
3. ADVERSE SELECTION MODELS.
The models concerned with adverse selection can be
divided into two main classes:
a) models involving transmission mechanisms.
b) Adverse selection models with active agents.
As I have already explained in the previous section I
prefer to include models with adverse selection and "active"
agents in the type A principal and agent models and for this
reason I will here briefly review just the transmission
mechanisms models. the literature on these models is not so
wide as the one on the principal and agent relationship but
for what it will follow this is the relevant class of models
to take into account.
3.1 MODELS REQUIRING TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION.
These models are designed for situations in which the
relationship between the two parties involves the
transmission of some messages. The agent has usually the
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ability to misrepresent the information he has to pass on to
the principal to his own advantage.
Examples in this class include allocation mechanisms,
nonlinear pricing in monopoly markets and auction — design
literature and, as I will explain later, in this terms it is
possible to model the relationship between central and local
government. Models dealing with public goods and the related
problem of preference revelation are just the most known
example of how optimal contracts can be devised in this
context. Suppose that a planner has to implement a certain
social choice rule. By social choice rule it is usually
meant a "set of feasible social states for each possible
configuration
	 of	 individual	 preferences	 and
characteristics." 19
The Pareto principle is just the most widely known example
of social choice rule. If the relevant characteristics of
individual agents happen to be publicly known, then the
social choice rule can be implemented trivially because the
choice set from which to optimize is known.
The problem of incentive compatibility in models dealing
with public goods arises precisely because the
characteristics are not known by the planner a priori. The
planner may attempt to learn them directly by asking agents
to reveal them. In general, however, if agents realize how
the information they reveal is to be used, they will have an
incentive to misrepresent their preferences . The planner's
task is then more difficult. Those models usually assume
19This definition has been borrowed by Hammond and Maskin
(1986).
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that individual agents send their own signals and the
planner on this basis implements the social choice rule. The
problem for the planner is to set out the rules of the game
in such a way as to prevent each individual agent from
cheating. Planning with public goods was studies by Dréze
and De la Vall6 Poussin and Malinvaud. In these models it is
assumed that each consumer reports his marginal rate of
substitution between public and private goods which is then
used by the planning bureau to define the quantity of public
goods to be provided and the price sharing. Agents can lie
along the way but these mechanisms prove to converge to a
Pareto—optimum in the long run. Another peculiar model in
this class is the preference revelation rule put forth by
Clarke (1971) and further developed by Tideman and Tullock
(1976) in the public goods context. The Clarke principle can
be stated as such:
each person is given the choice of accepting the decision
that would be made without his participation or changing it
to whatever he likes. In this second case he has to pay an
mount of money equal to the marginal cost of all other
persons of doing what he wants.
This payment is the so called "Clarke tax". Any individual
has a strong incentive to reveal his true preferences
because the loss in utility he suffers from not reveling
them correctly is greater than the Clark tax he has to
eventually pay.
Most of the models in the transmission of information
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literature deal with repeated games which imply a dynamic
framework. Roberts (1982) has identified general necessary
conditions for long term contracts to dominate short term
ones but these conditions are not in the form to delineate a
priori classes of models that satisfy them. In most cases,
the repetition of the game can provide an efficiency gain in
cases in which the contract commits either the principal or
the agent to a lower payoff in some events in future periods
than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated
when future periods arrive. In the case of public goods
provision it is the assumption of a constant marginal rate
of substitution over time that makes the agents better off
by revealing their preferences.
The models in the principal-agent literature with active
agents seems to be more difficult to deal with in a dynamic
context, and whether the long run contract is superior to
the short run one much depends on the peculiar assumptions
of the model. Malcomson (1988) for example shows that
efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not
require long term commitment from the principal and,
provided that a short term contract can punish the agent
sufficiently, it does not commit the agent either. Radner
(1981, 1985), Rubinstein (1989) and Rubinstein and Yaari
(1988) have instead shown that a first best solution can be
obtained for a sufficiently low enough rate of discount and
a sufficiently long time period.
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4.CONCLUSIONS.
This brief review of the literature on incentive
compatibility models shows the potential applications this
theory can have. The natural extensions on theoretical
grounds are concerned with dynamic models or multipart
contracts. Finally it should be kept in mind that the
distinction between principal and agent problem and adverse
selection models is sometimes very difficult, expecially for
models involving "active" agents. While this can be a
problem when we want to classify models, the advantage is
that the literature can provide a uniform framework to deal
with problems which are apparently and substantially
different.
Finally I can recall that in a number of applications the
adverse selection aspect and the moral hazard problem are
combined together: an important example is represented by
the income tax model by Mirrlees (1987). In this model,
while agents share the same preferences over consumption and
leisure, they differ in their marginal labour productivity.
Adverse selection is intrinsic in the problem because the
tax authority (the principal) does not know the agent's
marginal product. The additional problem, that is the
inability of observing agents' labour — leisure choices create
a moral hazard problem.
This brief review of the literature, although not
exhaustive, gives some insights into the problem and offers
general tools to solve problems that can be formulated in a
"principal and agent" framework. The models I will present
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in the next sections are mainly related to the adverse
selection literature since I will assume that local
governments' task is to report their true preferences for
public services to central government. The asymmetry of
information caused by Central Government inability to
observe true preferences falls for an optimal incentive
scheme; however its actual implementation might be
difficult, if not impossible, due to the peculiarities of
the economic agents involved in the game. This problem will
be discussed at length at the end of chapter four after the
basic model and the optimal solution will have been
presented.
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APPENDIX ONE
P does not know x but has some information about the
distribution of 0, a random variable depending on a i.e.
. = x + a .1	 1
The problem can be written as:
p U P (Y — S.)Max
S (Y,z),x
s.t. S . (Y	 ) — f(x ,a )	 01	 1	 1	 1	 1
S . (Y ,0 ) — f(x ,19 ) 	 S .(Y	 .) — f(x . ,a .) z 0	 (all i,j)1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 J	 J	 J	 1	 j
The only difference in the solution, if compared with the
case I presented in the previous appendix is that now there
is a joint distribution for Y. It is possible however to
show that the payment for the agent is modified in the light
of the new information acquired.
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CHAPTER THREE
1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of chapter one I have argued that one of
the main reasons for the existence of local authorities is
their ability of being better informed than Central
Government about local preferences and needs. These
parameters are however essential to Central Government to
devise any grant system that allows it to allocate resources
1
efficiently .
This chapter is concerned with describing the optimal
grant system that Central Government could use in order to
reach an efficient allocation of resources and the reasons
why the actual implementation of the system might be
Impossible. The optimal grant formula will be examined in
both a static and dynamic framework and the Harris and
Townsend (1983) methodological approach consisting of five
steps will be followed. First the economic environment
including the information structure is described, then I
will define the concept of a feasible allocation mechanism
for an environment. The third and fourth step consist of
describing the preferences of the agents over the different
mechanisms and defining the concept of an efficient
mechanism. The last step describes efficient mechanisms and
their allocation. Due to the peculiarities of the agents
involved in my analysis I will start by explaining the
reasons leading to the choice of an utility maximisation
framework to describe the behaviour of collective decision
bodies and its shortcomings.
1 Efficiency is defined in terms of minimum resources to be
given up to attain an objective.
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1 .1 UT I L I TY MAX I M I SAT I ON APPROACH AND COLLECTIVE DECISIONS
MAKERS: A DIGRESSION.
Decision making and choice lie at the heart of much of
the discussions of human behaviour and they affect the
allocative process in many ways. When dealing with
individual decision making the neoclassical utility
maximisation framework seems to be widely accepted. Since
resources are scarce, any individual tries to do his best in
order to attain the maximum level of satisfaction. Private
action, at its simplest, presents little difficulty since
the ultimate decision maker is assumed to be the acting
individual; the problems raised when the same framework is
applied to collective decision makers are, however, quite
considerable. Given that individuals make decisions and
organizations do not, it is worth considering whether the
behaviour of collective decision makers might be well
represented by a utility maximising behaviour. The widely
known Arrow's impossibility theorem seems to rule out this
possibility by showing analytically that there does not
exist a collective choice rule or social ordering which
obeys the basic axioms which any social ordering, derived
from a .set of individual orderings should conform to. During
the fifties and sixties Arrow (1951), Black (1958), Buchanan
(1954), Oliver (1955), Tullock (1958), Downs (1957) and
Buchanan and Tullock (1967) have developed new approaches to
collective decision making.
Downs' theory of collective decision making is focused on
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the behaviour of political parties. The attempt of parties
to maximise voter support replaces utility maximisation in
the market process. Arthur Bentley explains collective
decision making in terms of the interplay of group interests
while Buchanan and Tullock, by using the "theory of teams"
concentrates on the behaviour of the individual in a voting
process. Although those approaches are quite stimulating I
will use a utility maximisation approach at least to
represent local government's behaviour because, despite
recent theoretical interest by economists in the subject,
relatively few empirical studies have been carried out on
the comparative performance characteristics of the different
group decision rules. Most of the recent studies in the
field are founded on utility maximisation models and they
commonly uses a Cobb Douglas functional form. McMillan and
Juffour(1988), however, by using data for local government
expenditure on different services in Victoria (Australia)
have tested alternative specifications of the underlying
preferences using a translog model and rejected symmetry
conditions so that data did not seem to be consistent with
utility maximisation. I will take account of those factors
at the end of chapter four when I will present some reasons
why the optimal incentive system could fail to reach its
objectives. To start with, even with the pitfalls implied by
applying rational decision making processes to collective
bodies, the utility maximisation approach is the most
suitable to pick up the information structure of the problem
I am examining. However, due to the limitations of' the model
when applied to collective decisions makers I will assume
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that local authorities behave as if they had a utility
function which they want to maximise. This point is quite
important because, for the reasons that will become clear in
the proceeding of the analysis, it jeopardizes the actual
implementation of the optimal grant allocation rule.
The goals pursued by Central Government and Local
authorities are asymmetric since the approach I have been
using assumes that Central Government's aim might be
represented by a straight minimization of the size of the
grant without any specific reference to the interests that
Central Government have in giving the grant to local
authorities in its exact size. I think this approach can be
justified on the ground of efficient allocation of the
resources available. Once Central Government has decided how
much local services have to be provided in a specific area,
it is in its best interest to reduce as much as possible the
resources that have to be spent to attain this goal.
2. THE STATIC MODEL
This model assumes that the game played by both central
government and local authorities is a one shot static game.
Local authorities' behaviour is described by using a fairly
general utility function defined over two goods, y, a
composite private commodity and X which represents local
public	 services.	 p is	 a parameter summarizing the
characteristics of each local authority with respect to its
preferences for expenditure.
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0a u
ay
U(X., y., 13.)1	 1	 1 au o	 ;
a x
The utility function for authority i can be written in a
very general form as:
which has to be maximised subject to the budget constraint:
X + y = M
where M represents local income available. As it can be
noted from the equation above the price ratio is assumed to
be one. In diagrammatic terms, the budget constraint faced
by a representative local authority can be depicted as
follows:
FIGURE ONE
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The slope of the budget constraint, given the assumption of
equal prices is 'y = — 45 0 while the price ratio is equal to
tan(/)= —1.
Maximisation of this utility function subject to the
budget constraint will lead to a demand function of the
following form:
X NG = xNG(I3N)
13 = preference parameter.
Central Government's objective is to make each local
authority to spend at least a* in local public goods. a* can
be thought of as the desired level of expenditure and can
*
somehow be related in real world to the GREA 2	 i. a	 s a
parameter specific to each local authority and it is known
by Central Government. I will also assume that:
X NG (13,m) < a
*
for all the local authorities I am considering in the sample
in order to rule out the possibility of negative grants that
are not observed in the real world. In this environment, if
Central Government wants to make each local authority spend
at least a* , a of subsidy has to be provided and the two
principal forms can be either a lump sum of money to
2 GREA stands for Grant Related Expenditure Assessment.
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increase local income or a per unit expenditure subsidy by
which the cost of each unit of the service is partly matched
by the subsidizer. Both situations are depicted in figure
two.
tan(a) + tan(P) = tan(7)
FIGURE TWO
As it can be noted from the above figure in the case of a
lump sum grant the income available increases to M+G while
in the case of a matching grant the price ratio is reduced
to g with Central Government offering to pay (1 — g) for each
unit of expenditure. As a result of this assumption, local
government's budget constraint can now be written as:
gX + y = M+G
where g represents the per unit cost faced by local
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authorities for providing local public expenditure after a
matching grant of the form (1—g) has been introduced and G
is the lump sum offered to local authorities. The new
demand equation can thus be written as:
XGR = X GR (P,M-FG,g)
The form and the size of the grant has clearly to be chosen
in an optimal way. Optimality is here defined in terms of
minimum resources necessary to make each local authority
spend at least a* on public services.
More formally Central Government behaviour can be
described by:
Min	 (gX + G)
g,G
s.t. X GR (P,M+G,g)  a*
1 will start by describing the optimal grant formula in a
world with no uncertainty in order to compare the optimal
contract with the one that will arise in an asymmetry of
information world. The environment in which Central
Government has to operate in the first case 3 can be
described as follows:
i)	 Central Government can observe the amount of local
income available in each region, M , and set the amount
3i .e. when both parties are perfectly informed.
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of local public services to be provided, a*.
ii) Before the start of the period Central Government
observes preferences over local public services which
will be in turn used to determine the size of the grant
for each authority.
iii) Open ended matching grants and lump-sum grants are the
two instruments available to Central Government to
reach its objective.
Once the environment is specified, the concept of an
allocation mechanism for the environment has to be defined.
An allocation mechanism for a given environment is simply
the set of rules which specify the game to be played by the
agents in allocating resources and the optimal allocation is
the set of rules that both maximise the objective function
and satisfies the constraint imposed by the environment.
In the problem I am examining the allocation rules are grant
distribution formulas that Central Government can announce
at the start of the period to achieve its goal while the
optimal allocation mechanism is the one that allows it to
minimize the size of the grant. Given assumption ii) the
model can be designed to cope with the optimal allocation
rule for just one authority and it will then be replicated
for the entire population by changing the relevant
parameters characterizing each local authority. The
separation is based on the further assumption that no
ceiling exists on the amount of the grant total. 4
 In terms
of the exposition that follows these assumptions allow to
4Grant total in this context means the sum of grants
distributed to all local authorities.
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drop all subscripts i for local authorities.
2.1 OPTIMAL GRANT WITH BOTH PARTIES PERFECTLY INFORMED.
In a world with no uncertainty Central Government
problem can be written as:
Min gX + G
g ,G
*
s.t. x (M,13,g,G)  a
GR
Government can reach its goal by using an open ended
matching grant that, by having both an income and a price
effect, boosts up expenditure to a higher level than a pure
lump sum grant provided the substitution effect is not zero.
This can be formally shown by using the Slutsky equation for
this problem. If the grant was given in a lump sum form the
demand equation could be written as:
X
GR
(M 1-G,P)
a x = 3x
a G 3 M
If the grant is given in a matching form it is equivalent to
a price reduction, then we can write the Slutsky equation
as:
3 x i a h(g,Ti)	 3 x
X 1
a g 3 g	 3 g
*
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where h(g,u— ) is the Hicksian demand function.
Starting from an equilibrium point at which:
G([3,M) = (1 — g) * x
the marginal change in the lump sum grant is approximately
equal to5 :
aG.- ag*x
then it is clear that, unless the substitution effect is
zero, the matching grant has a greater effect in boosting up
expenditure than a lump sum grant.
Further insight in the problem can be gained by the aid
of a diagram. Consider figure three in which a local public
good, X, is measured on the horizontal axis and a private
composite commodity ,y , is measured on the vertical one.
5The exact formula implies taking account that, the matching
grant will be shared among a greater amount of expenditure,
then we have to take account of this feedback we want to
assess the full effect of the same marginal change in the
grant distributed. I will assume here that since we deal
with marginal changes we can assume that, from the point of
view of grant sharing x is constant.
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FIGURE THREE
The local authority's budget constraint is represented by
the line MM The before grant optimal allocation is
represented by A ,the point at which the budget constraint
is tangential with the Indifference Curve (IC) I
o
. Now
suppose central government offers the locality a matching
grant in the form of a percent contribution to the unit
price. The local authority's budget constraint pivots to M
M 1 The locality moves to A 1 on indifference curve I.1
Provided price elasticity of demand is not zero, demand for
local public goods will increase; in this case from X
o
 to
X 1 ; the resource cost will amount to Me, of which y ie is
financed by Central Government. If the amount y 1 e had been
given as a lump sum grant the local authority would have a
budget line M 2 M 2 and would be able to achieve a more desired
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position A 2 but its demand for local services would have
been less than at A 1 because the matching grant is
effectively a price reduction which, has I have explained
before, has a substitution as well as an income effect, and
this is reflected by the fact that the price consumption
curve (FCC) lies to the right of the income consumption
curve (ICC) after the initial position.
If the utility function for local government is a Cobb
Douglas the it is possible to formally show that Central
Government requires less resources by using a matching
grant. The proof is given by solving the following problem:
Max U = (1-13) tn y + g tin x	 0 < (3 < 1
subject to:
X + y = M
which leads to the demand equation:
X NG = p
When the grant distribution formula is introduced the budget
constraint will be written as:
gX + y = M+GL
and the demand equation will be equal to:
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X GR = P 
(M + GL)
g
If all the grant is distributed in a lump sum form, then
(1—g) =0 and the problem faced by Central Government can be
described as follows:
MAX (— GL)
s.t. — ( p*A4 + p * G L )  — (x*
and the optimal solution is given by:
*
aG*a—  X=L	 0 = -T— M
If Central Government wants to offer a matching grant, GL
will be set equal to zero and the problem faced by Central
Government will be:
MAX — (1—g)ca
M
s.t. — (—PH  a*g
In order to allow local authorities to spend a* the price
they have to face has to be equal to:
P*M
g=
	
a
*
from which it follows that the optimal matching rate is:
pc1111
1
a
*
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- MG =L g
The grant in a lump sum form will be equal to:
and under matching grant will be equal to:
G
m
 = (1—g)* a *= a* — X= at— 13M
G
m
= PG L
since 13 < 1 the matching grant is less than the lump sum
grant.
2.2 INCENTIVE  COMPATIBLE PROBLEM.
Suppose now that government, although it knows exactly
*
a and M, it cannot observe g, the preference parameter of
the local authority. In terms of the description of the
environment in which Central Government operates this means
that assumption ii) has to be modified as follows:
ha) Central Government knows that the true 13 for any local
authority lies in the closed interval [13 1 , p2 1. Since
no other information is available the distribution of
P, f(P)	 is assumed to be uniform 6. Before the
6It is then clear the analogy of this model with Tresh
interpretation of Stigler's approach. Even all the analysis
that follows will be conducted in terms of expenditure
behaviour it is clearly the marginal rate of substitution
between private and public goods that cannot be known with
certainty.
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starting of the period each local authority has to
report to the Central Government its preferences over
local public services which will be in turn used to
determine the size of the grant. The preference
parameter declared by local authorities will be
labelled Pd to distinguish it from p, the true one.
Two further assumptions have to be made to give a complete
description of the environment, namely:
iv) Preferences parameters are peculiar to any authority
considered i.e. it is impossible to infer authority's
i preferences by observing the relevant parameter for
authority j 7 .This assumption rules out the
possibility (or the need) for coalitions between
authorities then the problem can be restricted to
examine the optimal contract between one local
authority and the Central Government, at least in this
8first stage of the analysis .
v) p is assumed to be both independent between
authorities as stated in iv) and across time 9 .
The grant that each local authority receives depends
negatively on 13 d' i.e. the more it prefers expenditure, the
less grant it needs in order to reach a*. It is clear that
it will have an incentive in reporting a P d as low as
7in other words 13 is not either a simple political
or regional parameter.
8The problem could not be treated as such if the Central
Government had a budget constraint on the total amount spent
on grants to local authorities.
9This second assumption will be relaxed in dynamic model
and it will actually be the crucial difference between the
two setting.
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possible such that it will be entitled to receive a greater
amount than needed to reach a * . The cheating clearly
depends on the possibility of this behaviour to be observed
and on the consequences that it might bring about. The model
I am presented here is of type A 10 : the agent always knows
with certainty and before the start of the period all the
relevant parameters and its cheating cannot be avoided by
the principal. In this framework government has to devise a
system to make each local authority reveal its true
preference. The uncertainty is implicit in this problem. The
problem can be written in fairly broad term as such 11:
Min [1 —g(f3d)]* X GR
s.t. X (M,g(13 ) , p ) GR	 d d
s.t. V [g(13),M]  	 V (g(Pd ),M)	 all f3
where V(.) is the indirect utility function which is assumed
to be well behaved 12 .
The second constraint in this problem is the so called
Incentive Compatible constraint and its function is to
10The classification of different models can be found in
chapter two, table one.
11 This approach follows closely Sappington (1984) and Harris
and Townsend (1983) models. The theoretical links between
the two models have been explained in the previous chapter
while the application to a transmission mechanism is quite
straightforward.
12.	 a V	 a Vi.e.	 >0 and	 s 0 .
a X 	 ä g
a
*
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assure that the optimal rule implemented will avoid cheating
by the better informed party. If this constraint is
satisfied, any local authority will receive an amount of
money such that the level of utility it can reach by
revealing its true preference is as least as high as it
would be if it was cheating. It is important to note that,
since in this model I am dealing with an agent that knows
all the information prior to the start of the game, the
13inequality constraint must hold for any f3
According to the preferences they declare before the actual
realization of expenditure local authorities will receive a
matching grant whose matching rate, (1—g(f3d)), will depend
on the preferences they declare. (1—g(P)) is negatively
correlated with gd since the higher the preference revealed,
the lower is the matching rate for the same level of desired
expenditure: the level of expenditure without grant is
caeteris paribus, higher and the grant is more effective.
However, the indirect utility for local government is
negatively correlated with g : the lower the price they have
to pay for public goods the higher is the amount of private
commodities they can buy.
This consideration should be sufficient to explain why in
this situation the incentive compatible constraint cannot
work properly. If local authorities can, as the set up of
this model allows them to do, cheat they will declare the
lowest f3 they can. In terms of the model described befored
13This is one of the major differences with Sappington model
in which, since the agent will know the true parameter only
after the start of the period the constraint must hold on
expected values terms.
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this means that since V(.) is monotonically decreasing in g,
the only way to have the incentive compatibility constraint
satisfied is to set g(P d ) = g thus giving the same matching
grant whatever p is. This might be better illustrated by an
•example. Let us assume that Central Government knows a
priori that the preferences for local public services in a
particular locality are either (3 1 or p 2	 with f3 < 13 2 and
those two event can occur with the same probability 14 .The
problem can be formalized as follows 15 :
Min 0.5 (1—g
--1 )*XGR + 0.5 (1.-g2)*XGR
s.t.	 [x (P1,M,g1)]
	

s.t. V(M,g 2 ,P 2)	 V(M,g1,132)
s.t. V(M,P i ,g i )	 V[M,P1,g2]
For the reasons I explained before, higher preferences
imply a lower matching rate ,then if p i < (3 2 it follows that
g 2 > g which implies that the second constraint is
redundant because an authority with a comparatively low
preference for public expenditure would be worse off by
reporting a parameter higher than the true one.
14.i.e. p(P i ) = p (3 2 ) = 0.5
151n the following example g .
 1=1,2 is used as a shorthand
notation for g(P i ) while the values with asterisk denote
the optimum amounts of both public and private goods.
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4, 	 4,4,	 4,
It is possible to illustrate the problem and its solution in
the following diagram:
g1
4-
4-
A A
€/
g 2
FIGURE  FOUR
The diagram is drawn in the g — g space. g and g
1	 2	 1	 2
*
represent the matching rate which, since x NG (I3,M) < a , have
to be less than one. Constraint 1 is represented by the
straight line AA while , since V(.) is decreasing in g and
g 
2 
> g 1 constraint 2 is satisfied only along the 45°1ine from
the origin. The objective function is represented by the
straight lines bb that are increasing towards the origin. It
follows that the optimal point is represented by c at which
local authorities with preference parameter equal to 131
spend exactly a*16 and any authority receives the same
matching grant rate irrespective of its preferences.
If again I assume that the functional form for the
utility function of each local government is a Cobb Douglas,
16It is clear from the diagram that, in this case constraint
1 is binding
€
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the problem can be formulated by the following minimization.
Min (1 — g) X
P1M 
 a*S.t.
g
Since it is impossible to discriminate among authorities
Central Government has to set the matching grant such that
local authorities with the lowest preferences will spend at
least a*.
The optimal g is equal to
13 * m1 
g1=1
a
*
An authority with preferences equal to /3 2 will declare 13 1
before the start of the period but it will then spend
according to its his true preferences:
x= 
P 2 * a*
	> a
*
13 1
The grant loss for government with respect to the
"separating equilibrium" formula will be equal to:
( g2- g1) -	 ** a* + ( 1 — g1) a ()( — a )
where the first expression represent how much more
government is offering to the local authority for each pound
it spends than it would be necessary to it to reach the
optimal demand a* and the second expression is the grant
loss due to the fact that in this second case the local
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authority is buying a quantity of X greater than a*.
The overall problem could be formulated in a slightly
different way by assuming that Central Government is
interested in seeing each authority spend at least a * in
expected value terms. I show this problem in appendix one.
It is clear that in this case the size of the loss is
reduced but local authorities whose preferences are lower
than the expected value will not be able to reach the target
level of expenditure. 17
2.3 A TWO PRICES OPTIMAL GRANT ALLOCATION
It is then clear that in the framework I set up Central
Government is unable to set a system that allows it to avoid
cheating. In a static game each period local authorities can
announce the lowest P and then spend according to theird
true /3. In this case the best policy that it can implement
is to reduce the loss as much as possible.
This goal is achieved by designing a more complicated grant
distribution formula. In my analysis I will consider the
possibility of setting different matching rates according to
the level of expenditure 18 . In very general terms Central
Government could set two different matching rates as
17 Because of the assumption of a uniform distribution for p,
P l+ 13 2
2
18 This system has extensively been used by Central Government
in recent years as I will explain later.
E(P) will be in this case equal to
100
follows:
(1—g) for any quantity X < a*
(1—h) for any unit of X  a*
The post— grant budget constraint for a representative
authority under this new assumption is shown in figure five.
FIGURE FIVE
Central Government's problem is now to find a value for h
such that any local authority, even if it is an highest
spender 19 will not demand any quantity above a*. In terms of
diagram 5 this means that the tangency between the
Indifference Map representing local government behaviour and
19Highest spenders are identified with local authorities
whose true preferences are equal to 132.
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 a
*
5 a *
the budget constraint on the second segment must be for a
*level of X 2  a	 i.e., 	 in a non feasible region.
GR
The new system can be implemented by using a two price
system offering a subsidy for expenditure up to a but
introducing a system of penalties in the form of grant
withdrawals if local authorities over spend. If government
want any local authority to spend exactly a * the new problem
can be formulated as such:
Min (1—g)	 + (1—h) (X GR — a*)
s.t. x 
1
GR
2	 7,4
XGR
x
1
= demand on the first segment.
GR
X
2
= demand on the second segment.
GR
M = M + (h—g)a*
2
20is the imputed income on the second segment
The first constraint assures that local authorities
with the lowest preferences will spend at least at their
target level of expenditure while the new constraint is
meant to stick any local authority to spend no more than a*.
This second constraint derives from the studies of utility
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Following Moffit (1986) the kinked budget constraint for
each local authority can be written as:
M = gX,t + y	 if X s a*
M =	 + h(X—a ) + y	 fo r *X > a*
from which it is possible to derive M = M + (h—g)a
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maximisation subject to piecewise linear constraints. As
Hall (1978) showed it is possible to derive the demand
equation for a commodity whose price is non linear by
maximising utility along the linearized extension of the two
segments of the budget constraints. If the budget constraint
is convex, the tangency of the Indifference Map with one of
the extended segment in a feasible region assures uniqueness
of the solution found. The problem and the technical details
concerning how to derive a set of demand equations subject
to a piecewise linear constraint has been studied at length
by Hanoch and Honig (1978) to which the interested reader is
referred. In this case Central Government has to set a price
such that the quantity demanded by the highest spending
authorities on the extended second segment is less than a*.
This will assure that if local authorities with highest
spending preferences are constrained to be at the kink, all
the other ones will be spending no more than this amount.
This policy can be better illustrated by using the following
diagram in which I will assume that the plotted indifference
map represents the utility contours of a local authorities
with preferences for expenditure p > pi.
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FIGURE SIX
The post—grant budget constraint for this local authority is
represented by the line MM' of which the first part MC
derives from the budget equation g iX + y =M and the second
part, CM' corresponds to the budget equation g 2X + y = M2
If Central Government was to offer a matching grant equal to
(1 — g 1 ) this local authority would have chosen to spend B and
local government loss would have been DG+EF. However, due to
the introduction of the kink B is not a feasible allocation.
On the second segment of the budget, this local authority
would have spent A which is not • feasible again. The
authority will then be located at C, i.e. at the kink and
will demand a*
 for public expenditure and the loss is
reduced to FH. The optimal g will be equal to g1 and h will
be
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h = h(3 2 ,M 2 ,g)
f3 = highest preference2
M 2 = income in the second segment.
The system is more efficient since in this case:
(1 — h) * (X 2 — a* ) = 0.GR
If Central Government uses this formula it will never be
able to learn the true preferences, but it will be able to
reduce the loss. By observing local authorities spending at
the kink, Central Government cannot infer their preferences,
but this information would be of any use in a static model
anyway since it could not be used to set up the system in
the following period.
3. AN EXAMPLE USING A COBB DOUGLAS.
I will now present an example in which I will assume
that local government behaviour can be represented by a Cobb
Douglas utility function, namely:
Min (1—g) a * + (1— h) (X — a* )	 for x > a*
giM
 a
*
s.t. X 1 =
GR	 g
13 2 M 2	 *
x
2 
=	 S a
GR
where the first constraint assures that authorities with the
lowest preferences will spend at least a* and the second
h
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P i* mg= *
a
h 
g 2  0 * g2	 2
1 — /32
P 2 * m	 21g 2 _ 	
*
a
constraint means that authorities with the highest
preferences will not be able to spend along the second
segment of the budget constraint.
Minimization leads to:
The model can again be adapted to cope with the case in
which Central Government is interested in expected values
as shown in appendix two.
The conclusion from the model I have just presented is
that since there is no way for Central Government to know
I he true preferences for local authorities, the best it can
do is to prevent them spending more than a*.
It is worth noting that in this case Central Government has
91 The formula for h can be derived as follows:
From constraint 2 we know that:
P 2 M2h  *
a
M = M + (h—g)a*2
then:
0 2 (IVI +(h—g)a*)
a
which rearranged gives the formula in the text.
h 
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not actually any true incentive in learning 13 since this
information will be of no use in future periods.
The dynamic game is thus clearly different and. as I shall
show it allows Central Government to know the true
preferences, at least if the right incentives are used.
4. THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
It is often recognized in economics that decisions
taken by rational economic agents are the result of
choice among a set of opportunities taking account of the
future implications of those decisions.
Optimization within a static framework seems thus to be very
restrictive expecially in the light of the new techniques
developed to cope with very complicated economic models. As
concerns utility maximisation, for example, the conventional
static framework is substituted by the discounted stream of
utility which has to be maximised subject to the constraints
derived from the present and future resources. Dynamic
consistency in agents' behaviour seems to be now recognized
and incorporated in most economic models while this aspect
seems to be left behind when economists analyse government
29 .
and its agents' behaviour I will suggest that local
authorities behaves as if they were utility maximiser over
the period they are elected. My approach is aimed to be an
application to collective organizations behaviour of the
92 A new strand of macro economic literature is however
already filling this gap by studying time consistent models
for government intervention. For a review of this models see
Stevenson et al. (1988), ch.9.
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U t = U(X t , y t' (3)
a 
2 
Ua u
>0
a x
	 	 <0
a X 
2
permanent income and life cycle hypothesis even if, as it
will be clear later the modifications to the standard
consumer's analysis are quite important. In my analysis I
will use the basic assumptions of the Modigliani Brumberg
model of lifetime consumption and the most important
empirical works in this field can be considered the one
carried out by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) MaCurdy (1983)
Browning, Irish and Deaton (1985). I will start by showing
how a dynamic consistent set of demand equations can be
derived for local authorities. The problems to solve are
many and the solution seem quite restrictive and highly
dependent on the assumptions used to derive it.
The model assumes that the behaviour of an individual
authority can be represented by utility maximisation over
two commodities, namely its own level of expenditure for
local services and a composite private commodity, y.
Lifetime preferences in period t might thus be written as:
a u
	
a 
2 
U
> 0	 <0
a y	 a y 
2
Lifetime utility in any period t may be written as the
following discounted sum of a concave, twice differentiable
period by period utility indices Us:
W t =	 8-tp 	 U (X ,y ,p)8	 8 8
8
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where p is the discount factor for utility.
Perfect foresight as well as intertemporal separability
is assumed in this first part of the analysis .
Under these assumptions a two stage budgeting procedure can
be used and dynamic consistent current demands can be
written in terms of a single variable capturing both past
decisions and future anticipations
Since the most crucial assumptions in deriving a set of
dynamic consistent demand equations are those relating to
the characteristics of the authority's utility function, it
is important to spend some time in describing them in full
detail. As I have pointed out before, intertemporal
separability is assumed as well as additivity.
This aspect is very important when the perfect foresight
assumption is relaxed and the individual authority is
allowed to replan its demand pattern.
In standard life cycle consumption models individuals
are assumed to maximise their utility over their life. The
question of how long the "life" of a local authority is is
nontrivial. It is worth keeping in mind that the model is
designed to describe local government behaviour rather than
local authority as a set of people. This implies that I have
to link the concept of life cycle to the political aspect of
local authorities. There are in Britain two basic systems by
which local governments bodies are elected:
a) the representatives are elected simultaneously for a
period of four years;
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b) for each of the first three years 1/3 of the councillors
are elected and no one is elected in the fourth.
I will concentrate for the sake of simplicity on examining
the optimal behaviour of type a authorities. Is the life
cycle of those authorities four years? How have they to be
evaluated? Let us suppose that at the end of year T there
are elections in authority i. The representative elected
will run the authority for four years i.e. until the end of
T+4.
T	 T+1
	 T+2
	
T+3
	 T+4
However, due to the rules by which the budget is set
the local government will have to set the budgets for the
period T+1 — T+5.
T	 T+1	 T+2	 T+3	 T+4
I 	 n 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 n
T+1	 T+2	 T+3	 T+4	 T+5
On one hand it is possible to argue that the period to
be taken into account is T+1 — T+5 that is the period for
which the local authority is setting the budget. This
approach does not to seem quite useful since the rule
governing budget setting in period T+5 might be quite
different and the consistency with the budgets set in the
previous years crucially depends on the confidence the
leading government has to be reelected.
If we consider the period T — T+4 as the right spell length,
110
the first objection would be that local authority has not
got any power in setting the budget for the first period
since it has been set by the previous administrators; this
argument, however, is not completely valid since, although
the decision at the first stage cannot be altered, actual
expenditure is still a decision variable for the new
administration through the use of rate balances. The
argument that the new government is always able to spend
less than the budget since it could "save" by increasing the
balances while it could find quite difficult to overspend is
counterbalanced by the suggestion that using sophisticated
creative accounting procedure it is possible to fiddle with
numbers. However, it is important to point out that by
assigning an arbitrary 23
	
ceiling to the sum of actual
expenditure plus savings in the first period a quite
restrictive constraint on the expenditure path through the
period could potentially be introduced. Those
problems,however are not very important from the theoretical
point of view of the model I am going to present since, for
reasons that will become clear later, local authorities, if
allowed to do so transfer money forward.
Local authorities neither expect to receive nor desire
to leave any inheritance. At the end of the period in which
they are in charge it is quite reasonable to assume that
local administrators will not leave any savings (in the form
of rate balances) to the new councillors that will be
elected. In order to secure reelection it is plausible to
23 in the context of this model
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think that local government will try to reduce as much as
possible taxation in year T+4 since election will take place
at the end of it: being able to maintain or increase
expenditure without virtually any tax increase might be a
determinant factor for securing reelection. The best way to
achieve this result seems to be to use rate balances from
previous years to finance expenditure in T+4.
4.1 THE MODEL
In this model I will not assume any proper discount
rate for utility: social welfare maximisation through the
political life of each government should be informed to a
long run welfare perspective which suggest that the pseudo
utility achieved in each period should have the same weight;
however, as I pointed out before local authorities do not
have a proper utility function: they behave as if they had
one. This might suggest that, from a more political point of
view the local government could have an interest in doing
its best to maximise utility over the period T+1 — T+4 for
which it is able (and has got the responsibility) to set the
budget; as concerns the first period it could always blame
for any perverse effect (like reduction in expenditure or
increase in taxation) the flaws in the previous
administration and the lack of accuracy with which they set
this budget. I will no turn to present the formal setting of
the new model.
In the absence of any grant, the budget constraint for
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1R t =	 t i.e. the discount rate that converts money in(1+ r)
period t to money in period 0.
To simplify the notation I will define 	 R *M = R.t t	 v
This term represents the discounted value of the local
income through the life cycle.
the model can thus be written as:
X t + ABLt(1+0 + y t= M t	 t = 1, 4
BL
o
 = 0
BL 4 = 0
BL	 = BLt (l+r)t+1
BL = balances from previous years; this term is equivalent
to wealth in a standard life cycle model.
ABL = the changes in balances from the previous year. This
terms is equivalent to savings in a standard life
cycle model.
Assuming a perfect market for borrowing and lending,
the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
l't)k X	 +	 1,t t /cy =	 1R*1nIIt	 t	 t	 tt
At the optimum it must be true that:
U i (X ey t ,P) =X*
U (X ,y (3) = A *2	 t	 t'
where subscripts denotes partial derivatives and X. * is the
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discounted Lagrange multiplier associated with the wealth
constraint. According to this equation expenditure is chosen
SO that the marginal utility of consumption equals the
marginal utility of wealth. Using the implicit function
theorem it is possible to solve those equations leading to a
general demand equation of the form
X NG, t = X [R ,A.,/3]v
Yt = Y[R ,X*,131v
Rv = discounted sum of resources available to each local
authority throughout its life cycle.
The functions X(.,.)
	
and y(.,.)	 depend only on the
functional form of U(.,.).
If a functional form is specified for U it is possible,
by substituting back in the budget constraint to obtain the
optimal value of X * and thus a complete set of equations.
Once again Central Government's objective is to minimize the
grant it has to give to any local authority to make it to
spend at least a* in each period. To simplify the analysist
*I will assume that a
	 as well as income are constantt
through the time period considered, they are peculiar to
each local authority and known with certainty by Central
Government.
To start with, I will consider a situation in which no
interest rate for money available at different times is
served i.e. r = 0 and, as I have pointed out before there is
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no time discount on utility. The implication of relaxing
both assumptions will be examined later. I will also assume
that:
X (0 ,R	 < cc* tNG 2 v t = 1,4
i.e. local authorities with the highest preferences are not
able to reach the expenditure target relying on their own
resources. This assumption rules out the possibility of
having negative grants. With the introduction of the grant
the budget constraint faced by a representative local
authority is modified as follows:
R t >tX.)1/41;	 +	 1R:k y	 =	 Rtt	 t	 t
and the demand equations for both public and private
consumption can in general terms be written as:
X GR	 = X[R,t 	 ,g	 ,f31t
= y[R ,g ,X * ,13]Y t	 v t
As for the static model, the optimal allocation rule is
defined as the set of rules that determines the allocation,
the size and the form of the grant that each local authority
will receive in the four periods.
In analogy with the results obtained in the previous
section, the optimal grant setting in a system characterized
by both parties fully informed is again an open ended
matching grant for the reasons I explained before.
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4.2 THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PROBLEM
When Central Government does riot know the preferences
for services provided locally the asymmetry of information
that characterizes the prol:!em makes local authorities
better off by cheating. By reporting a lower 13 than the true
one, they can achieve a greater overall level of utility
because they receive a grant which is greater than they one
they should be entitled to had they reported their true
preferences. In terms of the environment I described in
section 2.2 assumption iv) is now replaced by
iv )a 13 although independent across authorities is fixed
through the life cycle of each local authority.
From assumption iv)a it follows that the optiltil solution
can be examined in a context characterized by Central
Government and one local authority and then replicate the
optimal solution to the entire population 1 .
Central Government can observe local income in each period
and it knows a but it has to rely on local government as
concerns preferences for local public services. The only
available information is that the true preference parameter
lies in the closed interval [131
 132]. Before the start of'
period one Central Government asks local authorities to
report their preferences, 13d . From period one onwrrds it can
Infer 13 by observing the expenditure for local public
l it is clear that this does not mean that all authority will
receive the same incentive: what it means is that the
general formula will be the same for all authorities but the
act ual value will depend on the parameters characterizing
each authority.
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services that each local authority has actually chosen.
The main difference with the static model is that in this
case Central Government is able to infer from the chosen
expenditure level in each period the revealed 13 and then
local authorities'expenditure behaviour must be consistent
with the declared 13d if they want to receive each year the
same amount of grant. The basic differences between the two
models are illustrated in the flow chart diagram in table 1.
TABLE ONE
STATIC MODEL
	 DYNAMIC MODEL
Period one
	 Period one
a) Central Government	 ask
local authorities their 13
b) on the basis	 of	 the
reported 13 it set s up the
matching grant
c) local authorities set up
their expenditure
Per iod 2 until period 4
	
Period 2 until period 4
Start from a) again. Central Government infers p
from c) in per iod t-1 and
set s up the new matching
grant according ly.
In the next sections I will show graphically and
analytically the gain a representative local authority might
have in cheating in the first three years of its life cycle
under two different assumptions, namely:
a) the local authority is constrained to spend all the
income and grant in the same period it receives
them. (i.e. its budgets has to be balanced each year);
b) it can transfer resources from one period to another one
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4.2.1 CASE A) BUDGET BALANCED EVERY YEAR.
The gain from cheating for the case in which local
authorities cannot transfer money across time can be
quantified by comparing the indirect utility for cheating
with the one it would get by declaring its preference
truthfully. If our local authority declares 0 before the
start of period one, it would be able to spend a* and y* in
each period then its indirect utility function would be:
V (
 no cheat)  . U(a* , Y* ) + U(a* , y* ) +U(a* , y* ) + U(a* , Y* )
as illustrated in figure seven.
FIGURE SEVEN
The local authority in this case declares f3, spends exactly
*
a	 each year and is maximising its utility since the
Indifference curve is tangential to the budget constraint.
By reporting 13 d before the start of period one and
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being consistent with its cheating in the following periods
our local authority will spend a*
 on local public goods but,
since it is entitled to a higher grant than in the previous
case, it will actually be able to spend more on private
goods. The indirect utility for this case can be written as:
* **	 * **	 * **	 *	 *
V	 - u(a , y
	 ) + U(a , y	 ) +U(cx , y	 ) + U(X GR' y )( cheat)
y
**	 *
> y	 which by greed implies	 : U(cc* , y** ) > U(a* , y*)
X * R > cc
*
 which again implies
G
: U(X *GR , y* ) > U(a* , y*)
This can be illustrated by using the following diagrams:
FIGURE EIGHT
In the first three periods the local authority is at an
equilibrium point which is not optimum since the utility is
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not tangential to its budget constraint but it is on a
higher indifference curve than the one labelled I 	 in
nc
figure seven. In period four it will reveal its true
*preference by choosing to locate at X: R y, which is both an
equilibrium and an optimum point since the Indifference
Curve is tangential to the budget constraint. Again, by
comparing	 IC h 4 with IC	 the gain in utility is selfcric
evident.
FIGURE NINE
From the following diagrams it is also possible to infer
that the cheating does not depend on the assumption of no
time preferences on utility: each local authority will be
better off by cheating anyway because it is in each period
on a higher indifference curve. Local authorities will wait
until the last period to reveal their true preferences in
order to maximise the benefits they receive by cheating.
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Just as an illustration I will compare the indirect utility
derived from revealing the true preference in the first
period or in the last one. The two indirect utilities can be
written as:
U(X* Y* ) + 11(a* , y* ) +U(a* , y) + U(a* , y* )v (p.r.per. 1)	 GR
*
V	 U(a* , y
	
U(cc , y ** )+1.3(a , y ** ) + li(X , y )(p.r.per.4)
and the gain is self evident.
4.2.2 CASE B) RESOURCES CAN BE TRANSFERRED ACROSS TIME
If local authorities can "save up" resources by
reducing their consumption of private goods in the first
three periods they will use part of these additional
resources to finance more expenditure in the last one in
which they will
	 again reveal	 their preferences. This
procedure is a form of "creative accounting" behaviour.
will explain this feature at length later when the basic
model will be dealing with expenditure and taxation as
decision variables.
It is again possible to see the gain local authorities
have in cheating by comparing the indirect utility derived
from cheating with the one obtained by truthfully reveal
their preferences. Let consider again a representative
authority. If it reports its true preference, it would be
entitled to spend a* and y * in each period then its indirect
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utility function would be:
V	 = U(a* , y* ) + U(a* , Y* ) +U(a*,) +	 y * )(no cheat)
By cheating on the p it reports, our local authority will
spend a*on local public goods but, since it is entitled to a
higher grant, it will actually be able to spend more on
private goods and to save resources for the last period.
The indirect utility for this case can be written as:
V (cheat) . 1,1 ( a* , y) + U(a* , y) +U(04 * , y ) + U(X",
Y < Y
	
which
	 implies: 1..T(e,y ) > 13(cx * , y'` )	 ;i=1,4
X
**
> a
* 
which again implies	 :	 y) > U(e,
This can be illustrated by using I be following set of
d iagrairis:
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FIGURE TEN
In the first three periods, the local authority is not at an
equilibrium position since the indifference curve it locates
is not on the budget constraint. This policy, however allows
it to save up resources for the last period as diagram
eleven shows:
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*9,
M'M =	 ( y -)
1
FIGURE ELEVEN
In period four our local authority's	 budget constraint can
be analytically written as:
g 4 X 4 + y 9 = M
(y* ) 
_ y1)
i.1
where EC) represent the savings from previous periods. As a
result of its cheating then the budget constraint for our
local authority in the last periods shift upwards and the
price it faces is less than it should have been had it
revealed its true preference in the previous periods. Since
after period four local authority's decision making body
will be reelected, it has an incentive to reveal its true
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t = 1 ,4
preference since this information would only be partly used
from Central Government to infer the preferences for future
periods and this consideration might not affect local
government decision body because in this model I do not take
account of the possibility that the same body will be
reelected, then utility is maximised within the period in
which it is in charge of government.
In period four, then our local authority choose an optimum
point and it uses the savings from previous years to shift
its expenditure for public goods from a * to X. The
parallel shift in the budget constraint represents the
amount of resources saved up in the first three periods,
3
Z**i.e.	 (y	 — y . ). As a result of this policy Central1
1=1
Government is worse off in this case because the matching
grant has to be provided for more unit of public goods.
To avoid the cheating Central Government has to devise a
system of incentives such that local authorities will be
better off by revealing their true preferences. The form of
incentive received will be a function of the preferences
that local authorities declares to Central Government before
the start of period one and I will assume that, as a result
of the incentive scheme expenditure on local services is
boosted up in each period by the amount:
where et represent the optimal incentive that avoid
cheating. The incentive can be introduced in many ways.I
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dg d
Jt = 1
g e (i3 )(x* e dc p )tt d t Min0 g
t t
g te t cg d )at *Y.
t=1
Min
e g
t t
have chosen a multiplicative form because the actual grant
system relates measures of needs, target expenditures and
kinks by a scaling factor 25 . The problem faced by Central
Government is then to minimize the grant to be given to each
local authority • with the double constraint of having them
spending at least a * in local public services and avoid
their cheating. The problem can then be formalized as
follows:
that can be rewritten as
4
s.t.v 1 ( 0 1 (P) ,g 1 (P) .m ,P) ± v (0 (13),g (19),L13)
	 +2 2	 2
V 3 (0 3 (13),g 3(19),M, ) + v 4 (e 4 (g),g 4 (g),m,g)	 
V 1 0 1 (13 d ),g 1 (13 d ),M, /3) + V 2 (0 2 ( gd ) 1 g 2 (%), M 1 /3)
+ V 303 (13d ),g 3 03d ),M 43) + V4 ce 4 (f3d ),g 4 03d ),M , 13)
S.t. X(gd ,Rv ,g t ) 2 eet
The problem can be solved using a standard approach to
constrained maximisation and the optimal set of grant
allocation rules is determined by the specific form of the
251n the real world, in fact, the threshold level of
expenditure for a representative authority i, which should
represent 
a* 
e t = GREA i *K i .
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utility function local governments are assumed to maximise.
From constraint 2) it is possible to not that the problem
can solved for just one decision variable. For example if
the problem is solved with respect to 6, it is possible to
observe that, since the incentive will raise the size of the
grant the incentive compatible constraint will be binding
then:
a)0	 =1
a et
b)	 > 0 at least for some t
Condition a) means that no incentive is required if the
authority's true preference is the lowest value in the range
while condition b) means that, in order to make an authority
whose preference for expenditure is higher than p reveal
their true parameter the incentive itself has to be an
increasing function of the preference parameter declared.
For the rest of the chapter the analysis will be conducted
assuming that local authorities behaviour can be
approximated by a Cobb Douglas utility function and the
optimal allocation set of rules will be shown under
different assumptions.
5. THE DYNAMIC OPTIMAL GRANT RULES : A COBB DOUGLAS EXAMPLE.
In analogy with the more general case presented above I
will show first of all the optimal grant allocation rule for
the case in which both parties are perfectly informed and I
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(1 — f3) EMt
will then present the system of incentives necessary to make
local authorities reveal truthfully their preferences in a
world characterized by asymmetry of information.
5.1 OPTIMAL GRANT FORMULA IN PERFECT INFORMATION.
In the absence of any grant local government's demand
for local services might be derived by maximising its
utility function subject to the budget constraint. This can
be formulated as:
Max	 (1-p) tin y t + p t/n, X t
	  = 1,4
s.t.	 [x 	 y t]
In order to simplify the analysis I will assume that M, as
I, i
well as a is constant through time. By using a standard
Lagrangean approach it is possible to derive the following
set of demand equations: 26
26
under the further assumption that M is constant through
time.The same result would in this particular case be
obtained also by assuming that local authorities cannot
transfer money from one period to another one. If M is not
constant through time and local authorities can transfer
money from different periods the two demands equations have
to be rewritten as:
13 EM t X t —	and	 y t =4	 4
while demands if the budget has to be balanced each period
do not change.
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-M
g t
y = (I—g) M
•
In analogy with the models I presented before, I will assume
that XNG,t= 13 M < a then Central Government has to offer a2
subsidy to all local authorities. Again, the form of subsidy
can either be a lump — sum grant which will increase local
disposable income, M, or a matching grant whose effect is to
reduce the price that local authorities have to face for
expenditure. For the reasons explained in the previous
sections it can be shown that a matching grant is more
effective than a lump—sum grant to reach the scope of making
local authorities to increase their expenditure. When the
matching grant is introduced the budget constraint for local
authorities can be written as:
YligX -1-y1=14t t	 t
and the demand equations are:
X t = (13 M )/g t
y t = ( 1 -13) M
In this environment Central Government problem is to
find the optimal grant allocation form that:
MAX — (1—gt.)*(x*
s.t. — [ g
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The optimal solution is then:
P*M
g
t 
=
a
*
5.2 THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE SOLUTION.
In analogy with the previous models I will now assume
that Central Government does not know the preferences for
local expenditure. The environment is still represented by
the assumptions stated in section four. Central Government's
objective is still represented by the minimization of the
sum of money it has to give to local authorities in order to
make them spend at least a *
 in each period. In this case one
of the policies that Central Government could follow would
be to set a system of' matching grant in an open loop policy.
Before the start of period one, since no further information
is available, Central Government asks local authorities to
declare their preference parameter. From period 1 onwards
the level of matching grant (l — g t ) can be set according to
the previous level of expenditure. If local authorities
behave according to a Cobb Douglas utility function, then:
M
X = pt	 g t
By observing Xt
 and assuming that local authorities
behaviour can be represented by a Cobb Douglas Central
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P—
X
t M
U
*
Government can infer:
g 
t
If local authorities report 13 d < P.	 they	 will receive a
unit matching grant of the form:
(1 —g t ) = [1
in every period, but they will be constrained to spend no
M
more than	 d g t	 in local public services in the first
three periods 27 . The final remark to make is that local
authorities, if they decide to cheat they must be consistent
in the first three period by declaring the same 13
d
. As I
have explained before, local authorities are supposed to
maximise their utility function through time and preferences
are assumed to be constant, then a change in f3 can only be
interpreted as a signal that they are cheating. I will first
examine the case in which it is not possible to transfer
money from one period to the following one.
5.2.1 CASE A: BUDGET BALANCED EVERY YEAR.
Under this assumption the demand equations for the
private commodity and the public one can be written as
follows:
13
27This is the result of the assumption that Central
Government can infer after the first period local
government's preference by observing its actual expenditure.
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x
t 
= pd g
4 = p g t
=
Pd
g4= 	
4
OC
P d	 P1
a v
= _ 3
1 — p
— pd
a 0d
s 0
y t = (1 — Pd ) M	 t = 1,3
y 4 = ( 1 	p ) m
The optimal level of cheating might be found by
maximising local authorities' indirect utility function with
respect to P d .
Max V (m,g,p d )= (1—p ) tA-L mo—Pd)
P d A
(i -a ) in M(l—)
	
+	 p tin. a* 	+
(1-3 ) -e4-1. M(1 — P)	 +	 13 Xin. a *	+
* P(1—p ) tff i. M ( 1 —0 )	 +	 P tin a --p--6
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions:
Pd aa VP =
Since 0 < /3 < 1,
	
this derivative is always negative, then
it follows that the constraint is binding and:
Pd	 P1
In order to make local authorities reveal their true
preferences Central Government has to devise an incenth, e
scheme.
	 I will consider here an open loop policy by which
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P *m 	
t=1,4
[1 a* (9	 )t t d
	 * ee )
t t d
t 0 td
P d*M
central government, before of the start of period 1 offers
local government the following matching grant:
such that local authorities are allowed to spend X =e0t(i3d)
and y = M(1-f3 d ) in each period. If the form of incentives is
chosen optimally, local authorities will not cheat and their
indirect utility function could be written as:
vb(m,g(e*),P)=(l -(3 ) tin. M(l -13 ) + f3 tia c(* (9 1	 +1
(1 -13 ) tift. m ( 1 -13 ) + f3 tin ee l +
2
( 1 — 13 ) tin. m ( 1 - p ) + g tn. a*e * +
3
( l 
-f3 ) tin m(l 
--f3 ) + 13 tin. a*e*
4
where e
t 
denotes the optimal incentive to be given to local
authorities at time t in order to avoid their cheating.
Central Government's problem is to find the minimum
amount of grant to give to each local authority. The total
grant can be written as:
i = 1
then, in analogy with the more general case presented in the
previous section, the problem can be written as:
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4y
4 a e t (P d) — PaM
t=1
s.t. 0, 1 a =1
i I n
The second constraint in the problem just states the initial
condition for the optimal incentive: the matching grant rate
set up at the start of this section assures that local
*
authorities with preferences equal to p I will spend c, then
no further incentive is needed for them to reveal their
preferences. If e t (f3 d) is chosen optimally, it must be true
that 28 :
Min
e
t
I3 tin. ext
13
 Liza — + 3(1—(3) tyn. 	g i	 1— f3
[ 1 — 13 1 )
This formula has a clear interpretation: the incentive
to be offered to local authorities must give to them the
same amount of extra utility they would have received by
cheating. This is in fact the interpretation that can be
given to the right hand side of the expression where the
first term represents the extra utility local authorities
enjoy by spending more in period four and the second term is
the extra utility they enjoy by increasing the private
28This result can easily be obtained by observing that if
local authorities cheat they would chose p -1 in V a . Then it
Is just a matter of evaluate V — V .b	 a
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t = 1,4
that if a local authority has preference equal pi 0	 1V,S
be equal to one, i.e. no .incentive is need to if	 tIll
spend at least a * then the second constraint is red4r fliart
Central Government's problem can thus be rewritten a§
4
(a*e t (fi d ) —P211)
t = I
13	
1	 131 
S.t. 13e40 t 	 f3tin.	 + 3 ( 1 -13) A-1/	 1-0
This problem can be solved by using the standard Arroa, —
Entoven approach to maximisation. The first order condit,ons
are:
a 1,
- (x" + x / e t  O
a e t
t=1,4
-
L
=	 e cod
	-	 pi	 )3 	 p	 1— p J
From the first set of constraints A should be positive then
the constraint is binding. From this set of constraints it
is also clear that 0 =0 2 =03 =0 4 then the optimal solution,
due to the equivalence between the declared p and the true
one assured by the optimization of the previous problem can
be lk ritten as function of fl as follows:
3 ( 1
	
'1	 ( 1	 1314
t.
	13 1 J	 (1-13 )
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The solution for this problem is rather intuitive. The
constraint implies that the sum of the rate of growth of the
incentives is linear and constant which implies that the
functional form for the incentives should be log linear 29 .
It is then clear that the best way of minimizing the
incentive to be given to local authorities is to choose a
common incentive for any period.
5.2.2 CASE B: MONEY CAN BE TRANSFERRED ACROSS TIME.
In this second case I will allow local authorities to
transfer money from the different periods of their lifetime.
By using the same line of argument I explained for the case
in which the budget had to be balanced each year a
representative local authority will spend:
PdM 
X
t
 = R
d g
=	 t = 1,3	 g t =
U
*
in the first three periods. However, due to the possibility
of transferring money across time this local authority is no
longer constrained to spend y t = (1 — f3 d ) M	 t = 1,3
in private commodities.
The demand equations for both X 4 and y can be derived by
solving the following problem:
[
Max	 (1—n) tin. y t + fi tin, X 4 -I- 3 13 tin. cc*
29 13 is assumed to be a given parameter determined outside the
model.
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goods is equal to:
g a* = 3	 Mt	 t t = 1,3
s.t.	 [x
	 y t] =	 M tt t
By having declared g d
 the grant they receive in the first
three periods is equal to:
d*M1
*[1	
=	 PdM
a
while the price to pay in period four will be:
[3 AM
g 4 =
The amount spent in the first three periods for local public
thcn the budget constraint can be written as:
g \ 4 +	 y t = 4(M — 3P d )
Maximising the utility function for X 4 and y t gives:
M ( 4 — 3g d ) /3	 (4-313d) /3
*
( 4 — 3g) g 4
	(4 — 3g) gd
Y t = 	  * (1 — g)	 t = 1, 4
M ( 4 — 3gd)
4 — 313
the latter set of demand equation have been derived such
X 4
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that the process of maximisation leads to equalizing the
marginal utility of money and then to spread resources
evenly among periods on the unconstrained good. It is worth
noting that the level of X t demanded is greater than in the
case in which local authorities do not cheat. This is the
result of the income effect produced by the possibility of
saving resources. The optimal level of cheating might be
found by maximising local authorities indirect utility
function with respect to Pd.
M(4 - 3 (3 )
Max V (Tv1,g,f3 )=(1	 ) tift. 	 d	 * (1 —
 
j3)+ f3 tin. a*
13 (1 	 a
(1 -P
(1-13
(1-13 )
)
)
4 - 3(3
M(4 - 3(3)
" *
*
(1- fo+
	 P .f/n-
(1- ri)+	 P	 a*
(4-30d)
+
+
13
13d
4	 -	 313
M ( 4	 -	 313d)
4 - 3g
M( 4 -313
u (1*
4	 -	 313 4	 - 313
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions:
[3 ( 1	 - (3 )
	 311av 4 	 	 s 0
a	
=
gd	
-	 4 - 3 (3 d	 4 - 3Pd Pd
Pd	 P1
v
Pd (--(73- (1 ) =
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since the derivative is always negative, the constraint is
binding then:
P a =
In order to make each local authority reveal its true
preference Central Government has then to offer a form of
incentive to local government. I will here consider again
the policy of offering local governments a matching grant of
the form:
{1
Pl*M
aTh (13 )
t d
such that local authorities are allowed to spend c:((9 t (P d ) in
each period. If the form of incentives is chosen optimally,
local authorities will not cheat and their indirect utility
function could, in analogy with the previous case, be
written as:
v (m,g(0*),P) = (1-P ) a (1- p)+ p t/n c( *e' +1
-p ) tin. (1— (3)+ 13 tin a*e;
(1-13 ) tin ( 1 - p)+ f3	 c(*O*3 +
(1 -p ) tin 1 -a) + 13 tin cr*O:
where a t. denotes the optimal incentive to be given 10 local
authorities at time t in order to avoid their cheating.
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	 I
t=1
(C(*e t (P d) — PdM )Mm n
et(Pd)
Central Government's problem can thus be written as:
Min
0
t
t=1
— P dM )
st. Vb(M,g(6*),P)	  V, (M,g,Pd )	 all p c [pi,p21
If 0 (P ) is chosen optimally, it must be true that 30t d
P
—	
(
=	
4 — 313 1 )
/3 tAl. et :	 PEAL to + 4 (1 — P ) t in. 
	
tj .1	 4 — 3f3 j
which has the same interpretation as the analogous formula I
presented in section 5.2.1.
Central Government's problem can thus be written as:
s . t . f3 tin. 6 t
P
= ptirt - t-3-1 + 4(1-p) tn.
4 — 3P 1 )
4 — 3P j
This problem can be solved by using the standard Arrow —
Entoven method. The first order conditions can be written
"This result can easily be obtained by observing that if
local authorities cheat they would chose pi in V. Then it
a
is just a matter of evaluate V b — Va.
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= ptia. —(3 + 4(1-13) tin,
8L
= — a * + X / e t s o
a et
t=1,4
4 —313
From the first set of constraints X should be positive then
the constraint is binding. From this set of constraint it is
also clear that 0 1 =6 2 =6 3 =6 4 then the optimal solution, due
to the equivalence between the declared 13 and the true one
assured by the optimization of the previous problem can be
written as function of p as follows:
13
e ((3) =
"
1
r 4 —30i)
4 -3g j t = 1,4
It is worth noting that in this case the incentive to give
to this representative local authority to make sure it does
not cheat is greater than in the case in which the budget
had to be balanced every year, as we would expect.
6. A TWO PRICES SYSTEM FOR THE GRANT ALLOCATION RULE.
In the previous system the loss suffered by Central
Government for its inability to know local government's
preferences is equal to:
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a* ( et-1)
	 31
I will now slightly modify the system in order to make
Central Government learn the true preference parameter for
each local authority by using a lower incentive scheme which
reduces the amount Central Government has to pay to learn
P.The new system foresees a set of rules by which local
authorities will never be able to spend more than a* 32 in
each period. The implementation I will present requires the
introduction of penalties in the form of grant withdrawals
for expenditure in excess of the desired level. As result
the system of incentive can be reduced. Each year is
characterized by a double price system such that for
expenditure up to a* the matching rate is:
[
(1 —g t ) = 1 —
For expenditure in excess of a * the matching rate will be:
(1 — gt,2)
where g is the price level assuring that any authority,
31	 .	 . -This is the loss for each period and for a representative
authority. The total loss suffered by Central Government
will then be:
4
a
* ( 6 — 1)
tj	 tj
t=1. j=1
32The actual level of expenditure at the kink is, for the
reasons I will show later, a*Ot.
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irrespective of its true preferences will not spend more
than a*.
I will start as usual by examining the optimal level of
cheating by local authorities in this case.
I will formally present only the model based on the
assumption that local authorities are allowed to transfer
money from the different periods of their lifetime 33 . Let
start by finding the penalty for the last period. I will
assume that a representative local authority has declared P d
before the start of period one. The demand equations for the
private and public goods be written as follows:
M
	
	 PdM *
X t = Pd	
=a	 t=1,3
	 g t —g t	 a *
Pd M
X 4 =a
*
g41 =
, 
a
*
g	 .?
4 , 2
yt = ( 1 — 13 ) Md t = 1,4
In order to achieve this result Central Government has
to find a set of prices to be applied on expenditure
exceeding a* such that the budget constraint of each local
33 Since the incentive system would be the same in both cases
I have preferred to recall here only the most general. If
local authorities could not transfer money across time there
would be no need of increasing the severity of penalties
through time.
143
-X 4
m ( 4 -3gd) + e(g4,2 _ g
authority will look like figure six . The grant a local
authority receives for expenditure up to a *
 is equal to:
13
* a
* 
= a
*
— 13 M
*	 d
a
such that the extended intercept of the budget constraint on
the second segment is:
P	 )	 34M(4-3gd ) 4- eig,2-	 M4	 d
 *
a
The demand function for the problem without constraint on
how much to spend on the last period was:
M(4 — 313d)	 g
*
4 — 3p	 g 4
then Central government has to find a g4,2 such that:
 a
*
*
4-3p	 g43p	 2,
g
g 2  M(1 — 13 ) * *- 4, 	 d
a (1 -(3)
Since Central Government does not know p, the best it
can do is fix a price so high that also the highest spenders
34The derivation of this formula is analogous to the one
presented for the static model, the only difference is
represented by savings from previous periods.
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M
*
= a
/3
2
X = 2
3
t = 1,2
X 4 = a* g =
9 4 , 2 M(1 — (3 d ) *
a* (1 — 13)
4 , I
P m
a
*
will be stuck at the kink. In this case 13 has clearly to be
chosen equal to 19 2 . A penalty system in the last period is
not sufficient alone to achieve the result of having local
authorities spending a * in each period.If the two price
system is introduced on expenditure only in the last period,
local authorities could be better off by revealing their
true preferences in the previous periods. In this case their
expenditure decisions could be summarised as follows:
X 3 can be found by maximising:
Max	 ( 1 - p ) t/11. y t + f3 tn X 3
s.t.	 g t X t + yt =	 M
By having declared 
13d 
the grant they receive in the first
two periods is equal to:
Pal 
x a
* 
= a
*
— 13 M
a
*	 d
while the fourth period will be (a* — pm).
The amount spent for local public in the first two periods
[1
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and in period four is equal to:
(20d + g)
t t	 4
t=1
the budget constraint can then be rewritten as:
g 3 X 3 + yt = 4(M — 20 d — p)
then
M(4 — 2(3 d -0)	 g
a	 *  p 
4 — 3f3
M(4 — 2(3 d —g)
y t = 	 *(1— p) t = 1, 4
4 — 30
If local authorities were allowed to do so, Central
Government will have a loss in period 3. However it is again
possible to design a two price system also for this period
in ordcr to make them spend a * . The intercept on the
extended budget on the second segment is:
M(4 — 2f3 d — p) + alg3,2
then Central government has to find a g 32 such that:
,
)d M(4 — 2f3 d — (3) + a	 *
a
 a
4 — 313
4(4 — 3P d —
 P)
	  *3,2 4 a* (1 —
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which can compared with the equivalent expression for g42
to assess that g3,2 < g4,2 i.e. the grant withdrawal is
tougher in the last period.35
Equivalently for period one and two prices on the
second segment have to be:
g	 2
2,2
M(4 — 2f3d-213)
4 c( * (1 — p)
M(4 — p d -313)g	  	
* P1,2 4 a* ( 1 — p)
The optimal level of cheating might be found as usual
by maximising local authorities' indirect utility function
with respect to f3d.
	
Max Va (M,g,f3d ) = (1—p ) t/n. m(1- pd )	 +
	
(1-p ) tin M (1 — f3 d )	 +
	
(1-p ) Zn. M(l—Pd )	 +
	
(1 —p ) tin M(1-I3 d )	 +	 13 t.n. a*
s.t. f3d  131
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions:
p-p 1a v
= - 4
a Pd	 1 — 13d
35As result of less savings available.
s 0
(3 tin. a* +
/3 tin. a * +
p tin a* +
147
M in
Pd
 H
a
a—p-d) = 0
since this derivative is always negative, it follows that
the constraint is binding then:
gd = g
In order to make local authorities to reveal their true
preferences Central Government has to offer a form of
incentive to local government. I will here consider again
the policy of offering local government a matching grant of
the form:
(1 – g ) = [1
cx*S-2'
I.
	 t
such that local authorities are allowed to spend (x*Q.t t
in each period.
If local authorities are given the cptimal incentive
their indirect utility function is modified as follows:
v (m.g(Q*),p) = (1 – (3 ) in m(i-(3 )
	
+	 g tin. (IV	 +
b	 I
(1-13 ) tin, M ( 1 -(3 )	 +	 p tin a *S2 .2 +
(1-13 ) tin. m (1 -13 )	 +	 13 tin a *C2 	 +
(l – i3 ) tin mo.-(3 )	 +	 /3 tin a O.4
In analogy with the cases I presented before, Central
Government's problem can thus be written as:
4
(a *C) – /3 'NIt	 d
Pci*M
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g 1
Q t(	 = t = 1,4
[ I -f3
(0). 	
1 - g
t = 1,4
g2
S .	 eA Qt 	 = 4(1-13) tin
which gives as optimal solution:
1
1
Clearly the prices on the second segment will have to be
modified to take account of the incentive. The final system
can be summarized as follows:
1\ \TIVF] SCHEME:
PRi cE ON THE FURST SEGMENTS:
i = 1,4
PRICES ON THE SECOND SEGMENT:
M(4 — /3 — 313 )2  * g2
4 cX *0 ( 1
	 g 2 )
M(4 —313 — 132)
g 3 2	 * g2
4 a *S2 ( 1 — /3 )
3	 2
M(4 — 2/3 — 213 2 )2 * g2
4 c( *0 2 (1 — 132)
g 2 = M(1 — I3 ) *, 
(x*° 4 ( 1 —132)
g 
1 2 
_ g 2 2
Government loses a * ( t — 1) in every period and for each
single authority. However, since e t > C2 t there has been a
reduction in it.
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7. A MODEL WITH THE INTEREST RATE.
The standard model is now extended by allowing the
Interest rate to be different from zero. In this case, in
order to derive the standard demand equations I have to
discount future revenues to bring them to the same time. The
basic assumptions of the model do not, however change and in
particular I will assume that both Central and local
government uses the same rate of interest. Local authorities
still have an income in each period equal to M and Central
Government wants them to spend at least a * in each period.
Perfect foresight and additive intertemporal separability
separability is assumed throughout in analogy with the model
presented in section 4 and 5.
7.1 OPTIMAL SETTING WITH BOTH PARTIES PERFECTLY INFORMED.
In a world with both parties informed and in the
absence of any grant from Central Government the counterpart
of the model presented in section 3.1 can be found by
solving the following problem:
Max 1 (1 —p) tin Yt + P kn. xt
X 2 	 	 Y 2
S.t. X	 -I-	 +	
3	
+	
X 4
	-I-
1	 (1 + r)	 (1 + r) 2
	(1 + r)3 
+ y
1 
+ 
(1 + r)
Y3	 .6.	 Y 4	 M	 M
= M +	 +	 +
(1 + r)z ' (1 + r) 3
	(1 + r)	 (1 + r)2
M
(1 + r)3
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P Rv
4 t = 1,4X NG, t 17:
t = 1,4
[
M t
(1 +r) (t-1 ))
= p
t	 4X
In section 5.1 I define:
M+ 	  + 	  + 	
 =R
v(1 + r)	 (1 + r) 2
	(1 + r)3
In order to simplify the notation I will also define
v	
= (i+r)t-1
and
*	
0+01-t= 
then the solution to the previous problem can be written as
follows : 36
t
Y t =- 4
* v t
In analogy with the models presented in the previous
*
sections I will assume that X NG, t < a for all the local
If M is not constant through time and local authorities can
transfer money across time the demand equations can be
written as:
[
M t
(1 +r) (t-1)1
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authorities which rules out the possibility of offering
negative grants. In this environment Central Government
problem is to find the optimal grant allocation form that:
MAX — (1—g t )*a * * 19t
S. t.
	
[h. R
—	
v  
* t, 1t s — a*-,,
g
t
and the optimal solution is:
P*R
V 
g 
t 
=
4a
* 
*1)
If the form of the subsidy is assumed to be either a
matching grant or a lump sum the optimal policy for Central
Government is again to offer a matching grant such as (1—g)
7.2 THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE SOLUTION.
If local authorities are better informed than Central
Government about preferences, they have an incentive
tocheat. I will examine consider only the case in which
local authorities are allowed to transfer money among
different time periods. The demand for local public goods in
the first three periods can, in analogy with the model
presented in section 5.2.2 be written as:
t
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	R	 p dR v 0	 v
= a
*X
t 
=	 t = 1,3	 g =d g
t 	
t	 *
a
in the first three periods.
The demand equations for both X 4 and y can be derived by
solving the following problem:
Max	 (1-13) tin Yt	 +	 /3 t_in, X 4
s.t. Z 8 (g X + y )=- R
t	 t t	 t	 v
By having declared Pd the grant they receive in the first
three periods is equal to:
p d *R vI * 
= a
*
- g R* a
a
*	 d v
while the price in period four will be:
/3 *Rd v
g 4 —	
t?
a
*	 t
The amount spent in the first three periods for local public
goods is equal to:
-& g a*
 = 3 /3 R t = 1,3
t t t	 d v
and the budget constraint can be written as:
[1
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	+ X = R [
	4 4	 v
4 — 3I3d]
t t 4
— 4
6 P d	 4 — 30 d 	 4 — 3Pd
a V _	 3(1 - P )	 ap
Maximisation of the utility function subject to the value
constraint leads to the following set of demands:
12 ,(4 — 3P d )	 pQ *
4 Pd4 — 3P
1/(_ 4 — 313d)
Y t = v 	 *(1— (3)* t t = 1, 44 — 3/3
The optimal level of cheating can be found by
maximising local authorities' indirect utility function with
respect to f3d.
Rv(4 — 3p_,)	
*Max V (M,g,I3 ), = (1-P ) i 	  *(1- g)+ P {in( p d ) a	 d 4 — 313
Rv(4 — 3P,)
(l — 13 )	 	"	 — p)ya, 2 + f3 Zn, a *
4 — 3p
lt s,(4 — 3Pd)
ci—p )	 	  *(1— /3)*1,3+ g t/n. a
4 — 33
12.,(4 —3P )d 	
_ 
R V	
*
( 4-319 d ) p(1 —p ) tAL	 * tx —pptv	 p	 '-----	 ---- ilta44 — 3p	 4 — 3P Pd
s.t. p
d 	 p1
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions:
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Pc!  °
13d
 1
a V
-5-7di = 0
since this derivative is always negative, it follows that
the constraint is binding then:
p d = p 1
In order to make local authorities to reveal their true
preferences Central Government has to offer a form of
incentive to local government. I will here consider the
policy of offering local government a matching grant of the
form:
(1 —g t ) = [I.
, 	
1 v t
a t e t (Pd)
13 d *R V
such that local authorities are allowed to spendcx *E3 cp ) int t d
each period t. If authorities would	 not cheat their
indirect utility function	 could,	 in	 analogy with the
previous case, be written as:
V b (M,g(e*),P) = (1 --t3) •fin,(1 — p )	 + ptin a*e * +1
(l-p) tia( 1 - p) v 2+ p tin. a*61:-F
(1—p) tin.(1- p ) 0 3 + p tin a*e +
(1-13) tin ( I — a ) 0 4 ± P tin, a*e;
where e t denotes the optimal incentive to be given to local
authorities at time t in order to avoid their cheating.
Central Government's problem can thus be written as:
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s . t . /3 tin. 0 t
4 —3131)
+ 4(1-13) t.41. 	 4 —313 j
Min
	 [c(*0(i3d) — 13dR,)
t
t=1
St.	 V  V
b	 a
S.t. 
0i	 = 1lgi
The problem might be again rewritten as 37 :
4
(ON
td) -P d R v
t=1
Mi n
0 
t
then the interest rate affects the price system but makes no
difference as concerns the incentive scheme.
8. THE TWO PRICES INCENTIVE SCHEME.
In analogy with the model I presented in section 6 it
Is possible also in this case to devise a two price system
that allows Central Government to reduce the extra cost it
has to pay to learn the true preferences. A possible way of
dealing with the problem is again to set for each year a
target expenditure represented by a * and by devising a set
of prices on the first segment such that local authorities
37This result can easily be obtained by observing that if
local authorities cheat they would chose 13 1 in V. Then it
is just a matter of evaluate V b —
 
V.
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[ 1 — f3 d i
_
1 — P1
[ (3 -13 1 1
0 i i = 1,4
with the lowest preference for expenditure can just reach
the target and they are at an optimal level of expenditure
38
. The price on the second segment has to be set in a way to
avoid authorities with the highest preferences for
expenditure to Spend anyway along it. Since the method to be
used is quite similar to the model without interest rate I
will explain here the procedure quite briefly. By performing
the same procedure it is possible to show also that in this
case Central Government can do better by not allowing local
authorities to spend more than a* . However, the prices on
the second segment for years two through four have to be
changed in order to take account of the discount rate. For
this model the optimal set of grant rules can be described
by the following scheme which is analogous to the one I
presented at the end of section 6. In analogy with that case
I present the solution for the more general case in which
local authorities are allowed to transfer money across time.
INCENTIVE SCHEME:
Prices on the first segments:
38 i.e. one of the Indifference Curve mapping their utility is
tangential to the budget constraint.
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R(4 — 2P — 20 2 )
*	 * v
2	 2
(x*C)4 ( 1 -P2)
4
Prices on the second segments:
g 1 2 _
R (4 — /3 — 3g )2	 132
4 cr A Q 1 (1 — 132)
g 2 2
4 a% (1 — g2	 2
3, 2 -
R(4 —313 — g2)
* /32 *
4 a * 0 3 (1 —	
3
 p2)
P2
= Ps (l —8 ) * 	  *
, 2
The modei I presented here can be quite easily modify
to cope with inflation instead of the interest rate. It is
clear that since perfect foresight was assumed in the
analysis, the optimal solution will not change.
8. SOME FURTHER SUGGESTION FOR THE ANALYSIS.
The model I consider here could be extended in
different ways. One possibility that is worth mentioning is
the introduction of a discount rate on utility in different
periods. For example, for the two price system I presented
before it is quite easy to note that the incentive to be
give to local authorities to make them reveal their true g
should be equal to:
g
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=[
1 - p
1 - pi
i = 1,4
p-
0
I have not considered this case in detail because the
introduction of a discount on time preference brings about a
series of issues that I have preferred not to deal with in
my analysis. On a theoretical ground it is hard to justify
tne existence of a discount on utility when dealing with
organizations that are supposed to maximise some sort rf
Social Welfare Function since the common good should have
the same weight in each period. On the' other hand it is
pns.-ibie to argue that utility, expecially in later years is
more important from a political point of view because the
deckion making body behaviour could be reelection oriented.
If a weight greater than one exists, say, on utility in the
last period, The system of grants has clearly to be revised.
If Central Government knows the exact amount of this weight
an optimal grant system could still be devised. However, in
my opinion, this is not the best way to deal with the
problem from a theoretical point of view. It is quite hard
to believe that Central Government, although unable to know
preferences for expenditure, is perfectly informed about a
weight on utility which depends onlocal factors. If a time
preference parameter is introduced, it should then be in the
form of an additional parameter that Central Government has
to learn. This clearly complicates the analysis quite a lot
159
since in this case two variables interact and their joint
distribution has to be taken into account.
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CHAPTER FOUR
I. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I will assume that the utility function
for local authorities is defined over two commodities one of
which is actually a bad. This new assumption is useful for
estimation purposes since it is very difficult at an
empirical level to find reliable data concerning local
income available in each area. I will show that the basic
results of the previous chapter do not change and that in
particular the basic incentive scheme has to be the same.
The problem presented here is more realistic because I will
assume that local authorities have needs as well as
preferences for local public services.
2. THE MODEL
c,-rdcr to achieve a utility function consistent with
utiiry axiums, I will use a Stone — Geary type of utility
which, for a representative authority i can be written as:
U = (1 -	 .ein. (a — T . ) + p	 (\ i - a 2i )
Local authorities perceive a minimum level of services
to be provided and the community does not receive any form
of "utility" by this provision; in my model the need element
is represented by a 2 . Each locality has an amount a
	 ofi
resources available for providing those services through
taxation. a 1 . represent the maximum amount of resources that
the community can raise from taxation diner as a result of
a true lack of' other resources available or as a result of
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xinterest groups behaviour or "political" reasons.
2.1 OPTIMAL SETTING WITH BOTH PARTIES PERFECTLY INFORMED.
In the absence of any grant from the Central Government
and dropping the subscripts for ease of exposition, the
budget constraint can be written as:
X=T
In analogy with the budget presented in section 2.1 of the
previous chapter, the price ratio is assumed to be equal one
and for a representative local authority the budget
constraint can be drawn as such:
0	 T
FIGURE ONE
In analogy with figure one presented in chapter three the
slope of the budget constraint, y, is equal to 45 0
 and the
reciprocal of the price ratio, tan(y) is equal to 1.
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Maximising the utility subject to the budget constraint
gives the following demand equation for local public
services:
X	 = (1 — 13) a + 13 a
NG	 2	 1
from which it follows that if a 1 < a 2 an under provision of
public services would result 1 .
in analogy with the two goods problem I presented in
the previous chapter, I will now examine the effect of both
a lump—sum grant and a matching grant on the budget
constraint of a local authority representing the whole
population. If a locality is provided with a pure lump sum
grant equal to G its budget constraint will shift upwards by
the amount G	 while if a matching grant is offered the
Idget will become steeper since the price ratio decreases.
Leth situations are depicted in Figure 2.
1 i.e. the local public services provided will be lower than
the need.
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FIGURE TWO
If a lump — sum grant is introduced the original line oo
shifts to GG' while if a matching grant is offered, the
budget line becomes og. The budget constraint incorporating
both a lump — sum and a matching grant can be written as:
gX — T = gG
Maximisation of the utility function subject to this budget
constraint gives the following demand equation:
a
XGR = (1 - 13)* a 2 + 13 [—
l
 + G
It is worth noting that if Central Government wanted each
local authority to provide at least a 2 , i.e. the basic need
expenditure, a .
 lump—sum grant and a matching grant would
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have the same effect. The total grant to be provided in this
case would in fact be equal to (a 2
 - a 1 ) irrespective of the
9
form it is granted	 This is the amount of resources that
an authority for which )( NG < a 2 would need to provide the
latter quantity. This result depends on the functional form
adopted for utility: resources are first allocated to
satisfy needs and then the surplus, if any, is allocated
according to preferences.
I will assume, in analogy with the model presented before
that Central Government wants local authorities to spend at
least a * for local services with a * > a 2. X NG is assumed to
be less than a for all local authorities in the sample. 3
Tne environment in which Central Government has to operate
can be described as follows:
i)	 Central Government can observe the amount of local
income available in each region. a . 	 , the right1,
amount of local public services to be provided, (xand
the need parameter, a2,
ii) Central Government knows P and uses it	 to determine
the size of the grant for each authority.
iii) Open ended matching grants and lump-sum grants are the
two instruments available to Central Government to
reach its objective.
The solution to this problem can be formally shown as
follows:
9
- See appendix four for a formal proof.
3This assumption again rules out the possibility of having
negative grants.
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Min G + (1—g) * a*
g ,G
a
s.t. (1 — p) * a + 13 [--- +G2
s.t. g	 0
The optimal solution for the problem cannot be found by
using a standard Lagrangean technique because the constraint
is not convex 4 . Because of the nature of the problem the
optimal point will then be a corner solution and it can be
shown that for this problem the best distribution formula is
characterized by giving local authorities a matching grant
The solution can be easily shown in diagrammatic terms 5.
4This point can be easily shown by writing the first and the
second derivatives of the constraint. The are as follows:
a G	 a
>0
cT	 g
	 2
G	 a
=
< 0	 i.e. the function is concave.
5The intuitive explanation for this result is that, as l
have shown in the previous chapter, a matching grant has a
greater effect than a lump sum on expenditure.
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a4
001-(4-112.
g= G= 0
FIGURE THREE
As it is possible to note from figure three, the objective
function can be depicted as a set of straight lines
increasing in a north — westernly direction while the
constraint is represented by the concave line AA .The
optimal solution is then represented by the corner:
a
a — (1—)a2
In my analysis, however, I will make a further assumption
that will prove useful when I will try to link this
theoretical model to the actual grant system. The model I
will present is built on the assumption that the grant
system has the twofold object to bring local authorities to
spend at least a* and to provide a fully equalization as
concerns their needs, irrespective of the resources
available. The lump sum grant corresponds to what in the
theory of inter governmental grant is known as a need
equalizing grant. In order to pursue this equalization,
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Central Government will have to provide each local authority
with a lump sum grant at least equal to a 2 which is its
baseline need. The final level of expenditure will clearly
still depend on preferences and resources and equalization
on those elements is pursued by the matching grant. In that
case the matching grant rate (1—g) will be equal to 6:
19 a
(1—g) = 1	
a
* 
— a 2
2.2 THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE SOLUTION.
If, as in the case presented in chapter three, I assume
that Central Government is not fully informed about
preferences of local authorities, a true "adverse selection"
problem arises and an incentive has to be granted to local
Governments in order to make them report their preferences
truthfully. The environment in which Central Government had
to operate should be modified as follows:
iia) Central Government knows that the true /5 for any local
authority lies in the closed interval (p l , [3 J. Since2
no other information is available the distribution of
0, )(is) is assumed to be uniform 7.
Before the starting of the period each local authority
has to report to the Central Government its preferences
6 See appendix four for a formal proof.
7 It is then clear the analogy of this model with Tres'n
interpretation of Stigler's approach. Even all the analysis
that follows will be conducted in terms of expenditure
behaviour it is clearly the marginal rate of substitution
between private and public goods that cannot be known with
certainty.
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over local public services which will be in turn used
to determine the size of the grant. The preference
parameter	 declared
	 by	 local	 authorities	 will	 be
labelled 0 to distinguish it from 13, the true one.
iv) Preferences parameters are peculiar to any authority
considered 8 .This assumption rules out the possibility
(or the need) for coalitions between authorities so the
problem can be restricted to examine the optimal
contract between one local authority and the Central
Government, at least in this first stage of the
an 	
9
.
v) 13 is assumed to be both independent between authorities
as stated in iii) and across time 10 .
The static framework. however, does not give any
insighi into the problem since again there is no incentive
for the Ceni ral Government to learn local authorities'
prefcrences. The optimal solution is again represented by a
two prices system such that local authorities with the
lowest preferences will be able to spend a* and to stick all
the other ones at the kink 11 by using a penalty system on the
81.e. it would be impossible to infer authority's i
preferences by knowing 13 for authority j in other words 13 is
not either a simple political or regional parameter.
9The problem could not be treated as such if the Central
Government had a budget constraint on the total amount spent
on grants to local authorities.
10This second assumption will be relaxed in dynamic model
and it will actually be the crucial difference between the
two setting.
The kink is clearly represented by a
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P	 "fin	 t	 azt.)
t = 1, 4
second segment.The actual formalization is not reported here
since it is very similar to the two—goods model and does not
give any further insights in the analysis.
3. THE DYNAMIC PROBLEM.
I will assume, in analogy with the model presented in
the previous section, that local authorities' behaviour can
be represented by the following utility function that they
want to maximise through their lifetime. According to
whether they are allowed to transfer resources from
different time periods the problem faced by local
autnorities can be written as:
Max (1 —13)
s.t. gN t = Tt	 t
—T)
+ g t a 2
a 2 = G
if their budgei s have to be balanced each year and:
Max (1-13)	 -€/n,( a 1
It
— Tt) + /3	 tin( X t — a 21.
s.t.	 g x =	 T + g at t	 t	 t 2
if they are allowed to transfer resources.
In analogy with the more general model I will show first of
all the optimal grant allocation rule for the case in which
both parties possess all information relevant to solve the
problem. To simplify the analysis I will assume that needs
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Yt=
4
and resources are constant throughout the period.
3.1 THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION IN A NO—ASYMMETRY FRAMEWORK.
In the absence of any grant system but a lump—sum grant
equal	 to	 a 2 	the demand	 for local	 services of a
representative authority might be derived by maximising its
utility function subject to the budget constraint. The
formal representation of the problem will then be:
Max (1-g)	 tin( a 1 — T t ) + P	 tAL(X —	 )t
S t.	 X	 T +a 2
which leads to a set of demand equations of the following
10form:
X t =a +Paz
12 The same result would in this particular case be obtained
also by assuming that local authorities cannot transfer
money from one period to another one. If a l is not constant
through time and local authorities can transfer money from
different periods the two demands equations have to be
rewritten as:
g Ea It 
t = 	 + a 24
and
while demands if the budget has to be balanced each period
do not change.
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T t = fi a 1
In this environment Central Government problem is to find
the optimal grant allocation form that:
MAX -	 (1-gt)*a*
a 1 ] *
s.t. — [a 2 + f3 g	 s — at
which gives:
(3* a 1
f% = 
	b t
a
*
 - a 2
3.2 THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE SOLUTION.
If local authorities are asked to report their true f:5
and the only way it is possible to realize their cheating is
by observing actual expenditure, it is in their best
interest to report a Pd lower than the true one at least in
some periods of their life cycle. In analogy with the model
presented in chapter three the new assumption introduced is:
v)a p although independent across authorities is fixed
through the life cycle of each local authority.
such that the environment is now described by assumption i)
— ii)a — iii) — iv) — v)a and the process of decision making
is still described by table one in the previous chapter.
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ur ill first. examine the case in which the budget has to be
balanced every year and I will then present the model in
which money can be transferred across time.
3.2.1 CASE A: THE BUDGET HAS TO BE BALANCED IN EVERY PERIOD.
If local authorities are not allowed to transfer money
through their life cycle the demand equation for local
public goods of a representative authority can be described
as follows:
a 1
	
d 
= a + /3	 = a + (a * —a )tz	 g t	2	 2 d	 a—
t = 1,3
a d *a l*X = a + g	 = a + ta —a ) * —p	; g 4
4	 2	 g 4 	2	 2 d (X * — a
T =
d
a l
	 t = 1,3
T 4 =	 13 a
The optimal level of cheating can be found by maximising
local authorities' indirect utility with respect to d
Max	 V (G,g,g d ) = (1—g ) tffi, a 1 (1 —g d) + g	 (CX*— a 2)
(P d )	 a
0 tin.(a — a)* 2(1 — p ) tin. a 1 (1 —(3 d )	 +	 +
( 1 — 13	 ) tin a 1 ( 1 — f3 d ) + /3 tin,	 ,(a* —a)
g'-.
+
a -p ) tin a 1 (1—(3 ) + -- a	 )z13 (1
f3 d 
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1- 13
1 — gd
=0
V
t	 2	 t d
13 *ad	 1
(a* -a ) .e (P)	 1
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions:
since this derivative is always negative, it follows that
the constraint is binding then:
g d = (31
In order to make local authorities reveal their true
preferences Central Government has to offer an incentive to
local government. I will here consider the policy of
offering local government a matching grant of the form:
such that if the incentive is chosen optimally, local
authorities will not cheat and will spend a 2 +(oL-a 2)* et int 
each period. The indirect utility for not cheating under
this new assumption can be written as:
V (G,g(6*),g) = (1 -13 ) tin a (1 —P ) +	 g 4:in, (u *-a )0 +b	 'I	 2	 1
*	 .
t. ((1 —0 ) tin. a (i—p )	 +	 g in a-	 +a )0
I,. here e t denotes the optimal incentive to h	 glvon to a
1
( 1 - (3	 )n,ti	 a 1	 ( 1 -13 ) +
( 1
-13	 ) tin, a 1	 ( 1 -13 ) +
2 2
0 tu (/(* — a )b +
...	 3
p .tni (IA *
 - a )0
..	 4
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	 4
t=1
Min
0 t
representative local authority in each period to avoid its
cheating. In analogy with the method presented in Chapter
three, Central Government's problem can thus be written as:
[a*(9 -13 Md)t 
a
*
s.t. e (13 ) =1	
d
t 1
*At the optimum values for e t it must be true that 
13
:
st. V (G,g(e),13)  V (G,g,P )b
g
13 tin e * = f3t41 —0
 + 3(1-p) tjat
1 - g, )
1 - i3 J
and the incentive compatible solution is then the same as
for the two goods model.
3.2.2 CASE B: MONEY CAN BE TRANSFERRED ACROSS TIME.
In this second case I will allow local authorities to
transfer money from the different periods of their lifetime
by presenting a model in which local authorities are
allowed to save and borrow.
In appendix five I show that the same result I present here
applies for the case in which local authorities can save but
13This result can easily be obtained by observing that if
local authorities cheat they would chose /3 1 in V. Then it
is just a matter of evaluate V - V .b	 a
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they are not all owed to borrow money. If the resources
available are constant through time and Central Government
knows the true preferences of local authorities their budget
will be balanced every year, as I have previously shown.
However, when Central Government does just know the range of
preferences rather than the true parameter local authorities
are better off if they cheat.Their expenditure decisions in
the first three periods can be described as follows:
Na= 	 +t 2
1 d 	 1
	
= a + (x * — a )
	
=
2	 2
—g t
t = 1,3
Due to the possibility of transferring money across time
this local authority is no longer constrained to raise.
t = 1,3T t =	 d l
The demand equations for both X 4 and T can be derived by
solving the following problem:
Max	 (1 — P) tin (a l — T t ) + f3 tin (X 4 — a2)
[g X —T 1 =t	 g at	 t 2
By having declared 
13d 
the grant our local authority is
entitled to receive in the first three periods is equal to:
s .t.
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[313d0 —0) +	 t = 1,4
a
'f =
(4-3g)
+
*	 2
Pd*a1
* (a—a )
a— a 
2
then the budget constraint can be written as:
g 4 X 4 — T t =a g - 30 a2 4	 d 1
where:
13 *ad	 1
g 4
— 2
Maximising the utility function suoject to the budget
nstraint it is possible to derive tre following set of
d‘s mand equations:
4 — 313d
X = a 2 + 	 	 (a )k— a4	 )P d	 4 — 315	 2
which shows that the process of maximisation leads to the
equalization of the marginal utility of money and then to
spread resources evenly among periods on the unconstrained
good. It is worth comparing the two pseudo demand equations
for taxation under the two assumptions presented. If the
budget has to be balanced each year, taxation in the first
three periods will be equal to:
T =ad	 1
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T
t = (4-313)
[30d(1-13) +
a 1
t=1,4
while if resources can be transferred across time
the amount of taxation raised will be:
The comparison of the two expressions shows that in
the second case the amount of taxation raised is larger. 41
This gives further insights in creative accounting. Local
authorities in the first years cheat on their preferences
and raise through taxation more money than they require.
This policy allow them to over spend in the last period
without any further burden on the taxpayers From a
political	 cycle point of view, the Iasi	 period coincido5:
with reelection and local Government s decision bccy
increases its chances of reelection by using this policy. If
the derision making body is reelection oriented cheating
might not be quite appealing if resources cannot be
transferred. In period 4, when the true preferences are
finally revealed, the increase in expenditure from a * to
13
C.X is partly financed by the cheating but also taxation
14 The proof of the last proposition is as follows:
j3 ad	 1
 
—313) * [3/6d(1—P)	 p a
-1	
d	 1(
3 g d o—p) + g > f3d(4-3/3)
> gd
which is always true under the assumptions made before.
a
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has to be increased. 15 If, as some political scientists argue
16 the electorate is more aware of taxation than expenditure,
the beneficial effects of the rise in expenditure could even
be outweighed by the increase in taxation, at least from the
point of view of reelection.
The optimal level of cheating might be found by
maximising local authorities' indirect utility function with
respect to Pd.
a (4 — 3P )
Max V (GP )=(1—f3 ) tin 1	 *(1—	 )+j3 tin ca * -a ) +2
( P d ) a 4— 3P
a (4 — 3Pd)
(I — 6 )	 1	
4 — 30
* (1 — 	)+ 1 tin. Rx*-
a, (4 —0_,3)
(1—P )	 	 u *	 ( 1— 13 )+	 tin.	 - a ) +
4 — 30
a
1
(4-3P )	 4-3P
(1 — 13 )
	
(1 
—0) +
4 — 3P	 4-30
.((x'- a
Pd
Pd
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions:
( 3(1 — p ) 1	 sp 	 0
a V
= — 4 	 	 S 0
`. ' l3d	 4 — 313d	 4 — 3Pd	 °d
13 d  P1
od	(61	 )
= 0
CI /3 d
151n this case, in fact T has to be raised from p a to Pa .d 1	 1
16 See, for example Borooah and Van Der Ploegh (1985), ch. 9
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since this derivative is always negati‘ e, it follows that
the constraint is binding then:
= f31
In order to make local authorities reveal their true
preferences Central government has to offer an incentive to
local government. I will consider the policy of offering
local government a matching grant of the form:
(1 —g) = [1
(c( * --a	 )()t	 2	 t
slich tnat lot al authorities are allowed to spend a 2 +((x — a ) t
(7) t 	 in each period.
if the incentive is chosen
	 optimally the indirect
utility function for not cheating can be written as:
%, (G.g(O*),(3) =(1 —13 ) tin, a (1— 13 )-1- 0 -fin. (4.x*--a
	 ).(i '	 -4-b	 1	 2	 1
(1-13 ) tin. a 1 (1— 13 )+p, tift. Rx R - a 2 )*0 .2	 +
( 1 -13 ) tin a 1 (1 — /3 )+13 tin, ( a R -a 2 )*O;	 +
(1-13 ) tffl. a 1 (1 — P ) + 13 tin. (a*- a 2 )-e:,
where O R
 denotes the optimal incentive to be given to
authorities at time t to avoid their cheating.
Central Government's problem can thus be written as:
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Min
0 t 	 	 _,t=1
[cet—Pdhl]
st. Vb (G,g(e*),13)
 
v(GP )
a	 d
s.t. e
The first constraint can be rewritten as 17:
'	
P	 ( 4 — 3f3 i )
fi' Zn e t . f3t/n. — + 4(l-)tyn 	P i	 4 — 313 j
then the system of incentive should be the same as for the
problem I presented in the previous chapter.
3..3 A TWO PRICE OPTIMAL GRANT DISTRIBUTION FORMULA
In the previous system the loss suffered by Central
Government as a result of its inability to know the true
preferences of local authorities was equal to:
(a* — a 2 ) ( e t - 1)
in each period and for each local authority. I will examine,
In analogy with the previous section, a different system by
which Central Government, although being unable to learn
the true preferences parameter for each local authorities,
can reduce the loss. The new system foresees a set of rules
by which local authorities will never be able to spend more
17This result can easily be obtained by observing that if
local authorities cheat they would chose P i in V. Then it
a
Is just a matter of evaluate V b — Va.
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a —a 2
*	 ithan a	 n each period if they cheat. The actual
implementation of the system requires the introduction of
penalties for expenditure in excess of the desired level.
This means that each year is characterized by a double
matching grant as such:
(1 — g i ,1 ) for any	 X	 s a
GR
i = 1,4
(1 — 8i , 2 ) for any unit of expenditure exceeding a*
For expenditure up to a*
 the matching rate is:
*
( 1 - g ) = [ 1
For expenditure in excess of a *
 the matching rate will be:
(1 — gt,2)
where g is the price level securing that any authority
*
.will not spend more than a I will first present
	 the
optimal level of cheating of local authorities in this case.
I will formally present only the case in which local
authorities are allowed to transfer money from the different
periods of their lifetime 18 .Let us start by finding the
penalty for the last period. The demand equations for the
private commodity and the public one can be written as
18The incentive for this problem would not change under the
assumption of local authorities not being allowed to
transfer money across time. However, prices on the second
segment could be set equal to g 12 for all the periods.-,
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Pd
Pd
g 4 2,X 4 = cc
*
= ?
follows:
a 1	 *Xt= a2 1- p	 = a 2 + (a — a 2 ) *gt
O d Yca l
; gt =
a
*
— a 2
t = 1,3
T t = p d a 1	 t = 1,4
where g4 is the price on the second segment that must be—,2
chosen to secure that any local authority will not spend
more than a* irrespective of its preferences. In order to
achieve this result Central Government has to find a set of
prices to be applied on expenditure exceeding a* such that
the budget constraint of each local authority will look like
figure four.
FIGURE FOUR
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Appendix six presents the procedure that leads to the
following equation for the price on the second segment:
0 1 a l ( 1 —p)+K
(cc * — a 2 ) (1 —	 )
g 4,2
K = 3
r a l	 (0 -gd)
[ 4 — 3 p
Since Central Government does not know 0, the best it
can do is fix a price so high to avoid overspending. in this
case 0 has clearly to be chosen equal t f. porialt%
system in the last period is not sufficient a:one to achie,..c
the result of having local authorities spending a * in each
perioi A farther set of penalties (in tne form of grant
withdrawals) has to be introduced in the system because if
the two price system was introduced on expenditure only in
the last period, local authorities could be better off by
revealing their true preferences in the previous periods. in
this case their expenditure decisions could be summarized as
follows 1 9 :
aP	 d *a lci OX = a 2 +	 g	 = a + (cc
*
—a 2 ) *	 ; gt	 2 a a,d
t = 1 , 2
19Throughout the analysis prices on the f:rst segment ar.L
referred to with the year in which they are in force i.e.
g t = price for expenditure on the first segment . f the bud-et
constraint in period t.
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1gd*al
* (a* —a )2a +
a
*
— a 2
/3	 a l X 3 = x(M,O,BL,g 3 )	
,1
gq— *
— 2
gd a 1	/Jai (1 — fsd ) + KX 4 = a* ; g4
	
g
a
*
— a	
422
— a 
z 
) ( 1 — 13 )2
X 3 = x(M,P,BL,g ) can be found by maximising:3
(1-13) t/11	 —T t. ) + /3 tin, (X — a )3 2
s.1.	 g	 + y t =	 g t a 2t t
I* fla y ing declared 13 d
 the grant it receives in the first two
periods is equal to.
in tne last period they receive a grant equal to:
/3 *a 
* (a —a )a 2 4- [1
a
*
— a
	
2
then the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
T t	=4a2 g 3 — 2gd a l -13a
i3 A ad	 1g
*CY — 2
2
X33
'max.
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'The maximisation procedure leads to the foil ov. ing
demand equation.
X = a +3	 2
* 4 — 2/3 d —
fC1	 4 — 3g
* (a *
	)2 2
In appendix six I show	 the procedure that leads to the
following equation for the price on the second segment:
/3[a	 (1 — (3 d ) + K1
(a * — a 2 ) (1 — p )
4 — 3 /3
which can compared with the equivalent c\pression
i.e. the grant withdrawal is
Equivalently for period two and one prices on the
second segment have to be:
g
3,2
te assess that g_ , < g 4,2
tougher in the last period.
g	 2 , 2 
13 1a 1 (1 — gd ) + 12
(a *— a 2 ) (1 —P )
a 1 	(0 -0d)
4 — 3 /3
Ora	 (1 — f3 d ) + g 2,1 
(a * — a 2 ) (1 — 13)
90 As a result of less savings available.
g 1 , 2
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The optimal level of cheating might be found as usual
by maximising local authorities' indirect utility function
with respect to fid.
Max V (G d ) = (1-0 ) tin, a (1—(3 d )+	 13 t (a* —a 2)
( g d ) a
(1-13 ) 471, a i (1 — (3 d )	 +	 (3 ,fin. (a * —a )	 +2
(1 —(3 ) n.ti a 1 (1 — g d )	 +	 13n...ei (a * — a )	 +2
( 1 -13 ) .ein. al(1
-13d)	 +	 (3' ,ii,( a * — a2)
..,
s.t. fi d	131
The problem can be solved using Kuhn Tucker conditions.
1- 13
	 11- 13	 O d
d
v 1[CI	 = ^
Sifle ihis derivative is always negative, it follows that
the constraint is binding then d = /31 In order to make
local authorities to reveal their true preferences Central
Government has to offer a form of incentive to local
Government. I will here consider the policy of offering
local Government a matching grant of the form:
I.
(1 —g t ) =	 1
(a —a )*(2tt 2
such that local authorities are allowed to spend a +(a * —a )*t
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nOt
. * in each period.
if the incentive is chosen optimally the indir
utility function for not cheating can be written as.
',.. (G,g(0*),(3) =
	
(1—(3 ) tin. a (1 — (3 )-F 0 tin, (a * - a )*()*	 +b	 1	 2	 1
( 1 - (3 ) tin, 3. 1 0— (3 )4-0 tin, (a *- a+2 )*(); 
	
(1—(3 ) tin, a i (1 — (3 )-Fp 'fin (a -a	 +2 )*Q*3 
( 1 - (3 ) tin. a 1 (1 — (3 )+0 tin. (a * — a 2 )*0:
where 0 *
 denotes the optimal incentive to be given to local
authorities at time t in order to avoid their cheating.
Central Government's problem can thus be written as:
(tx t —	 M
st.
	 (,g(0*),13)  	 (G,g,(3 d )a
S.	 t I t)
The first constraint can be rewritten as 21:
= 4(1—(3)
1 —
-
This result can easily be obtained by observing that if
local authorities cheat they would chose p in V. Then it
is just a matter of evaluate V — V .
a
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then the system of incentive should be the same as for the
problem I presented in the previous chapter.
4. WHY THE SYSTEM COULD FAIL TO REACH ITS GOALS.
The analysis so far has assumed that local authorities
behave as if they were utility maximisers and had definite
preferences for local public services. As I pointed out in
the introduction to chapter three there is a lot of
discussion in the literature on whether the utility
maximisation framework is a useful tool to use when dealing
with organizations.In this section I will present two of tne
possible reasons why the previous optimal grant allocation
setting may fail to reach its objective. The first model is
linked to the public choice literature and finds its origins
from empirical evidence on local government behaviour while
the second argument is more strictly linked with utility
maximisation behaviour. I will present them in turn.
4.1 THE FLYPAPER MODEL.
The first failure to the system steps back from the
literature on the budgetary effect of inter governmental
grants. The main predictions of what I might define the
conventional approach that I have implicitly adopted in the
analysis so far can be summarized as follows:
a) the form as well as the total amount of thc grant
matters; in particular a matching grant stimulates more
spending than a lump sum grant. The reason for this
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difference being that, while a lump sum grant Push up
expenditure through the income effect the matching grant
creates a price as well as an income effect as I showed
in section 1.1 of chapter three.
b) a lump sum grant paid to the local authority is
equivalent to a series of personalised lump-sum grants
paid to individuals. This second proposition is known as
the equivalence theorem.22
The predictions of the impact of different types of grants
are usually made under a set of quite restrictive
assumptions that, when relaxed, make things far more
complicated. The usual utility function maximisation
approach to local behaviour assumes that the community is
rationally trying to maximise some concept of utility that
can be that of the median voter or of a representative
individual in that community and it does not assume any sort
of disharmony of interests between politicians and voters.
But if some disharmony exists different results can be
obtained. In particular the equivalence theorem as stated
93
before is not confirmed by any empirical testing.-
In an harmonious world it should not matter whether the
central government cut taxes or gives revenue-sharing funds
to local governments; as long as the income distributional
properties are the same, either measure should increase
public spending by the income elasticities of demand with
the remainder going into increased private spending.
90
The equivalence theorem has been developed by Bradford and
Oates (1971).
23 Gramlich (1977) gives a useful summary of the different
studies on the subject. See also Courant (1979).
191
Given the suggested failure of the existing paradigm, some
authors have argued that a self interested behaviour by
bureaucrats and politicians or a fiscal illusion by voters
cause a lump sum grant to affect much more sub central
spending than an equal value changes in the tax payment of
grantee citizens to the grantor. This new development is
known as flypaper theory. The main contributions to the so
called flypaper theory can be found in the works by Courant
(1979) and Oates (1979). The model developed here follows
the one presented in Barnett (1985) and Barnett et al
(1989) with some important modifications. I will assume
throughout my analysis that local authorities behave as if
they were social welfare maximisers over public expenditure
and tax bills .Any local authority is assumed to be made of
homogeneous individuals with respect to preferences and
resources available such that the social welfare function is
equivalent to the utility of a representative individual in
that community up to a scaling factor. Since all individuals
are equal, the "average" member of the community is also the
median voter i.e. the decisive voter. A representative
individual in local authority i is assumed to have a well
behaved utility function of the form:
U = u (X ,T . ,a , a , P)	 (1)i	 1	 1	 2i
	
a u.	 82 U	 a u.	 a2 U
	
1	 i	 1	 i
> 0	 < 0<	 0	 < 0
	
a X .	 a X 2
	
a T ,	 a T 2
	
1	 i	 1	 i
where the parameter a 1 reflects the underlying income
available in the area for local authority's 	 service
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provision and a 2 can be thought of as a baseline expenditure
required to provide a minimal level of services. The
parameter (3 is determined by the preferences between local
authority services and local taxation. The decision
variables for the problem are X., the level of per capita
expenditure and T i , the tax bill.
The budget constraint derived under the two price system I
presented before is drawn in figure four and can be written
as:
X= G il + T (1—g 1i ) + T.g.
X = G	 + T (1 — g ) + T.g.i2	 i2	 1 12
(i=1,n) for x s oc	 (2a)
(i=1,n) for x > a*	(2b)
FIGURE FIVE
Where X .
 is per capita expenditure, 	 G .	is the implicit
13
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( —f3)	 +	 ( 	
zo, j
+ G ) (4)
lump—sum grant for local authority i if it is located on
segment j, T i is the local per capita tax bill . As I noted
before	 G	 is set equal to a 2 , but for what it follows iti I
is better to keep the two terms apart.
I assume as in the previous sections that the utility
of each individual in authority i is given a specific form
of the Stone Geary type then (1) can be rewritten as:
= (1-0) in (a 1 ,i	 T.) + p In (X — a	 )2, i
In an homogeneous world without conflict of interest between
voters and politicians or without misperception,
maximisation of (3) subject to (2) yields a demand equation
that, for segment j, can be written as:
a
X =
(3)
In the flypaper theory the representative voter is
instead viewed as misperceiving the true cost of a unit of
public services. Instead of thinking in terms of the true
marginal cost of the service provision he thinks in terms of
average costs. In this case the budget constraint is
perceive to be:
X = TB	 (5)ik	 ik
X ik
(N	 —	 G . .) g . .
Is
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In terms of my diagram in figure four the budget line
is replaced by a set of points on rays which emanate from
the origin with positive slope as shown in figure six.
FIGURE SIX
Given a suggested expenditure level of (say) X 1 the local
decision making body will concentrate on the local tax bill
implication of this ,T 1, and hence an implicit post grant
budget constraint of B 1 = X 1 /T 1 is perceived. Similarly, for
an expenditure level of X 2 the post grant budget constraint
is perceived to be B 2 = X 2/T 2 . More generally then the post
grant budget constraint for any local authority i for a
given level of expenditure, X k is given by:
X i	 =k	 T i B . i j	 (6)
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where B i k is the perceived post grant tax base given
expenditure level X ik . Equation (6) can be rewritten to give:
X	 = T.(B. - 1) + T i k B i	 (7)1 lk
Here the first term on the right hand side of the equation
represents the perceived matching grant and the second the
locally raised revenue. By comparing equations (2) and (5)
it can easily assessed that in the flypaper model the
implicit lump sum grant disappears and revenues received in
This form are perceived to be part of the implicit matching
grant. - The reasons why bureaucrats might think in average
terms can be explained in different ways: as a result of a
process of decision making among a hody of people with
different objectives the average level of taxation is the
crucial variable; on a different perspective uncertainty
about the exact form of penalties ruling in different years
combined with a grant setting that in its actual
implementaticn was more complicated than the one I depicted
might nave induced decision makers to care about how much
money they hope to receive from central government without
bothering about the form and the marginal price of
additional expenditure. Maximising (3) subject to (7) gives
the following demand equation:
MsX = (1-p) a	 + p (aB k )2i	 Ii i
94 Only the points on the true budget constraint are however
relevant, since by definition only at these points will the
representative voter's budget constraint be balanced.
(8)
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This expression is equal to + G
.1 j	 only if:
a
1,i
P.j
X
ik
( X	 —	 G.
	 )g .•ik
	1,3	 1.1
If I compare the two demand equations I can note that, for a
given level of [3, a 21 , a l 	G .	,g .	 the demand derived1 ,J	 1,3
under the misperceived budget constraint is greater than the
one derived under the actual budget. 	 This effect is
explained in figure seven; the positive implicit lump sum
grant assures that the average price is always less than the
marginal price; this statement in diagrammatic terms means
that the misperceived budget is always steeper than the
actual one 26 and that the flypaper equilibrium occurs at a
point such as e where a tangency point on one of the
perceived budget constraints coincides with a point on the
true budget constraint.
1111S can be readily assessed by observing that
a	 =
G i j 
+11,1	 Tk
i
,
B lk (9)
a 1,	 = T i k .
From (5) we know that utility function is defined only if
a
	
> T i , then the misperceived demand is greater thank
the standard one.
26The slope of the budget constraint is the inverse of
price.
t
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FIGURE SEVEN
Although it is not required for the discussion
developed here, given the Stone—Geary preference function,
the flypaper equilibrium is unique. This is the case since
the price — consumption curve is downward sloping throughout
and thus cuts the budget constraint, which is upward sloping
throughout, once only; and the flypaper equilibrium occurs
at point at which the price — consumption curve crosses the
true budget constraint. Given convex preferences, had the
local government correctly perceived the budget constraint,
it would have been in equilibrium at a point such as ec
which involves a lower level of expenditure than does the
flypaper equilibrium, ef* From a policy point of view the
existence of the flypaper effect is quite important. One of
the main predictions of this theory is that the amount
13
nm
to be the same. Whether p
nm 
is thus a
m 
(X — G	 ) 
2 <
i , j
a 
1
	 B .
 , j
X
i
rather than the form of the grant matters i.e. the same
amount of grant either given in lump sum , matching or block
grant form should stimulate the same level of expenditure.-
If local authorities behave according to this policy it is
clear that the previous system of incentives fails to reach
its objectives since it is designed to deal with marginal
incentives rather than average ones. Even if local
authorities revealed their true preferences, the matching
grant offered to them on the first segment would be too high
to achieve its objective. If Central Government knew that
local authorities made their decision in average terms it
would have to give either a matching grant equal to:
2
(1
J a
(1-g)a
„--
The marginal effect of the lump-sum grant can however be
quite different. From equations (6) and (8) 1 can see that
the impact of a change in the implicit lump sum grant is
respectively:
a MsX	 a	 P	 X	 a	 X1	
,
, i	 i, j	 i 	 _	
13	
1,i	 1 
= 0P	 A
In	 In	 'I' .a G . ,	 (X - G .
 
j )
2	
1	 (N 7	 G )1, 3 	i 	 1	 1,3
If (3	 = 13 1 could conclude that the impact of a lump-sum
nm	 rn
grant is always greater if the flypaper effect exists.
However, there is no reason why I should expect both values
matter of empirical investigation.
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or a lump sum equal to 98 :
a
*
a
*
— Pa
l a*—(1—P)a)
Under the previous system of grant the optimal total grant
was equal to:
a +2	
a
*
—
	
•
a 2
g a l  jaY, = a * —
Since a*— a > a * — Pa (	 the system fails to
a
reach its objective.
The s stem of penalties is jeopardized as well since
the average price on the second segment is clearly
considerably lower than the marginal one and then it fails
to restrain over spending.
4.2 DO LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAVE AN UTILITY FUNCTION AT ALL?
The second reason for the failure of the optimal grant
allocation rule derives from the consideration that local
authorities might not behave according to standard utility
maximisation theory: although a trade off between
expenditure and taxation exists, it cannot be represented by
an utility function, at least in a conventional way. To
28In this case, because of averaging the price the lump sum
grant and the matching grant have the same effect and the
equalizing grant is just a part of the total lump sum.
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illustrate this point 1 will assume that local authorities
do not have any preferences for local services in a standard
definition but they can instead choose them according to the
system ruling in a particular year. This clearly implies
that g is not fixed through the lifetime of each local
authorities and that maximisation is performed within each
period. To illustrate this point I will recall that, from
the previous system of grants the optimal amount of X and T
can be written as:
,\ = a + (a*
 — a ) 62
T =
Local authorities choose the best trade off according to the
following utility function:
= (I —	 tin. (a 1 — T) + 13 tAt. (X — a)2
in which g is not a fixed parameter but a decision variable
-2,9	 .itsclf. Given the scheduled functions for X and T,	 will be
chosen according to the following maximisation problem:
Max V = (1-0)	 (a1— Pa l ) + g m ((at — a2)*6)
s.t. 13
	
•
 02
giving as optimal solution:
29
and X as a consequence.
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P = Min
where edenotes the optimal value derived from the previous
maximisation and it is mainly a function of 2. 1 , the
resources available for taxation	 and the system of
incentives, Q. The level of expenditure chosen 30 , then,
depend itself on the	 grant system and on the resources
available31 .	 This	 behaviour is	 clearly oriented	 to a
maximisation of the grant received and does not respond to
any life-cycle maximisation behaviour. p can vary across
time according to the changes in the incentive systems
offered. Such a behaviour can be justified in the context of'
modelling organization behaviour because the decision making
process reflects the balance of different interest groups
for which it is arguable that a, say, decrease in price
could in duce a revision in the expenditure decision process
by which the pressure of the interest group claiming a high
tax - high expenditure policy could prevail on the opposite
low tax - low expenditure lobby.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In the last two chapters I have presented the basic
theoretical model aimed at explaining and solving the
asymmetry of information problem that exists between Central
and Local government, Under the assumption of a static game
30through the choice of g
31 Uri 1 ess 0 that maximise the indirect utility function is
greater than 0 2 .
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no incentive compatible solution exists: the best that
Central Government can do is to set targets and try to avoid
local authorities to over spend. In a dynamic framework, an
optimal solution can be found in the form of a set of rules
by which Central Government is able to learn the true
preferences for expenditure, The system requires an
incentive to local authorities in the form of increasing
expenditure and the rules must he set out before the start
of the game through a closed loop policy which does not
allow the players to revise their policies through time. The
reasons why this system can fail to r e ach its objective can
be different and I have pick up just two of them and
eNplained how they can jeopardize the entire system. in the
next chapter I will try to set. up a series of test to assess
whether local authorities actual behaviour reflects the
assumptions made in the theoretical part by assuming that
the two price system they face in real world has been so
according to the optimal grant setting.
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APPENDIX ONE.
The problem can be rewritten as:
Min (1 -g) X
s.t.	 0 5 [x	 )]	 + 0.5 [x
	 )]
Minimization of the grant leads to a price the locality has
to face of the form:
g= f (E(0),A,i,a*
Cobb Douglas example:
n (1-g) X
g_M
+ (1 p)
The optimal g is equal to
F.:(f3)
	 M
{,iven this g if the true value of /3 of the local authority
is greater than the expected value of f3, the lora]
authority will buy an amount of Exp greater than a with a
grant loss for government equal to:
(g 2 - g)	 * a* + (1- g) • ( -a*)
where the first expression represent how much more
government is offering to the local authority for each pound
it spends than It would be necessary to it to reach the
optimal demand a and the second expression is the grant
loss due to the fact that in this second case,, the local
authority is buying a quantity of X greater than a*.
If the local authority has got a 13 less t h an its expected
value, it will not reach the optimal amount a .
and the loss in grant that government has to face if the
local authority has a (3 greater than g i is clearly reduced
with respect with the rase in which any authority has to
spend at least a with certainty.
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s.t.
APPENDIX TWO
Cobb Douglas Example.
Min	 (1—g) (x *
 + (1— h) (X — a*)
P 2M
g2m
+ (1-p )
ot
*
t
h
Minimization leads to:
E(1.1)
and h
- o
z
. g/. 2
1 — f3
z
If Government wants any local authority to spend at least
*	 .
, it has to set:
and:
g —j3 * g
1 —j3 2
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APPENDIX THREE
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
INCOME = 2000
GREA = = 430
g i = 0.05
= 0.2
2
NO GRANT SETTING:
X 1 =  100
X 9 = 400
"SP: P AR '‘ TING EQUILIBRIUM" i.e. Government 1:nov.-s the true
preferences of the local authority.
= .05
Offer a matching grant (1—g 1 ) such that:
fi 11
a = 9
Grant:
(1 — g 1 )'450 = 450 — 400 = 50
g = 0.2
(3 2 M
g 2
=
8
= 9
Grant:
(1 — g)'450 = 450 — 100 = 250
1.C.0 PROBLEM.
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X = .05 * 2000 * 5 = 180 < 450
9
If Government wants local authority to spend
E(X) =
has to offer a grant equal to:
E(P)* M	 0.125 * 2000	 5
g=
450	 9
Ex post:
If locality has got 13 = 0.05
it would spend:
If locality has got p = 0.2
it would spend:
9X =	 * 2000 *	 = 720 >. 450
In this second case the grant would he:
(l—g)* 720 = 320
while in the no uncertainty case it was 50.
The loss of 270 pounds is made up as such:
— g ) ' 450 + (1—g)" (720 — 450)
If Government wants the local authority to spend anyway at
Iast 450 it has to offer:
9g = g =
1	 9
Ex post:
If locality has got 13 = 0.05
it would spend:
x = .05 * 2000 * 9 = 450 = 4509
It' locality has got 13 = 0.2
it would spend:
9
= . 9	 2000 *	 = 1800 > 4500
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35
36
X = .05 * 2000 A 5 = 180 < 450
9
In this second case the grant would be:
(1—g)* 1800 = 1400
while in the no uncertainty case it was 50.
The loss of 1350 pounds is made up as such:
( g 2 - g 1 )	 450 + ( 1 —g)' (1800 — 450)
To reduce the loss in grant Government can enforce a system
of subsidies and penalties.
If it wants the local authority to spend
E(\;) 
 a*
the contract has to specify
2= 9
8	 1	 5
— — *9	 5	 9
1
1 —
Ex post:
If locality has got p = 0.05
it would spend:
h=
If locality has got p = 0.2
it would spend:
9
X = .2 * 2000 for X s 450	 ; X = 450* 5
X = .2 * 2000 +450* 25	 5 26	 _ 45035	 —36	 9 
)
The locality with high preference is made stuck at the kink.
In this second case the grant would be:
(1-0* 450 = 200
while in the no uncertainty ease it W2S 50.
The loss of 150 pounds is made up as such:
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18
( g'	 g )	 450
If it wants the local authority to spend anyway 450 pounds
the contract has to specify
2g	 g 1 =	
9
8	 1	 2
— * —9	 5	 9 
11 — =-
5
Ex post:
If locality has got 13 = 0.05
it woulo spend:
9X = .05 ik 2000 A	 = 450 = 4509
If Iocatity has get 13 = 0.2
it would spend:
9\ = .2 * 2000 A	 for X  450 ; X = 4509
	19 	 2	 18 _ „c.
=	 A 9 000 +450* 18	 _-6- 
The locality with high preference is made sturi at the
In this second case the grant would he:
(1—g i ) A 450 = 350
while in the no uncertainty case it was 50.
The loss of' 300 pounds is made up as such:
( g2- g l)	 450
The final system can be summarized as follows:
Incentive system:
Q
t
	
1 1,	 :1 
rp 1 
	
1.9
	 t = 1,4
h=
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c•—•	 0.46 i = 1,4
Prices on the first segments:
Prices on the second segments:
M(4 — f3
	 3132) 
g l, 2 -	 * 132
4 
a*(3 1 (1 — 132)
M(4 — 213 — 2(32)
g „ 	 	  * B
, 
4 a * 6 2 (1 — P2)
'41(4 
—313 — g 2) 
;
g	 - 	3 ,
4 a .* 0 (1 — P
2
)
3
g	 =	 -(3 )
4, 2 ae 
4 
( 1 (3
2
)
The grant that they will receive will he equal to:
450'1.9 —400 = 455	 in all the four periods
while in the certainty case it was equal to 50
Thc loss is made up as follows:
.450'(1— .6) = 40;
APPENDIX FOUR
The demand equation for expenditure can be written as
X = (1- fi) a 2 + 13
	 a	 G
IF G = 0 , in order to reach a 2 the price each local
authority has to face would be equal to
then the matching rate is equal to
1g) = 	 20
and the total grant is equal to:
- a
by setting g = 0 , G should then be equal to:
-
If (I = a and X = cx*
15 a
=
- 2
a -a
a
2
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=( 4 — 313d)
APPENDIX FIVE
In the maximisation problem presented in the text I have
assumed that local authorities can transfer money freely
i.e. they can over spend their budget. in some periods if they
want to and then borrow money. it would be argued that local
authorities can only use their own resources, i.e. they are
not allowed to borrow.
I could have taken into account this suggestion by allowing
local authorities to put forward resources but not. backward.
This can be done by slightly changing the constraints.
In the first period the constraint would be written as:
g 1	+ y 1 s1 
y s M (1 —	 )1
Now if' I recall the previous optimal value for v	 it is
possible to show that. this constraint is satisfied.
)4(4 — 3gd)
g)
4 — 311
=
= P c1 4- 6
— 313
4 — 313 > 0
ki(4 — 313 + A) (1 — (3 )	 m( i —	 + A) (4 — 3g )
P-0 (1 — 13 ) s AM (4 — 319 )
> 0
(1 — (3 )	 4 — 313
2(3 s 3
which is always satisfied.
(1— g )	 — gd)
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TAPPENDIX SIX.
The budget constraint for each local authority in period
four can written in an alternative way by observing that if
in the first three periods:
-
	  * [313 (1-0) + d
430	 d	
T = 1, 3
(
while, due to their cheating, the grant system would have
allowed them to be budget balanced by just raising:
T t. = 0d a 1	t = 1,3
The difference between the two expressions give the amount
of resources that the local authority can transfers forward.
The total amount at the end of year three will be equal to:
a
R = 3 [ a l (P -19d) 
4 - 3 0
such that the budget constraint in period four can ne
rev,-. ;tten 2s:
=a 2 g 44
-.K-hich clearly gives the same optimal X 4 as in the text.
If c entral
	 Government	 wants	 the	 repi esentative
authority nor to over spend the grant on the second segment
can be feu.:1.i by first observing that the budget on the
second seamcnt will have to be written as:
_	 =+ Is+ (u -
	 ( g 2-g)4,2 - 4 	 4	 2'5 4,2
	
4,1
Maximising the utility function subject to this new budget
Ponstraint and imposing the condition i 4	 a gives:
01a	 (1 - 13 )	 +
	 N 1
(a * - a	 ) (1 - g )
2
Analogous proof can be developed for g 2 and g	 .
In the two latter cases it the amount of' savings available
to be changed. As a result of less periods in which they
cheat the quantity K has to be proportionally reduced.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter I have presented the optimal
set of rules that in theory could enable Central Government
to solve the asymmetry of information it has to face and
some reasons for the failure of this system were argued. In
the next two chapters I will compare the actual grant system
with the optimal one and I will assess to what extent the
history of the grant system in Britain reflects the learning
process that Central Government has to face. This chapter
presents the estimates ofestimate the parameters of the
utility function for local authorities and some test for the
consistency of the assumption underlying the theoretical
model; the actual comparison between the two systems will be
presented in chapter six.
In the first part of this chapter I will briefly recall the
framework of the analysis and I will then review and
compare the principal estimation techniques developed in the
econometric field to cope with convex nonlinear budget
constraints. In the third part, by using the model suggested
by Arrufat and Zabalza I will test the hypothesis that local
authorities' behaviour is consistent with a Cobb Douglas
utility function and I will derive the parameter estimates
for this case. In the last section I will test the existence
of a flypaper effect in local government behaviour and I
will try to assess whether utility maximisation, at least in
a conventional definition, can approximate local government
behaviour. The analysis will be restricted to the years
1986-87 - 1988-89, i.e the years in which the system of
grant allocation is more similar to the setting I have
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W (X, T) (1)
derived in chapter four.
1.1 THE MODEL.
My analysis is based on the assumptions that local
authorities behave as if they were social welfare maximisers
and their utility can be written in very general terms as:
where X is per capita expenditure and T is the (per capita)
revenue each authority has to raise from taxation if it
would like to spend X. 1 The utility is given the specific
functional form of a Stone Geary, namely:
w =	 -13) tirt. ( a	 - T.) + f3 tin ( X — a )
1	 Ii	 i	 i	 2i
Defining utility over local public expenditure and taxation
is a constrained choice since it is impossible to collect
reliable data for local net income. The budget constraint
faced by local authorities has then to be defined in terms
of resources available to provide local public services.
Local authorities have three major sources of finance:
central government grants, the rates, and user charges. The
'An alternative way of modelling utility function would have
been of introducing tax rates instead of tax bills ; both
methods have their own theoretical support; I argue that
individuals care about tax bills and the empirical work is
conducted within this framework.
(2)
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bulk of central government grant is distributed as a block
grant, a unitary grant intended to equalized simultaneously
for differences in needs and differences in resources
between authorities. By convention, expenditure is reported
net of specific grants and user charges, so the budget
constraint is defined only over this block grant and the
local property tax, the rates. The budget constraint for
each local authority can be written in a very general form
as:
X = T + G	 (3)
The system by which block grants are allocated causes the
budget constraint to be piecewise linear and has been
changed through years with the number of kinks varying
according to the penalty system scheduled. From fiscal year
1986/7 the system of grant allocation made the budget
constraint simpler by introducing only one kink at threshold
2
. The precise details of these discontinuities in the
budget constraint are explained in Barnett et al. (1989b)
and more detail will be given in the following chapter. For
the time being it is sufficient to note that the post—grant
budget constraint along any segment j can be written as:
g 	 X. = g	 G . . + T.
1	 1.]	 1
G .	Is the implicit lump sum grant on segment j
g..	 is the implicit price on segment J.
1.3
2Threshold is a parameter peculiar of the block grant and is
equal to:
(6)
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xBoth G and g derives can be derived from the Block Grant
allocation rules, are peculiar to each authority and can be
observed. The budget constraint for the local authorities is
then equivalent to figure three in the previous chapter but
it will be presented here again for the sake of
completeness.
For a representative authority i the budget constraint will
look like figure one.
FIGURE ONE
As long as g 2 > g .1 the budget constraint depicted in figure
1 is convex, as we showed in Barnett et al. (1989b) 3
3Actually the whole budget set faced by local authorities
presents two regions of nonconvexity that I have not
considered in this analysis.
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In this study I will start by implicitly assuming that the
actual grant system is set according to the optimal
allocation rule and I will derive the parameters of the
utility function revealed by local authorities through their
expenditure decisions. The estimation of the demand equation
Is not straightforward because of the piecewise nature of
the budget constraint; an ad hoc technique has to be devised
to obtain reliable estimates.
2. NONLINEAR BUDGETS AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES.
Traditional empirical analysis of consumer demand has
usually made the assumption of linear budget sets, that is
consumers are assumed to purchase any desired quantity at a
constant price subject to a linear budget constraint. In
recent years, expecially after the new development
concerning the optimal income tax schedule a growing number
of researchers have tried to assess labour supply responses
to changes in the income tax rate. With a progressive tax
the marginal after tax rate depends both on the tax schedule
and on the total hours worked so the simple model described
before can no longer be used.
The main problem when dealing with a piecewise linear budget
set is that, due to the discontinuities in the price
schedule the budget line consists of different segments each
one associated with a different marginal price.
In principle it would be possible to use an OLS ,but in
order to perform a satisfactory analysis the researcher
should be able to know the particular budget line segment
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and thus the particular marginal price that each individual
has chosen. This introduces a quite important complication
since available data on expenditure may measure it with some
error. If so, such data do not always correctly indicate the
specific budget line that a particular authority has chosen.
In the early stage of the analysis of piecewise linear
budget	 constraints	 some	 attempts	 at least	 squares
estimations were actually performed. In a fairly well known
paper Hall (1973) was the first to consider explicitly the
problem. Hall showed that if the budget constraint is convex
the piecewise budget can be thought of as a set of
linearized segments and that tangency of the Indifference
Map with one of the linearized segments assures the
uniqueness of the solution. Hall applied a least squares
technique by assigning observations to the segment on which
they located and ignoring the kink. The method was quickly
realized to generate biased and inconsistent estimates and
served as an impetus to much of the subsequent research.
One of the most interesting aspects of the econometric
problem involved in estimation subject to piecewise linear
constraints is that the stochastic specification is of great
importance and the error terms have more specific
interpretations for the parameter estimates. Using a
standard OLS procedure the demand equation subject to a
nonlinear budget constraint would be written as:
X = D	 X(g i 1 ,G i 1 ) +	 X(g 2i , G 2i )1
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(1 — D 1 — D 2 ) f+ E
	 (5)
D = 1	 if X * > (g	 G )1	 '1'
= 0	 otherwise.
= 1	 if X* < X (g , G. )2	 12	 12
:= 0	 otherwise.
where X (g , G ) is the demand on the first segment and:ii	 ii
X (g 2 , G 2 ) is the demand on the second segment which
in turn implies that: X (g	 Gil) < X (g 2 , G 2)
As Hausman first pointed out 6,	 the error term, includes
both
	 optimization	 errors,	 specification
	 errors	 and
measurement errors and monnt (1986) explained in great
detail the reasons why OLS approach leads to biased
estimates. I will recall here the most important. In the
previous model the least squares approach is inconsistent
because it assumes that the segment on which observations
are located are nonstochastic indicators of the variables D1
and D but both those variables are not observed. Since by2
assumption c has a nonzero variance, the segment on which an
observation is located might not necessarily be the one on
which utility maximisation occurs; it will be so only when
the error term is sufficiently small as to not move the
observation to a different segment. The consequence is that
there is a systematic correlation between the size of the
error term and the marginal price and Imputed income
assigned as regressors. Those	 problems raise some
221
interesting technical questions about the most appropriate
technique to deal with them and have received two basic
treatments in econometric analysis. Some researchers have
used the theory of latent variables and adapt it to cope
with both participation problems and the need of modelling
the error term in a different way; the most recent approach
to the problem tries instead to taking account of the
different sources of errors by explicitly modelling them and
their behaviour in the function to be estimated.
2.1 INDEX FUNCTION APPROACH.
The statistical theory of index functions has its
foundations in the literature on endogenous variables in a
system of simultaneous equations and provides a conceptually
simple framework for modelling corner solutions to consumer
utility maximisation problems. This literature is based on
the notion that discrete endogenous variables can be thought
of being generated by continuous latent variables crossing
thresholds. The approach has first been developed in
consumer theory to cope with participation problems in which
the idea of ranking observations according to the value of a
specific shifter parameter has been applied to situations
characterized by multiple choices. The model has been widely
used in labour supply models under progressive income
taxation which causes the post tax budget constraint to be
piecewise linear. For any chosen utility function it is
possible to determine the optimal allocation of resources
for an individual authority in terms of the equivalence
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= (8)
g.
1
4between the Marginal Rate of Substitution and the price the
authority has to face. When dealing, as in this case with
convex preferences and convex constraint set, a local
comparison of the marginal rate of substitution function
with the price of different segments determines the location
of any individual authority on the budget set.
For the specific problem at hand the marginal rate of
substitution for locality i can be defined as:
a W
	
d X .a T	 1 -	 X - a21
MRS = d T = - 	
	
a W	 a - T1	 1, i
ax.
By recalling equation (4), the budget set on segment j can
be written as:
g . 	 X. -T.. = g.."	 G	 (7).1 3	 	 13	 13	 j
such that an optimal tangency point is defined by the
relation:
MRS
T i j ' X i
For exposition purposes let us consider a model with only
one kink as the one depicted in figure two.
4The marginal rate of substitution will be referred as MRS
in the following analysis.
(6)
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-FIGURE TWO
Denoting the marginal rate of substitution along segment j
by MRS, and dropping the subscripts to simplify the
J
notation, an authority will be at a corner solution (zero
expenditure) if MRS i > f1 it will chose to locate on the
first segment if MRS i < fi
 and MRS2 > f 1 it will be
located at the kink if f 1
 MRS 2  f2 it will choose to
locate on the second segment if; MRS 2 < f2 The procedure can
be easily extended to cope with more than one kink;
furthermore since local authorities are not faced with a
participation problem (their expenditure being greater than
zero anyway) the first state will not be considered. To set
up an estimation algorithm it is necessary to define a
parameter on which to index the different states of the
world and thus determine which state each individual
authority chooses in relation to the value taken by this
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variable. In a recent paper	 , in order to compare the
relative performances of the index function approach and the
two errors model I assigned to a2i the role of taste
2
shifter, i.e. a2 was replaced by a ,..( a 2 , cia). I will
use here the same approach to explain the estimation
technique that can be derived using this approach. For given
values of G . , g i , a 1 any authority will choose one of the
possible states according to the region in which the random
variable a 2 lies. These regions can easily be defined by
observing that the marginal rate of substitution is
monotonically decreasing
	 in	 a 2 .	 The	 choice	 of ai
distribution for a yields a complete statistical
characterization of local government behaviour For example,
for the Stone Geary utility function I have used in the
previous chapters to describe local authorities behaviour,
a can be defined as follows:
a = 13-1	 g .
P 
	 a — T
Since f(a) has been chosen to be the normal density, an
ordered probit scheme yields to consistent estimates for the
parameters of the marginal rate of substitution and of the
variance of a.
The procedure can be described as follows:
a —T
a = 7 * 	 +	 X	 (10)
5See Barnett et al (1989c).
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1 = (1-13)/13
6 = 1.
a=1 if the observed expenditure lies on the first segment
a=2 if the observed expenditure lies on the kink and so on.
The model is characterized by the assumption that the
segment each locality chooses can be observed directly.
Knowledge of local authorities' expenditure and the price is
all information that is required to set up the model.
However, it is	 important to note that this approach does
not actually use any information about the observed
expenditure data since the model is based on the region of
the budget constraint in which the latter lies.
Anyway, observed expenditure ranking cannot by any means
assumed to be the preferred one since thc presence of
different sources of errors could make the preferred
position shift to a different segment 6 . The estimation
procedure, by not taking account of the different sources of
errors, has a poor predictive power; in particular a cluster
of observations around the kink will be observed 7 . The
technical reasons for this pitfall have been explained by
Moffit (1986); to have an insight in the problem it is
sufficient to remark that, while only one combination of
parameters is compatible with maximisation over a segment a
range of different values satisfying the kink.
6A more comprehensive explanation of the problem can be
found in Moffit (1986).
7i.e. the distribution of the probability for the expected
values will be clustered around the kinks.
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2.2 TWO ERRORS APPROACH
Several new techniques have recently been developed to
deal with the problem of estimating demand functions when
the budget set is piecewise linear. Beginning with the study
by Burtless and Hausman (1978) and later work by Hausman a
very general econometric solution to the estimation problem
has been shown to exist. All those approaches start with the
suggestion that, due to the presence of a piecewise linear
budget set, it is not efficient to assume that the random
error affects the overall demand equation in the same way:
the error has to be split in two parts: the so called
heterogeneity error that allows observations to be located
on different segments or at kinks and the random error that
determines the actual allocation within a segment or kink.
The two errors have then different implications for the
data: whereas the measurement error tends to spread
observations out evenly over the constraint, heterogeneity
of preferences tends to generate clusters of observations at
the kink point of a convex constraint. 8 The method has been
applied to different type of problem both convex and
nonconvex using different functional forms for the demand
equation and different stochastic specifications for the
heterogeneity error. Elsewhere I chose to implement the
approach • described by Moffit (1986) for estimation purposes
and the comparison between the index function approach and
9the two errors model	 showed that the two errors model,
8 See Moffit (1986) for a formal proof.
9See Barnett, Levaggi, Smith (1989a) for a full account of
those aspects.
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although requiring ad hoc algorithm to be estimated, leads
to significantly more consistent estimates. For this reason
I will use also in this analysis some models that
explicitly take account of the different sources of errors
and I will explain the technical details while I present the
estimation results to which they lead.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS.
The first part of the empirical analysis is devoted to
test for the hypothesis that local authorities behave as if
they were maximising an utility function belonging to the
Cobb Douglas class. This is the natural first step before
estimating the demand equations for local authorities I
presented in the theoretical part. In this analysis I will
use a model similar to the one proposed by Arrufat and
Zabalza (1985) which assumes the heterogeneity error 10 to
enter in the model in an additive form. The model proposed
by Arrufat and Zabalza uses a CES utility function of which
the Cobb Douglas is just a special case.
The model I will estimate empirically will, however
differ from the one proposed by Arrufat and Zabalza for two
main reasons:
a) on the utility specification side, local authorities
behaviour is represented by choosing the optimal amount
of two commodities one of which is actually a bad.
10In Barnett et al (1989a) we presented a model in which the
heterogeneity error represented "needs" and entered in the
demand equation in an additive form.
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b) all local authorities are spending a positive amount for
local public goods, so no participation problems arise.
The structural model is based on a CES utility function
which, despite not generating a linear function for
expenditure, turns out to be very convenient for estimation
purposes. The procedure can be described as follows:
The utility of each individual in authority i is given
the following specific form:
1/p)
w = [-c*
 (X i - a 2i ) -P + ( a1, - T)- ]-(i P	 (11)
where the parameter a 1 . reflects the underlying income
available in the area for local authority service provision
and a 2i can be thought of as a baseline expenditure required
to provide a minimal level of services. At the time of
budget setting"' Central Government decision makers have to
guess the baseline level of expenditure to be provided and
the income available for taxation. I will assume, in analogy
with the theoretical model described in chapter four that
the implicit lump sum grant on the first segment is Central
Government perception of the need for any authority while
income available for taxation might be approximated by the
maximum rate poundage increase applied by any of the
authority of the same class in the previous year without
incurring rate capping, multiplied by the rateable value of
the local authority. The parameter z indicates the weight on
expenditure relative to taxation while p determines the
11.i.e. one year in advance with respect to actual expenditure
decisions.
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elasticity of substitution between expenditure and taxation,
S = 1/(1+p).
The decision variables for the problem are X., the
level of per capita expenditure and T . , he tax
bill.Convexity of indifference curves requires that p > —1.
At the maximum of (11) given the budget constraint defined
by equation (5), the condition 12:
X
.j - a 2,ii
a	 — T ij	 [ g.1,i
must be satisfied for an interior solution on each segment.
The optimal behaviour can be fully described by the
expenditure—taxation ratio from which it is possible to
recover all the parameters needed to estimate the utility
function. I will now describe the set of opportunities open
to each local authority. Figure three represents the budget
constraint for a representative authority which has been
plotted for convenience in the (X — a 2 ) — (a 1 —T) space.
12The optimum point is characterized by the equivalence
between the MRS and the price ratio. Then it follows that at
the optimum:
a	 —T	 P.1,i	 ij	 ij
(12)
- a 22,i 11 1	 1
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FIGURE THREE
This local authority could spend up to a 2 without any
sacrifice, but beyond this point it has to give up resources
according to the matching grant that Central Government
offer on the different segments. I have not depicted the
budget for the region in which X < a 2 since because of the
utility	 function	 I	 am	 using	 local	 authorities	 are
constrained to spend more than a 2 anyway. As for the
empirical analysis that will follow a 2 is set to a level
such that all local authorities spend more than this
amount. Local authorities expenditure decisions can be
summarized as follows 13 :
13The approach, at least at this stage is very similar to the
index function model to which the reader is referred for
definition of symbols and derivation of such conditions.
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1
*
-c-1
1
g1
1
MRS <1
MRS <2 g 2
-
1 
 MRS 2 	
1
g l	 g 2
4 locate on the first segment.
4 locate on the second segment.
4 locate at the kink.
For the CES function the Marginal rate of substitution can
be written as 14 :
[
X	 -aij 	 2,i
a—1,i
As per the index function model a variable on which to index
the model is needed. The model considers two sources of
stochastic variation. First I will assume that the weight on
expenditure is determined by characteristics peculiar to
each local authority and by a random error. I will define,
dropping the i subscripts for ease of exposition:
t = exp {a — /ID}
	 (13)
where D is a vector of characteristics associated with local
authority i and a is a random variable which is assumed to
be normally distributed with zero mean and variance a
a
z
. a
thus	 represent	 the	 heterogeneity	 between
	 different
authorities in the sample. The maximisation of the utility
function and the definition	 of t will lead to the desired
expenditure — taxation ratio which is defined as:
14This can be obtained straightaway from equation 12.
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[ XT — a  12 
1 [
X — a 2 f
T — a1
= exp (e)	 (14)
*
a =(1+p) Q +/JD + tin. gi	 i i=1,2
[
X — a 2] * .
T — a
The second source of stochastic error, the random error
enters in the function for the expenditure—tax ratio in the
following way:
where c is a random variable which is assumed normally
distributed with zero mean and variance a2 I will assume,c
following Hausman (1981) and Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) that
c and a are independent. In order to derive the likelihood
function for the problem I will take the natural logs of
equation (14) and then the likelihood will be defined in
terms of the expenditure—taxation ratio expressed in natural
logs. This allows c and a to enter in the estimating
equation in an additive fashion. Any local authority will
desire to locate along the first segment of its budget
constraint, at the kink or on the second segment according
to the value of the parameter a. It can be easily assessed
that authorities will locate:
on the first segment if: a < a1
on the kink if
	
a sa sa1	 2
on the second segment if a > a2
233
[Pr(E)	 = Pr a=E—R1;a<a1 
* for E < Q
E — R ; a > a* I2	 2 for E > QF
Pr
Pr
E =
a1 — T = observed expenditure—taxation ratio
1¼.X — a2
—R . = s*pD — st/n.(g ) i=1,2
X— a 2
a — (0—a 2 )*g 1Q tin{ 1*
expenditure—taxation ratio at the
kink (in logs)
By starting with the heterogeneity error only model the
probability density for each point might be defined as:
E = Q ; a	 a: < a <: for E = Q (15)
where:
When the second error is introduced the probability of each
point is modified as follows:
Pr(E)
	
=Pr a+e=E—R•a<a*	 for E < Q
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c = Q ; a: < a <a; for E = QPr
E — g(a) da de
J
co
a2
(16)
(17)
Pr a+ c=E—R•a>a*2'	 2 for E > Q
The likelihood for this problem can be written as:
a 2	 E — Q	 g(a) da dc	 +
a
E — le I2	 g(a) da de
where
sR = *p D —	 ( g ) + s *a	 i=1,2
The derivation of the likelihood is equivalent to the one
presented by Arrufat and Zabalza to which I will then refer
for further technical aspects. I will record here just the
final equation to be estimated:
L =
a
[ Eci — R 1 	 (i) [	 1
a
1
a
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1
a 1
a
(18)
2
a:
a = 	
2 2	 2	
[ E — Rd
Scr
a 
+ a
i = 1,2
[ Ea -R R 2	 {	 [ 0( }
-
R a a
a4) [ E c—je Q 	 { 1
21- (I) [a	 L ae a
where:
2 1 / 2
22
a =	 O
a 
+ a )
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a
 (Y E
a 
— [
2 2	 2
S a 4- CI
LL =	 Zrz. (L)	 (18a)
3.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE CES MODEL.
I have estimated the parameters of the utility function
using equation (18a) for the fiscal years 1986-87 to 1988-89
for the Metropolitan Districts and the Shire counties. The
measures of expenditure used are the budget figures
announced by local authorities before the start of the
fiscal year and reported by the Chartered Institute of
Public Finance and Accountancy. At the time of budget
setting local authorities have available the Government Rate
Support Grant report which contains initial values of the
parameter which determines local authorities' grant
entitlements. The budget constraint arising from these data
1 / 2
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are used in this study. In the following analysis I have
assumed that there is no disequilibrium at all; that is any
authority is allowed to spend how much it likes to. The
actual system was however fairly different since the rate
capping legislation did not allow them to do so. In order to
overcome this problem I have just taken the step to delete
from the analysis all the rate capped authorities in the
year in which they were rate capped and in the previous
year 15 . The number of rate capped authorities do not exceed
three in each year. In theory it would be possible to model
their behaviour by setting an ad hoc model but estimation
would be impossible because of lack of degrees of freedom;
as far as my analysis is concerned, in most cases they
should have been deleted by the sample anyway by being
outliers.
The whole budget set for local authorities actually presents
two different non convex regions which correspond to:
a) all expenditure financed by the block grant.
b) all expenditure financed by local taxation (i.e. due to
the penalty system all the grant is withdrawn).
In this analysis I have modelled only the convex part of the
budget set; this does not cause any serious problem when
dealing with Metropolitan Districts and Shire Counties since
all of those authorities are far away from having a zero tax
rate or running out of grant. The model takes account of
the possible structural differences in Metropolitan
Districts - Shire counties behaviour by a dummy variable on
15since rate capping in year t is the result of having
over spent in year t-1.
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	a =K	 B i
	
1i	 c
c=1,2	 (19)
D which takes the value of 1 for Metropolitan Districts and
0 for Shire counties. The peculiar utility function and the
budget constraint used do not allow to obtain consistent
1
estimates of p, i and a li 6simultaneously. This is in part
the result of the correlation between G and g but the most
important cause is the role a 1 plays in our model. a1,i
being an estimate of the income available in each authority
for taxation plays the same role as disposable income in a
standard CES model demand equation estimates. With no
constraint on how much to spend the role played by needs and
preferences is clearly marginal. 17
For this reason a 1 i has been fixed as follows:
K = max rate levied by Metropolitan districts if authority
i belongs to this class.
K = max rate levied by Shire counties if authority i2
belongs to this class.
16It would clearly be impossible to have a separate estimate
for all a 's. but it could be desirable to estimate ai
common parameter that, linked to some other variable would
actually differentiate a n among observations.
In our case, for example this would account to estimate
K and k 2 instead of imposing their value a priori.
I actually allowed a i to vary and for all year a n was set
to extreme high values such that all the other parameters
estimates were very unstable and with no economic meaning.
17
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Other measures are clearly possible and I actually tried
different ones but this one proved to be the most suitable
to deal with this problem. The likelihood for this model 18 ,
being based on a joint normal distribution cannot be
maximised using standard statistical packages hence I wrote
my own programme using the maximisation algorithm E04UCF
taken from the NAG library to get the estimates which are
recorded in table 1. The asymptotical standard errors are
derived using Amemyia (1986) method. In order to derive the
expected values for this model it is necessary to integrate
the equations for the ratio along all segments; this
accounts to take the weighted mean of average expenditure
ratio on the different segments and at the kinks. 19 It should
be noted that, because of the peculiar estimation procedure
used, no reliable statistical tests of the overall goodness
of fit are available. Therefore the values for the R 2 in
table 1 are only reported as a guide to the quality of the
model but cannot be subjected to the statistical tests used
in more traditional applications. However, if we accept
Klein's (1962) suggestion that the empirical relevance of an
econometric model is to be assessed on the basis of its
predictive power, it is worthwhile to use the most common
goodness of fit measures in order to assess how the
parameters estimated for our model fit with the actual data.
For this reason, I have recorded the MAE and RMSPE
respectively 20 . Finally, it should be noted that because a
18
which corresponds to equation 19 presented before.
19The weight is here represented by the probability of
choosing that particular ratio.
20MAE can be defined as:
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estimates are consistent only for large sample. I have
decided to present them anyway since the definition of
"large" is quite unclear and because the results can be
taken as a guideline into the problem anyway. It will become
clear later, expecially after the presentation of the result
for the Stone Geary model that cross check of parameter
estimates are possible and can help in judging the
consistency of the model . Close parameter estimates using
quite different models cannot be used as a clear cut test
but they might somehow reassure on the validity of the
parameters obtained expecially when dealing with likelihood
function so complicated and, possibly, not even continuous.
The insight that metropolitan districts and shire counties
behaviour have quite a different behaviour seems to be
confirmed by this new set of estimates. Metropolitan
counties' behaviour seems to be consistent with a Cobb
Douglas assumption 21 and the model fits quite well with the
data. For Shire counties there is a mixed evidence. In
1986-7 their behaviour could have been consistent with a
Cobb Douglas utility maximisation, even though the structure
of the error terms follows a completely different pattern
than the one for Metropolitan districts and it is in general
higher; in 1987-8 the indifference map was in general more
curved than the one implied by a Cobb Douglas and again the
variance of estimates was exceptionally high. The overall
goodness of fit is quite good for Metropolitan districts
estimates while it seems quite poor for Shire counties.
The expected value of t for metropolitan districts in the
21 the value of p is in fact approximately equal to zero.
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T1
— E(E)
range of marginal rate of substitution are compatible with
the kink, no reliable estimates can be obtained if there
are a lot of authorities locating there; im my case the
number of authorities at the kink was quite low and the
estimates have been tested by using different starting
values for the parameters and checking whether the
algoritm was converging to the same result.
From table one it is possible to note that the results are
not quite satisfactory. Even if the R 2 is not an appropriate
measure of goodness of fit, its low value suggests at least
that the expected values distribution follows a quite
different pattern than the distribution of the observed
data. The signs of the different parameters and in
particular of the dummy variable suggest that the behaviour
of metropolitan districts and shire counties might be so
different to require a separate estimate for the two set of
observations.
In order to gain further insights into the problem I have
split the sample and estimate the previous model for
metropolitan districts and shire counties separately. Table
2 and 3 records the results. The number of observations in
the sample is now quite low and this could cause some
problems when dealing with maximum likelihood whose
i=1
RMSPE can be defined as:
2 }
i	 1
{	
n
—
N
=
E. — E( E .)1 2
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three years is equal to 1.6 2.40 and 2.77 respectively thus
implying a value for 13 equal to 0 .619 for 1986-87 ,0.709
for 1987-88 and 0.73 for 1988-89 22 . Those result will be used
later after a demand equation consistent with the Stone
Geary model will be estimated.
3.2 THE DEMAND EQUATION FOR A STONE GEARY MODEL.
In this section I will present some tests devised to
outline the main similarities (or differences ! ) between the
actual grant system and the optimal one.
From 1986-7 onwards the system by which grants to local
government are allocated has been considerably simplified.
In the last three years in fact the previous target system
has been abolished and then the budget constraint present
just one kink. This model is then very similar to the
optimal set of rules I presented in chapter three and I will
now test to what extent the actual system reflected the
92
— The derivation of 13 can be easily obtained by observing
that the marginal rate of substitution can be written as:
a w.
	d X .	 a T	 1 .	 -	 X — a 2,13
	
1	 1
	
T . ,X . 	 d T.1	 1	 1
a X
for the Cobb Douglas and as:
a	 - T1 , i
for the CES utility function.
It follows then that 13 = z/(r+1).
MRS
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theoretical one 23 . The problem does not allow for a unique
direct test but some indirect measures of consistency can be
devised. For the time being I will assume that the parameter
of the grant system have been chosen optimally 24 and I will
derive the revealed preferences of local authorities for
expenditure under the assumption of a life cycle consistent
behaviour. In order to do so I would require to estimate the
demand equations derived by the life cycle utility function
by possibly using one of the procedures suggested in the
labour supply literature. However this is not possible for
different reasons:
a) most of the models in labour supply just cope with
participation problems and assume a constant marginal
wage on the range of the feasible hours of work;
b) the wage rate is assumed to be given, i.e. a parameter
that cannot be changed by the decisions of how many hours
to work. As I showed in the previous chapter local
authorities can influence the price they are going to pay
for expenditure in the future by deciding whether to
cheat and how much; on the other hand the actual system
of grant as designed in the Rate Support Grant gives a
large weight to previous level of expenditure as concerns
the future levels of GREAS and targets. 25
23In 1986-7 elections for local authorities which adopt the
system of choosing their local representative each 4 years
took place, then the three years I am considering are
actually part of the same life cycle.
24i.e. M	 reflects the basic needs, threshold represents the
optimal incentive and P . are derived according to the13
formulas presented in the previous chapter.
25When the system of targets was in operation.
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My approach will then be a bit different. I will
derive the utility function parameters for local authorities
by estimating the model separately for any of the years I am
considering in my analysis and I will then devise a test to
assess whether these parameters are constant through time.
This procedure is perfectly valid in this case since I
assume that there does not exist any time preference for
expenditure and the interest rate has been set equal to
zero. The analysis I am going to present is, however,
tentative and incomplete since I face two other problems:
the first one is that the life cycle of the authorities I am
considering will end in fiscal year 1989-90 for which it is
impossible to perform estimates since the system by which
grants were allocated was different and some authorities in
the sample use the system of electing 1/3 of their members
each year.
Another important aspect to consider is that if the system
of grant is set optimally, local authorities will be budget
balanced each year and then it is possible to estimate their
demand subject to the static budget constraint. The evidence
that local authorities do actually transfer money among
their life cycle is per se an evidence of some failure in
the system. At the end of this chapter some possible causes
for this failure will be tested.
The analysis will be performed using data on Metropolitan
Districts since the assumption that they behave as if they
were maximising an utility function of the	 Cobb Douglas
244
class seem to be plausible 26 .
The procedure can be described as follows:
The utility of each individual in authority i is given the
specific form of a Stone Geary27 :
Vi = 0. — 13) tin, ( a	 - T . ) + g tin, ( X — a )	 (20)i	 Ii	 i	 i	 2i
where the parameter a l i reflects the underlying income
available in the area for local authority service provision
and a2i is the baseline expenditure required to provide a
minimal level of services.
As for the model I presented in the previous section,
at the time of budget setting 28 Central Government decision
makers have to guess the baseline level of expenditure to be
provided and the income available for taxation. The implicit
lump sum grant on the first segment of the budget constraint
is assumed to be the basic need indicator in order to
reflect the assumptions of the theoretical model, while
income available for taxation might be thought of as the
maximum rate poundage increase applied by any of the
authority of the same class in the previous year without
incurring rate capping, multiplied by the rateable value of
the local authority. The parameter (3 is determined by the
preferences between local authority services and local
2	 .8This has been shown in the previous section.
27The Stone Geary function I am using differs from the more
standard one from which the LES demand system is derived
because in this case one of the commodities, namely
taxation, T, is actually a bad.
28 i.e. one year in advance with respect to actual expenditure
decisions.
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[ a
X Ii= (1-13) a	 + 132iij gij
(21)G. .13
By	 assuming	 a2	G1.
	
the	 demand	 equation	 on	 the
(X 2i - a 2i ) = P
[ a ii + (X*— a )*(g2i — g1)2 
g 2i
(22b)
taxation. Maximisation of (20) subject to (5) give a demand
equation of the form:
first segment can be rewritten as:
a
(X 1i - a 2i ) =	 g
	 (22a)
while on the second segment it will be written as:
The source of error in the equation to be estimated derives
from two different sources, namely an heterogeneity error
which is represented by a and a stochastic error represented
by c. In the absence of any measurement error the preferred
segment of the budget is determined by the heterogeneity
error that in my model is represented by a. By adding the
heterogeneity error and dropping the subscripts i
representing different observations for ease of exposition
the demand equation can be written as:
al
(X 1 — a 2 ) =	 exp(a)	 (23a)gi
for the demand on the first segment and:
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la + (X* - G 1 )* 2(g - g 1 ) [	]
(X 
2 
-a
2 
)= g
g 2
*exp(a)	 (23b)
a l
 + (X *- G 1
 )*(g 2 - g 1 )][
(X 
2 
-a
2
)= g
g 2
*exp(a) * exp(e) (23b)
tin(X_ -a
2
 ) = tin. 13+tin.2 
a l + (X * - G 1 )*(g 2 - g 1[
I 
+a+ E
g 2
for the demand on the second segment.
The second source of error is the usual random or
measurement error that in my model is represented by c. When
also this second source of error is introduced the complete
demand equations to be estimated can be written as:
al
(X
1
 - a
2
 ) = 13	 *exp(a) * exp(0	 (23a)
g 1
By taking the logs of both sides
a
'PAL( X - a 
2
) 	 13 + tin, [ --1— ] + a+ C
1 
	 gi
If we consider to start with the heterogeneity error only
and assuming a has a p.d.f. f(a) the likelihood function in
this case can be written as follows:
L = Fl Pr[a = x-g(g i , G 11 13)] cx < x * -g(g i , G1913)
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11 Pr
fl Pr[x = x
= x-g(g 2 ,
*
x-g(g
G2,13)]
G 1
cx >
	
x -g(g2'	G2' 13)
,13)	 < a	 <	 x-g(g 2'	 G 2' p) (24)
g ( g i , G 1 , P)	 tin P	 [
al
g1
g(g_
z
 , G , p) =	 p +tin.
2
[ a l + (x*- G )*(g - g2	 1
g 2 )1
= ba (X - a 2 )
x* =	 (X* - a2)
X * = threshold level of expenditure.
When the second error, i.e. e, is introduced the likelihood
is modified as follows:
L = n [ Pr(x)
where:
Pr(x)=Pr[a+c = x-g(g i , G1,p)	 a < x* -g(g 1 , G 1 ,13)
+Pr[a+c = x-g(g 
2 , 
G ,	 a >(3)	 x * -g(g
2	 2' 
G 
2'
13)
(25)
+ Pr [c = x -
	 x*-g(g 1 , G 1 ,P) < a < x -g(g G p)2'	 2'
The log likelihood function can be written as:
LL =	 log [Pr(x)]
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where:
U 1
Pr(x)	 =
,
fh
-00
op
=	 g(g1, G1'	 13)) , a	 da
j
+	 h Cv	 = g(gz' G 2	 t3)) ,	 a da
u
2
IT
1
f
X 1 f( a )	 da (26)
j2
a
aU 1
0.2
u .
2
= a
a
=
+ a 2
— g(g ,G	 ,	 /3))
J J
By using	 the properties	 of the conditional normal
distribution the p.d.f. for each point can be written as:
1Pr(x ) =	 f(z	 ) [ F(r	 )a	 1, i 	 1
1
f(2 2, i ) [1	 F(r 2, i )0
1 f(s i ) [F(t 2, i )	 F(t 1, i ) 1a
(27)
z, . =[(x — g(g.	 G.•
3,1
	
3,1	 3,1	 av
gt.	= [(x.—	 (g,	 G. . , fi))	 / ac3, 1	3,1
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d
-
 p21
J I	 J ,	 j
P =
3.3 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE STONE GEARY MODEL.
I have estimated the parameter of the utility function
using the technique depicted above for fiscal years 1986-7
to 1988-9 by using data for the Metropolitan districts 29.
The set of data I used is the same as for the model I
presented in the previous section to which I refer for any
further detail. The likelihood for this model, being again
based on a joint normal distribution cannot be maximised
using standard statistical packages hence I write another
programme using the maximisation algorithm E04UCF taken from
the NAG library to get the estimates which are recorded in
table 4. In order to derive the expected values for this
model it is again necessary to integrate the demand
equations along all segments which accounts to take the
weighted mean of average expenditure on the different
29The assumption of utility maximisation behaviour consistent
with a Cobb Douglas type function is in fact consistent only
for Metropolitan districts while, as I have showed in the
previous section the Indifference Map for Shire counties
seems to be more curved in at least two years out of three.
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segments and at the kinks. 30
 Again, because of the peculiar
estimation procedure used, no reliable statistical tests of
the overall goodness of fit are available. Therefore the
values for the R2 in table 4 are only reported as a guide to
the quality of the model but cannot be subjected to the
statistical tests used in more traditional applications. The
results presented in table 4 show how close are the
estimates for (3 to the one I derived from the CES estimation
presented in the previous section. It is actually possible
to test the hypothesis that the two p are equal by using a
test first suggested by Hausman (1978). The application of
Hausman test is not straightforward in this case because the
variance of g for the CES model has to be evaluated. The
procedure to derive this variance and the results of Hausman
test are recorded in appendix one: the conclusion is that
the hypothesis of the two g being equal cannot be rejected.
3.3.1 TESTING THE LIFE CYCLE HYPOTHESIS.
I have argued in the introduction to this section that,
in order to be consistent with the assumptions of a life
cycle utility maximisation, the estimated g should be
constant through time. The results presented in table four
seem to suggest that p is actually increasing through time.
However, from a statistical point of view a test is needed
to see if 13 is constant. By using a pooling cross section
model I can achieve this result.
I will estimate the demand equation derived from the Stone
30The weight is here represented by the probability of
spending that amount.
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Geary utility function for the three years together and I
will then test for the constancy of p. The demand equation
for	 a	 representative	 authority	 i,
has	 been	 dropped	 to	 make	 the	 notation
written as:
X	 = (1—P) a k2	 + (p+ y 1 D 1 + 1 2 D 2 )kj
j =	 1,2	 k =	 1,3
D	 = 1 if k =21
0 elsewhere
D	 = 1 if k=32
for	 which
a 1k
+
simpler,
the
G kj
subscript
can	 be
(28)
[ 
gkj
0 elsewhere
If I again assume that a 2k = G 1k I can again use the same
technique I explained before to get estimates of equation
(28). Constancy of' P through time can be tested by imposing
the restriction:
= 1 2 = 0
and by testing its validity using the likelihood ratio test.
The results for both the constrained and the unconstrained
model are presented in table five.
The likelihood ratio test shows that the hypothesis
that local authorities behave as if they were maximising
31their utility function over their life cycle is rejected
The second important remark on the results of table five is
31 the hypothesis that P is constant through time cannot be
accepted at 99%.
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that the values for /3 in the different years are .614 for
1986-7 ; .71 for 1987-8 and .732 for 1988-9, then very close
to the one I obtained by performing the estimates for each
year 32 • Since the estimates for /3 are quite close each
other, it is possible to use the model in table five as
reference for policy implications and for comparisons with
the actual grant system.
Any definite conclusion is premature, but from the results I
presented above it seems possible to infer that even though
the actual grant system was designed according to the
optimal rules depicted in chapter three and four, it could
not have been able to fully achieve its goals because /3 is
not constant through time. The next section deals with two
possible causes of this outcome.
4 TESTING FOR ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIOURAL HYPOTHESES
In the previous chapter I have argued that one of the
possible failures of the optimal grant system could arise
from a misperception of the set of rules governing it and in
particular I have argued that the actual budget could be
misperceived. The misperception might well derive from
uncertainty about the precise form of the grant or from the
system being much too complicated to be fully understood.
Even if they do not act as life cycle utility maximisers
39 The R2 for the second model is however much higher,
suggesting then that the predictive power of the latter is
has quite improved. This result can in my opinion be related
to the fact that when performing separate estimates the
number of observations is not sufficient to make the
structure of the two errors terms optimal for the
problem.
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local authorities decisions makers have to set the budget at
least one year in advance when the information available is
not complete 33 . This might induce bureaucrats to care just
about how much money they hope to receive from central
government without bothering about how many new additional
kinks the actual budget will have. In addition to this
problem local authorities might not maximise their utility
function according to the conventional rules and the
alternative behaviour could seriously jeopardize the
theoretical grant system. In this section both hypothesis
will be tested in turn.
4.1 A FLYPAPER MODEL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOUR
The flypaper theory assumes that local governments
misperceive their true budget; instead of thinking in terms
of the true marginal cost of the service provision they
think in terms of average costs. If this is the case, the
budget constraint will be perceived as:
X =T B ikik	 i
Maximisation of (2) subject to (29) gives the following
demand equation:
X ik = (1-0 a 2	 + (3 (a B k )	 ( 30)i	 i
33 sincece in turn Central Government is not in actual fact
setting all the rules at the start of the new legislation.
(29)
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x.
B ik = X. —G . .)g1	 j
(30a)
From a policy point of view the existence of the flypaper
effect is quite important. One of the main predictions of
this theory is that the amount rather than the form of the
grant matters. If local authorities behave according to this
policy it is clear that the previous system of incentives
fails to reach its objectives since it is designed to deal
with marginal incentives rather than average ones. This is
particularly important for restraining expenditure on the
second segment of the budget constraint in which the average
price is clearly considerably lower than the marginal one.
The estimation of (30) is more tricky than the one for the
two segment budget constraint because B depends on the level
of expenditure. The model to be estimated can be written
using equations (30) and (30a) together. In order to compare
the results of this model with the one I presented in the
previous section, I will also impose the following
restriction:
a = G2i
It is worth noting that equations (30) and (30a) cannot be
estimated using a simultaneous equation approach since (30a)
is an identity and B cannot be substituted in (30) because
this would lead to equation (20), while the main hypothesis
of this interpretation of the flypaper theory is that local
government bodies do not do this substitution. B ik and thus
the budget constraint changes continuously according to the
(
(31)
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level of expenditure; however this is not realized until
expenditure changes i.e. for a certain level of
expenditure, the budget is perceived as being fixed 34 . This
suggests that I can implement a procedure that I have
labelled "iterative Maximum Likelihood" in which the
iterations follow a type of Walrasian tatonnement process.
The log likelihood for the model can be written as:
1	 2LL(0„0.2 ) = - 2 ln(2m) — n ln(cr)
2a 2
	[X — X	 (32)
where X is the actual expenditure and X k is derived from an
iterative procedure that finds for any given level of 13,
G , g . the pair of X ik and B k compatible each other. Thej	 1.1
iterative or tatonnement procedure is implemented as
follows:
1. Select an initial value for B ik (in the empirical work I
have taken the value of B ik which held at the previous
fiscal year's actual level of expenditure as the starting
value for B k , but in theory any feasible value could bei
selected) along with a guess for 13 and a 2 .
2. Use equation (30) to find the value of	 X	 for theik
assumed value of B .ik
3a If at X	 the local authority's true budget is balancedik
stop the procedure.
3b If at X ik the local government's budget is not in balance
adjust B ik and repeat step 2.
34People perceive the average price as if it was the marginal
price.
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which is the inverse of B i k if expenditure exceeds
Continue this procedure until the level of B 
ik
is found
for which the true budget is balanced.
Step 3b requires the specification of an adjustment rule for
changing B k . If at a given level of B k the estimated
expenditure exceeds the funds available the adjustment rule
reduces B k . This is equivalent to increase (average) pricei 
resources available. Similarly if the true budget is not all
spent the adjustment rule increases B k . The adjustment rulei 
is given by:
_	 t-1AB	 =	 (13 ti k	 ik	 ik 0 < (i) <1
where the superscripts refer to the stage of the tatonnement
process. The local government reaction path for this
procedure is given by its price—consumption curve and the
nature of the the tatonnement procedure is illustrated in
Figure four.
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XBak' 3_Ic ik
Rt-1.
3.1c
FIGURE FOUR
The starting value for B i k is given by	 ik
t-1
, the budget
constraint which held in the previous fiscal year, But at
this level of B ki the estimated level of expenditure is
t-1
.X k	 which does not lie on the true budget constraint
which is given by abc. At the estimated level of expenditure
the budget is exceeded and in fact the budget would be
balanced for this level of expenditure only if B ik = B. k .
t	 t-1Since B i k# B . the adjustment rule is implemented and
B ki is reduced. The reaction path is given by deg and the
tatonnement process will lead to a final equilibrium at
35.
4. Once step 1 to 3 is performed for all observations,
point e f
substitute X i k
2 iand the guess for a n (32) and evaluate
35The estimation procedure is then analogous to the one we
used in Barnett et al (1989a).
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the log—likelihood function.
5. Repeat 1-4 for a different 13 and a 2 . A grid search method
can be used to find the parameters 13 and a2 that
maximise (32). 36
4.1.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS.
I have estimated the parameters of the utility function
by using equation (30) for the fiscal years 1986/7 — 1988/9
by using data for Metropolitan Districts. The estimates for
the 'flypaper' demand equation have been obtained by using
the same set of data I have been using in the previous
estimates and the results are reported in table 6. The
'iterative MLE' procedure has been implemented by writing an
ad hoc program and using the NAG routine E041.ICF as
maximisation algorithm.
If I compare the results I can immediately note that in
1987-88 the value of 13 for the 'flypaper model' demand
equation is around half the one for the standard model.
This suggestion can be interpreted in terms of marginal
rates of substitution which can be written as:
a u
i 
,
	d X .	 a T	 X.	 g	 i — a 2i
	
1	 1	
	MRST	-,X	 d T	
=	 _ 	  . 	 (33)
	
.	 a U	 1 — f3	 a	 — T
	
i	 1.1 	 . 	 1, i	 i
a X .1
Other things being equal, g determines the curvature and the
steepness of the indifference map. In particular the
36This procedure is analogous to the one deleloped to obtain
estimates for Barnett et al (1989c)
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indifference map will be flatter the greater the 13. If I
look at figure four again I can interpret the rationale for
this finding: since the misperceived budget constraint is
always steeper than the actual one, the change in P. by
causing the indifference map to be steeper as well fits
better with the new budget. In the last two years the gap
between the two values is not so relevant, but it might be
born in mind that the relationship between the curvature of
the indifference curves and 0 is not linear.
In order to assess the empirical validity of the flypaper
theory I propose two different sets of tests, namely
goodness of fit and predictive power tests.
The first set of tests aims at establishing which model
fits best with the data. If I look at tables 5and 6 I can
easily notice that the flypaper model fits better with data
since the R 2 is higher and both the RMSPE are lower. As
concerns the MAE a straightforward comparison is not
possible since the two models, though using the same
original set of data, are estimated using a different
dependent variable. In the standard model the dependent
variable is tin. (X — a ) while for the flypaper theory the
dependent variable is X i . On the basis of the R 2 and the
RMSPE test it is possible to conclude that the flypaper
estimates are closer to the actual data both on average and
on outliers.
The second set of tests is more important from a policy
point of view since it tries to assess which of the two
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models leads to closer estimates of the actual expenditure
in year t by using only information known in period t-1.
I have carried out this set of tests by using parameters
estimates from 1986-87 and 1987-8 model to forecast
expenditure in 1987-88 and 1988-89. The forecasts for the
flypaper model are
	 quite	 straightforward:	 it is	 only
necessary to use the procedure I described before by using
as starting point 1986-87 estimates and iterate until we
find for any authority a pair of X and B. compatible with
each	 other.	 The	 forecasts
	 with	 the	 model	 without
misperception are somewhat more complicated since they
depend on the value of a. One possible way to proceed would
be to use the expected value of a on the overall budget but
in this case all information available would not be used
since the expected values of a on the different sets of the
budget that are known would not be considered. For the
forecasts I have used this information, i.e. the predicted
37
expenditure is the weighted
	
expected value of expenditure
on the different location with weights and expected values
of the random a assumed to be constant from one year to the
other. In this application I also face a different problem
which is based on which model to choose for prediction. As I
pointed out before, while the estimated value for p in the
different years obtained by using a pooling cross section
equation and a set of separate estimates are quite close
together, the actual structure of the error term is not. For
this reason I will present the forecast that can be obtained
37The weight is represented by the probability of being on
that segment or at the kink.
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by using both set of errors terms. Table 7 records some
goodness of fit of our forecasts using both models. Those
tests can be interpreted as predictive power tests in this
context since they assess how close forecasts are to actual
data. The flypaper theory seems to predict better both in
average terms and as concerns outliers 38 . The results
presented in table 7 can be also used as a straightforward
test for the existence of a life cycle utility maximisation
behaviour in the context of the flypaper model. By using the
value of p for 1986-7 only about 40% of the variation in
expenditure in 1987-8 can be explained while the
unconstrained model was explaining more than 85%. This
result supports the view that p is not constant through
time; the forecasts and estimates for 1988-9 are closer
together but the difference is still significant from a
statistical point of view.
4.2 ARE LOCAL AUTHORITIES UTILITY MAXIMISERS?
At the end of chapter four I have argued that local
authorities objectives, by being the result of a process of
decision involving a body of individuals could not in
actual fact be utility maximiser, at least in a standard way
of interpreting utility maximisation. In particular I argued
that f3 could not be constant through time and fixed outside
the model, but it could itself a choice variable. If this is
the case, I showed that preferences for expenditure depends
38The RMSPE which gives more weights to big deviations from
the observed value is greater for the forecasts obtained by
using the flypaper model.
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.62(X i — a 2 ) = ,ein, 0 -kf/n- [ i +pW + a + c
a i ig
-e_in(X —a)= ta g+,e_nl.
2 2
]
- ci-
° 1 + a+ pW+ E.
both on the price system in force in each year and,41
resources available. This hypothesis can be tested by
rewriting equations (23a) and
	
(23b) as follows:
al
(X 1 — a 2	) = (33a)p	 ,exp(6)	 *exp(6) g 1
a l + (X *— G 1 )*(g2 — g ,	 )
(X 2 — a 2 )= g L *exp(ô)	 *exp(e) (33h)
where 6 = pW + a
W = resources indicator.
By taking the logs of both sides
[ a t + (X * — G 1 )*(g2
g2
In this model pW determines the value of g that each
local authority will choose. If local authorities were
behaving according to a standard utility maximising model
their preferences should be independent of resources and
9.	 3prices	 then p should not be significantly different from
zero.
39 The actual quantity spent for local public services will
clearly depend on resources and prices as a result of the
type of utility chosen and of the budget constraint but this
should not affect the value of 13 which is assumed to be
given, i.e. a fixed parameter which depends on local
characteristics.
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I will test this hypothesis by estimating equations
(33a) and (33b) using again a two error model. I will not
rewrite here the log likelihood for this problem since it is
very similar to equation (27) .
4.2.1 ESTIMATING THE PREVIOUS MODEL
I have estimated the parameters of the utility function
by using equations (33a) and (33b) for the fiscal years
1986-87 to 1988-89 by using data for Metropolitan Districts.
I have used as a proxy for resources available the previous
year level of taxation. The model assumes that resources
available for taxation are actually determined by the
rateable value of each locality multiplied by the maximum
rate observed in each year; however this measure cannot be
used for W because of a multicollinearity problem. Resources
available, in fact enter the model through a 1• . The previous
level of' taxation and resources available have proved to be
highly correlated, so I use this variable as a proxy in my
model. Table 8 reports the result of' this model along with
the usual goodness of fit indicators.
By using results in table 4 and 8 it is possible to test the
hypothesis that 1.1 in the different years is equal to zero
and the results I have summarized in table 8 show that this
hypothesis has to be rejected.
The hypothesis that preferences for local goods depend on
the grant system itself cannot then be rejected. The average
sample value for W in the three years of the analysis was
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.228 .266 and .3004 respectively, thus implying an average
value for preferences equal to .63 .68 .72 on average. The
model then shows the upward trend of preferences and in this
case it is possible to note that the resources available
play a smooth role in the preferences pattern. If I assume
that the estimated /3 is the true preference parameter, its
variation is between .504 and .897 while the average
revealed preference is in the range between .63 and .72
which is again very similar to the estimates I derived from
the previous models. From a policy point of view this cause
another failure to the optimal system of grant allocation
outlined in the previous chapter arid can possibly mean that
an optimal set of rules cannot be designed at all.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has been mainly devoted to presenting the
parameter estimates for the utility functions of local
authorities revealed through their expenditure behaviour.
The exercise I presented implicitly assumes that the price
system set up by Central Government has been set according
to the rules presented in chapter four. The results show
that only Metropolitan districts behaviour is consistent
with the assumption of' an underlying Cobb Douglas type
utility function. The assumption of a life cycle
maximisation seems to be rejected since the revealed
preferences for expenditure are not constant through time
and present an upward trend. This result, in terms of the
shape of the indifference map, implies that indifference
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curves are flatter. Since the implicit price for expenditure
on both segments of the budget constraint increased through
the period of the analysis, this result can be interpreted
in terms of adjusting preferences to the system ruling in a
particular year and to resources available 40 •
Finally	 I	 showed	 that	 local	 authorities	 could	 also
misperceive their budget constraint by taking their
expenditure decisions in terms of average price to be paid
rather than marginal price.
40The latter proposition has been shown using results for the
model recorded in table eight.
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TABLE ONE
Summary of results for years 1986/7 1988/9 . Dummy on D 
i per head
YEAR	 p	 a
a	
	
p	 dum D
	 R 2C
1986-7
	 -.140	 .208	 .209	 -.55	 .093	 .380
(.01)	 (.02)	 (.009)
1987-8	 -.620	 .280	 .490	 -.83	 .23	 .180
(.03)	 (.04)	 (.01)
1988-9	 -.360	 .270	 .275	 -.97	 .16	 .340
(.02)	 (.05)	 (.02)
GOODNESS OF FIT INDICATORS
1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
MAE	 8.49	 0.53	 3.27
RMSPE	 19.40	 8.20	 31.76
The numbers in parenthesis are asymptotical standard errors.
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TABLE TWO
Summary of results for years 1986/7 1988/9
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
YEAR P aa a	 pE R
2
1986-7 —.0025 .28 .29	 —.486 .458
(.001) (.045)
1987-8 .077 .32 .31	 —.879 .736
(.002) (.102)
1988-9 —.004 .33 .32	 —1.022 .761
(.001) (.168)
GOODNESS OF FIT INDICATORS
1986-7 1987-8 1988-9
MAE 3.5 0.23 1.27
RNISPE 4.2 1.37 14.23
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TABLE THREE
Summary of results for years 1986/7 1988/9.
SHIRE COUNTIES
i per head
YEAR	 p	 a
a	cc	C	 R
2
1986-7	 .006	 .149	 .237	 -.58	 .232
(.03)	 (.2)
1987-8	 -.370	 .312	 .680	 -1.05	 .100
(.002)	 (.18)
1988-9	 -.370	 .344	 .304	 -1.089	 .123
(.003)	 (.15)
GOODNESS OF FIT INDICATORS
1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
MAE	 1.03	 2.78	 4.32
RMSPE	 18.09	 42.10	 61.94
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TABLE FOUR
Summary of results for years 1986/7 1988/9
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
YEAR /3 act a6 R
2
1986-7 .6157	 0.128 0.132 .613
(.041)
1987-8 .7124
	
0.150 0.130 .310
(.062)
1988-9 .733	 0.156 0.154 .207
(.073)
GOODNESS OF FIT INDICATORS
1986-7 1987-8 1988-9
MAE 0.80 1.00 1.27
RMSPE 0.32 3.48 14.23
LL -24.30 -27.67 -24.09
270
TABLE FIVE
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
UNCONSTRAINED MODEL
p aa a	 1E	 1 Y 2 R
2
.614 .129 .138	 .096 .118 .645
(.031) (.02) (.09)
CONSTRAINED MODEL
.680 .138 .142	 — — .47
(.042)
GOODNESS OF FIT INDICATORS
UNCONSTRAINED	 CONSTRAINED
MAE	 .92	 .94
RMSPE
	 3.06	 4.04
LL	
—58.322
	
—66.21
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST4:1 15.78
41 This value corresponds already to twice the logarithm of
the likelihood ratio.
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TABLE SIX
RESULTS USING THE FLYPAPER MODEL
YEAR g aa R
2
1986-7 .392 .0146 .764
(.032)
1987-8 .504 .0123 .765
(.041)
1988-9 .521 .0122 .827
(.052)
MAE RMSPE
1986-7 .0174 .0198
1987-8 .0153 .0091
1988-9 .0148 .0083
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TABLE SEVEN
FORECAST FOR 1987/8 USING 1986/7 PARAMETERS.
R
2
MAE RMSPE
STANDARD MODEL * .099 1.016 3.60
STANDARD MODEL ** .109 1.007 3.50
FLYPAPER MODEL .344 .026 .38
FORECAST FOR 1988-9 USING 1987-8 PARAMETERS.
R
2
MAE RMSPE
STANDARD MODEL * .049 1.028 3.835
STANDARD MODEL ** .044 1.030 3.864
FLYPAPER MODEL .819 .016 .034
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aCaa p	 R
2YEAR	 P
TABLE EIGHT
Summary of results for years 1986/7 1988/9
METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
1986-7	 .504	 0.102	 0.103	 1.025	 .640
	
(.021)	 (.108)
1987-8	 .897	 0.109
	
0.110	 —1.045	 .455
	
(.031)
	
(.109)
1988-9	 .812	 0.134	 0.125	 — .386	 .268
	
(.029)	 (.02)
GOODNESS OF FIT INDICATORS
1986-7	 1987-8	 1988-9
MAE	 1.23	 .98	 1.02
RMSPE	 2.11	 3.07	 3.76
LL	 —18.58	 —21.57	 —19.07
LR	 11.56	 11.46	 10.04 42
42This value corresponds to twice the difference of the log
likelihood.
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APPENDIX ONE
Derivation of the standard error for 13 in the CES model.
As I have shown in the text, 13 can be derived from y as
follows:
e	 /	 1 g =
	 = 1
1 + e l	 1 + e /
(1)
-
if we take the Taylor expansion of this series around g , it
is possible to write that:
I
+ 	
 (; 1) 2+2 [ 	 	
	 -	
	  1 
1
-	 2( -1)
21	 1	 1	 e 7	 2e 1e
Using the asymptotic properties of the variance distribution
it is possible to write that:
e 
21
plim 1-71
 ( .13 -13) 2
 =	
	  (1.-1)2
(1 + e1)4
(1 + e ll ) 4 1 -4- e 7
.,
1 + e l i=1 (1 + 0) 2 (1 + e1)3
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e 27
AVAR(P) = 	 AVAR(/)	 (2)
(1 + e1)4
From (1) and using the results of table two it is possible
to derive the following values of 13
1986/7
	 1987/8
	 1988/9
P	 .619	 .706	 .735
From (2) it is possible to derive the asymptotical standard
errors for 13 as follows:
1986/7	 1987/8	 1988/9
STD (3)	 .025	 .050	 .078
It is now possible compare the values of /3 with the one in
table 4 by using Hausman (1978) test.
The values for the test are as follows:
	
1986/7
	 1987/8	 1988/9
TEST	 —1.75	 .902	 —.20
then in the three years the hypothesis of the two 13's being
equal cannot be rejected.
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CHAPTER SIX
1. INTRODUCTION
The history of intergovernmental grants in Britain has
been characterized, expecially in the most recent years, by
dramatic changes in the grant distribution formula that some
commentators 1 have interpreted as a failure of the system
to reach its objectives. In this section I will present a
different interpretation by explaining how, in my opinion
the different grant distribution formulas applied in the
last decades reflect the perception of the information
asymmetry problem that characterizes the relationship
between Central and local government. The history of grants
might, in my view divided into three different phases:
1) Central Government assumed to know all the parameters
necessary to give the right amount of grant to local
authorities.
2) Central Government realizes the problems caused by the
asymmetry of information characterizing the game and
tries to react accordingly.
3) Due to the peculiar characteristics of the agents
involved in the play no optimal grant formula exists and
the grant is almost arbitrary. Central Government's
objectives determine the size of the grant and its amount
The dramatic changes in the grant system might then be
interpreted as an evidence of Central Government's
Increasing awareness of the asymmetry problem that it has to
face. In this light also the new drastic change in local
government finance brought about by the introduction of the
See, for example, Gibson and Travers (1986)
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poll tax might be seen as a response to a problem that, as I
have argued in the previous chapter might not have a
solution.
2. THE GRANT SYSTEM UNDER THE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT
INFORMATION
In 1967 a new grant system was introduced. In this
phase Central Government was confident of being able to
know, or at least to observe, all the relevant parameters to
distribute the grant in an optimal way. The key feature of
the system was equalization of both needs and resources
between different authorities.
Equalizing needs through the grant system involved
setting a national standard for all local Government
services and giving each authority the ability to provide
that service for each member for its population. Equalizing
resources meant that each authority should have to make the
same tax effort to raise revenue regardless of its taxable
capacity. In order to assess the need for each area a
unique method was used. A number of needs indicators were
set up with the aim of taking into account variations in
expenditure levels arising from:
a) the variable distribution of population and economic
activity;
b) the variable concentration of different people or
different types of economic activity (client groups);
c) differences in physical and social environment;
d) differences in scope and quality of services.
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Until fiscal year 1973-74 the need indicators were
defined a priori; from 1974-75 onwards a new method using
past levels and patterns of expenditure to indicate need was
adopted. The needs indicators were derived as a weighted
average of past expenditures by categories of local
authorities with the same characteristics by using a
multiple regression analysis.
In each year since 1976-77 the best regression equation,
based upon a set of explanatory variable able to provide
the closest relationship with past levels and pattern of
expenditure was searched and the need was then defined 2 .
The value judgment underlying the distribution of the need
elements was that areas should be fully compensated for
differences in their needs elements then a lump sum form was
the most suitable instrument to use 3 . As I have noted in
chapter four this system is efficient 4 for expenditure
below the need element since in this case a lump—sum grant
and a matching grant have the same effect in terms of
expenditure increase.
The aim of the resources element was to compensate
local authorities for their deficiency in the tax base if it
fell below the national standard. This element sought to
2For a most comprehensive explanation of the grant system
see Bennett (1985).
3The use of a lump—sum as the best instruments formally
derived in chapter four is a well known and recognized
principle in the literature. On this respect see, for
example King (1986).
4 here efficiency is defined with respect to the minimum
effort (or cost) that has to be incurred to reach a
predetermined objective.
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= a
*
overcome differences in local authorities' ability to raise
revenue and to ensure that authorities were not penalized by
their small tax base. A grant was paid to each local
authority which fell below the standard rateable value per
head as set by the Central Government and the grant was paid
in a matching grant form. It must be remarked that the
system was not fully equalizing since no grant withdrawals
were foreseen for authorities whose rateable value exceeded
the national standard.
If we recall the optimal solution for the problem with
no asymmetry of information, namely:
Min G + (1 — g) * a*
{al
s.t. (1 — 13)* a2
 + 13	
+ G j
g
and the optimal grant set given by:
G = a2
(l-g) =
then similarities with the system described before are quite
dear. The need equalization grant, in fact, has the same
form as the theoretical one; as concerns the resources
equalization part it seems that the system actually
implemented is a simplified version of the optimal matching
[1. a* —1	 ia
p a
z 
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element. The implicit assumption underlying the system was
that local authorities of a given class had the same
preferences for local services and it was on this assumption
that the standard rateable value was set out. The most
important characteristic of this system, at least in the
context of my discussion is that Central Government is
7
assumed to know needs 5 , resources 6 and preferences	 and
on this basis is thought to be able to bring local
authorities to the level of expenditure cc: that was seen as
the optimal level of provision of local services. Technical
problems related to the estimation of the regression
equation, and the special treatment of some areas 8were
blamed for the failure of this formula. The economic
explanation of this failure is, however, quite different.
The past levels of expenditure are not a good needs
indicators since they incorporate both need and preferences
then the system was actually boosting up expenditure. The
inability of Central Government to distinguish between needs
and preferences was the actual cause of the failure and the
Government soon realizes the problem and tried to respond
accordingly.
5i.e. a 2
61.e. a1
7 i.e. P.
8See Bennett (1982) for a full account of the different
criticisms to the system.
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3. THE GRANT SYSTEM AFTER THE REALIZATION OF THE ASYMMETRY
OF INFORMATION PROBLEM.
The method of allocating the Rate Support Grant
employed up to 1980 aroused an increasing body of criticism
and it became increasingly seen by Central Government as a
method undermining its ability to control public
expenditure. As a result the Conservative Government that
took office in 1979 changed the formula by which grant were
distributed. This phase of the history of grants is
characterized by a period of dramatic changes in the
distribution formula that I will review only briefly.
Central government grant to local authorities was made up
of three constituent parts: specific grants, supplementary
grants and the rate support grants. Specific grants were
made to aid local authorities in their implementation of
specific projects or programmes like urban aid, which the
government is keen to promote. Supplementary grants are made
to assist local authorities with particular obligations
often imposed on them by government, like the up keep of
roads and national parks. Rate Support Grant 9 was the
general grant made to subsidise spending by local
authorities which would otherwise have to be financed out of
the rates.
The new system for distributing the grant was sought to be a
unitary grant known as block grant. Although called a
unitary grant, it was concerned with the same two essential
issues to which the separate resources and needs element of
9
which is also referred as RSG.
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the old RSG were directed: resources and needs equalization.
As a unitary grant, however, it was designed to achieve
simultaneous need and resources equalization. This system of
grant distribution is quite similar to the optimal set I
described in chapter four, so I think it is interesting to
compare the two systems.
I will first describe the system as has been set up by the
Government and I will try later to examine the differences
and similarities with the optimal theoretical grant
allocation rule I derived in chapter four.
The reform of the grant system, even if has been proposed as
a method to simplify the system and to give greater
transparency to the way in which grants were allocated is in
my opinion the clear sign that Central Government became
aware of its inability to know all the parameters necessary
to set a fully equalizing system at the minimum cost As
stated by the Secretary of State for the Environment in fact
the system had, among other scopes 'to exclude as far as
possible differences in expenditure which are the result of
local preferences' 10 .
The block grant contained
	 two essential features.
11First there is the GREA	 for the authority. Although GREA
is defined as " the cost of providing for a common standard
of service in authorities with common functions" it is
rather, in my opinion, Government's estimate of the optimal
10Ministerial guidelines to Grants Working Group, 1980.
11 GREA stands for Grant Related Expenditure Assessment.
284
level of expenditure that each local authority should reach;
It is not the exact replica of the previous need element.
Since it is difficult to distinguish between need and
preferences GREA is rather an estimate of the optimal level
of expenditure that each authority should reach.. Central
Government's intentions are quite clear if we observe that
expenditure up to GREA is not fully financed by the Rate
Support Grant as was the need element in the previous system
12
. The calculation of GREA begins by taking the national
figure for relevant expenditure. This total is then
distributed between authorities by first identifying
measurable factors which influence the costs to authorities
of providing services. These factors approximate the client
groups and define the number of units of service need. The
second step is the assessment of the relative importance of
different factors for each service which become expressed in
a set of weights.
These weights approximate to the unit cost of providing each
service need. Like the previous need element five main
factors in GREA are identified:
1) the population of an area;
2) the physical features of an area;
3) social and environmental characteristics of an area which
may constitute particular problems;
4) differences in service costs between areas;
12In the years in which the target regime was in operation
for some authorities the target level was lower than GREA
which would be a contradiction with the assumption of
GREA=need but would instead be justified if GREA was an
estimate of the optimal level of expenditure to be reached.
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5) special requirements for service provision in different
areas.
Within each of' these categories a pound per unit of
service need is specified which is then multiplied by the
number of units of that service need in each relevant
authority.
The second central feature of the new RSG is the
definition of the Grant Related Poundage (GRP) . The
standard rate poundage is determined by Central Government.
In setting this poundage, as with the previous national
standard rateable value per head for the resources element,
central government chooses a level at which it is expected
most authorities will still receive benefits from
expenditure. However, unlike the previous resource element,
the level chosen is not in terms of the maximum tax—base
equalization attainable by dividing a given grant sum, but
it is instead in terms of the maximum expenditure
differences from the standard that can be supported on
differing tax bases; i.e. need, preferences and resources
are combined together by the use of the GRP. The first stage
of the definition of GRP is the national level. This is then
divided between different levels and types of authorities in
terms of their different responsibilities for services.
The further features to be mentioned in the new block
grant are the threshold and tapering multipliers to be
employed. These tapering multiplier terms are important
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since they are used to penalise those local authorities
which are 'overspending' in the sense that their expenditure
exceeds the GREA assessed by central government as typical
of authorities with similar objective characteristics.
For those local authorities for which this 'excess'
expenditure is beyond a specific threshold the level of
grant is progressively reduced so that the "marginal excess
expenditure" is borne increasingly by local ratepayers.
In order to compare RSG in its most simple formulation13
with the optimal allocation in an asymmetry of information
framework we have first of all to note that the term block
grant is a misnomer from the point of view of the economic
theory of grant: the grant is in fact a combination of a
block (lump sum) grant plus a matching grant. As I noted
before, the key features of the block grant are the grant
related expenditure assessment (GREA) and the grant related
poundage (GRP). The equalization through the block grant was
envisaged as follows: if each local authority of a given
class levies a specified tax rate (GRP) the block grant
allows it to spend at its GREA that is, for expenditure at
GREA the amount of block grant received by a local authority
Is the difference between its GREA and the amount of tax it
would raise by applying the specified GRP to its tax base.
Figure one illustrates how the budget constraint for a
13i.e. I will not consider for the time being the problems
introduced by the target regime in operation from fiscal
year 1983/4 through 1985/6
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representative local authority is altered by the
introduction of the grant from Central Government. The
budget is first illustrated in terms of expenditure per head
and tax rate. In the absence of any support from Central
Government the budget constraint for this local authority
would be written as:
X = rB	 (1)
where r is the tax rate and B is the tax base and in
the diagram is represented by the straight line ob.
FIGURE ONE
If our authority would spend at its GREA (point A in figure
one) the specified tax rate would be given by GRP (r * in the
diagram). Thus, by levying at tax rate r*, the local
authority would raise the amount R * per capita from local
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taxation and qualify for amount G * per capita in the form of
block grant
R * + G* = A.
As I have mentioned before GREA can be approximated by the
*level a of the theoretical model presented before.and it isi
now clear why it is not a pure need element.By spending at
their GREAs all local authorities of the same class will
have to raise the same tax rate. This does not clearly
implies that local authorities will receive the same level
of utility from this expenditure since the resource element
a 1 is different unless the GREA is chosen optimally to
achieve this goal. 14
For levels of expenditure other than A, the grant related
poundage schedule (GRPS) becomes relevant. This specifies
the local tax rate that must be levied if a local authority
is to be able to spend a given amount; again, any difference
between this level of expenditure and locally raised revenue
is made up by block grant. But it is useful to view any
level of expenditure as a deviation from GREA. Then what the
GRPS does is to ensure that any given departure of
expenditure away from GREA has the same implication for the
14In a world with perfect information agents the utility for
local government could be defined over expenditure and tax
rate as follows:
U t = (1 — f3) tn-L(a 1 — T) + 13 tni(X — a)2
and X and the matching grant could be chosen such that:
U t = (1 — 13)fin(a 1 — T) + 13 tin.(X — a 2 )	 = U*
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required deviation of the local tax rate away from r*,
irrespective of the local authority's own tax base. That is,
relative to their GREA's, all local authorities are able to
act as if they have the same tax base. In this way different
taxable resources are taken into account and the block grant
system can be viewed as a needs (GREA) related district
power equalizing grant. The tax base implicit in the GRPS is
not a constant, but is instead dependent on a local
authority's expenditure level. In the simplest formulation,
once expenditure reached a given level above GREA, known as
threshold, the implicit tax base was reduced. Thus a local
authority's post-grant budget constraint is illustrated by
line M de in Figure one, and it can now readily be seen how
block grant comprises a lump sum grant plus a matching
grant. Let the threshold level of expenditure be denoted by
X 1 ; the local authority's post grant budget constraint is
given by:
X =G +r*B
	
: X < X1	 1	 1
where G is the implicit lump sum grant and B 1 is the tax
base implicit in the section of the budget constraint G id.
According to this system, the block grant is given by:
BG = G + r (B - B)	 : X < X1	 1	 1
where the implicit matching grant is given by r(B i - B) and
the matching rate is	 0 as B < 0.
(2)
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Similarly, for expenditure in excess of X 1 we have:
X = G2 + r * B 2	: X  X1
	 (3)
BG = G 2 + r * ( B2 - B)	 : X  X 1
where B 2 is the implicit tax base in the section of the
budget constraint de.
It is clear that if B > B 2 there will be an expenditure
level at which block grant is exhausted. However, the
institutional arrangements in England do no allow block
grant payments to be negative and thus another kink is
Introduced at the expenditure level at which the grant is
exhausted.
The system that government introduced in 1981/2,
expecially in its virgin formulation which has been applied
only in the last three years could have been the right
response to the asymmetry of information that characterizes
the relationship between the two levels of government.
The implicit lump sum grant should have had the function of
giving local authorities the amount of resources necessary
to provide for the baseline level of expenditure while the
ranges of values between GREA and threshold with the
associated GRPS could have represented the set of choices
open to local government to reveal their true preferences.
The two marginal tax rate implicit in the two sections of
the budget constraint can be easily converted into the
system of marginal prices derived from the theoretical model
I presented before by observing that since X = T + G and T =
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X = T + G + (2a)
rB, where T is the tax payment, using equations (2) and (3):
B 2X = T + — 1 X  Xi (3a)G 2 +
[
The budget constraint can be depicted as in figure two.
FIGURE TWO
Adjusting the level of GRPs, threshold and GREA from one
year to the other one should have in theory given the right
Incentive to local authorities to tell the truth in (almost)
the same way as a* and all the price and incentive schedules
assure the realization of an optimal grant system in the
theoretical model. However, as I argued at the end of the
theoretical section the system could have failed to reach
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Its objectives if local authorities do not have a true
preference parameter at all. In this case the most likely
result is that local authorities instead of maximising their
utility over their life cycle choose their expenditure
pattern each year with references to resources available and
the system of prices in force that particular year. Past
experience of overspending have suggested Central Government
to avoid this risk as much as possible; as a result the
block grant foresees a target regime.
The targets regime operated throughout the fiscal years
1981-2 to 1985-6 and is appended to the underlying block
grant system. The precise nature of the targets regime
varies between different years of its operation but the
essence of the system is that an expenditure target is
specified for each local authority which is based
predominantly on the previous year's expenditure, and is
only indirectly related to expenditure need as represented
by GREA . Penalties in the form of withdrawals of block
grant are imposed if expenditure exceeds the target level of
expenditure. The size of the penalty withdrawal of grant
varies between the five years of the system's operation, but
Is always a monotonically increasing function of the
percentage by which expenditure exceeds the target. And in
general this introduces a number of additional kinks into
the post — grant budget constraint. The impact of this
target regime on the local authority budget constraint
Illustrated in Figure two is shown in figure three where the
assumption is that the target level of expenditure is given
by XT (as represented by point c).
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xFIGURE THREE
The post—grant budget constraint in the absence of the
target regime is G 1 de, and following the imposition of the
target regime it is given by G idcfg. The target system
represent an attempt by the government to encourage
restraint in local authority spending and its imposition
means that the equalizing aspect of the underlying block
grant system is to a large extent lost. Two local
authorities with identical GREAs can face very different
post—grant budget constraints depending on the previous
level of expenditure. The history of the grant and penalty
system is a well known matter and I will not go onto further
detail. In the next section I will try instead to see
whether similarities exist between the actual grant system
and the optimal allocation rule developed in chapter four.
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3.1 THEORY AND REALITY: SOME TESTS.
From fiscal year 1986-87 onwards the target regime has
been abolished, the post—grant budget constraint presents
just a kink, so the grant in operation is very similar to
the theoretical price system described in the previous
chapters 15 . The last three years also correspond to a new
life cycle for local authorities since in May 1986
elections for local authorities that choose to change all
representatives simultaneously took place. It is then
possible to devise a series of tests aimed at assessing to
which extent the grant system in operation through fiscal
years 1986-87 to 1988-89 reflected the optimal allocation
rule and was consistent with the preferences for expenditure
revealed by local authorities. One of the most important
defects of the models in the asymmetry of information
literature is the lack of hypothesis to test how the models
fit the actual data. The model I presented has the same
defect, but in this case it is at least possible to devise
some indirect tests. The first series of tests which I have
labelled "internal consistency tests" are aimed to assess
whether the actual two price system reflected the optimal
system outlined in chapter four.
3.1.1 INTERNAL CONSISTENCY TESTS.
At the end of chapter four I showed how, for the case
15The actual grant system in operation was an approximation
of the optimal system since rate capping was in operation,
then the system was per se admitting the possibility of
overspending on the second segment.
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f3 ra i
 (1 - (3d ) + K
Ox *- a2 ) (1 - p )
g	 2
4,2 
I (6)
(3 la 1 (1 - (3d ) + K1
( *a- a2 ) (1 - 0 )
g	 23,2 
I (7)
Pla i (1 - (3d ) + K2
(a * - a2
 ) (1 - P )
g	 2,2 
1 (8)
K1=1
K 2=
in which p=0 and r=0 16
 the optimal grant formula could be
written such that the price on the first segment of the
budget line was defined as:
p a1 g
li 
_
(a*- a2 )0
The prices on the second segment were defined as:
(5)
K=
3 a 1
	(13 -f3d)
4 -3 (3
2 a 1
	 c p -od)
4 - 3 (3
a 1	 cp -pd)
4 - 3 p
161.e. for a model with no discount rate on utility and
without interest rate on sums available at different time
periods.
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P[ai (1 — f3d) 1 
(a* - a2 ) (1 - g )
g	 21,2 (9)
(10)
while the incentive was defined as:
e
 = (
1 - 13 1
i-gij
From equation (5), by substituting in the formula all the
relevant parameters, namely:
a 2 I.e. the need element is represented by M 1 , the
implicit lump—sum grant on the first segment. This
assumption reflects the consideration that a full
equalization of pure need is optimally pursued by a
lump—sum grant.
*
a.	 i.e. the optimal level of expenditure is represented by1
GREA. As I noted before, GREA, although is defined as a
need element, incorporates preferences as well.
a*0 i is the threshold which in the actual grant systemi 
represents the kink of the budget constraint for each
local authority.
a 1	is, in analogy with the econometric model I presented
in the previous chapter the maximum rate across
Metropolitan Districts (excluding rate capped
authorities from the sample) multiplied by the rateable
value that year.
It is then possible to derive a distribution for 13 which I
labelled 13 and that represents the implicit 13 for prices ona
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the first segment. Two tests of consistency of the actual
grant system with the optimal one can now be devised.
The first test is aimed to check the consistency of 0
with the other parameters of the system. At the end of
chapter four I showed that the incentive should be set
according to equation (10) while the observed value for e is
equal to
THRESH
0= 	 	 (11)
GREA
For each year it is then possible to compare the
distributions for the theoretical values of' e derived using
equations (10) with the actual ones obtained by equation
(11) and several tests can be designed to assess whether the
two distributions are significantly different 17 . The values
for 0 in equation (10) are derived by assuming that e is
consistent with the distribution of 13 on the first segment
of the budget line, that is the )3, distribution is used to
obtain the e
a 
distribution. The derivation of the second 0
distribution using equation (11) is instead straightforward.
Table 1 summarizes the principal statistical measures for
each distribution in the three years under analysis. From
the diagrams in appendix one it is possible to see that the
two distributions follow different patterns and the log
likelihood test for the hypothesis:
il (a) = 11 (b)	 ; a (a) = a (b)
17from a statistical point of view.
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tested by imposing the restrictions on both (a) and (b)
distribution should be used to give a formal proof.
This test assumes that both distributions are normally
distributed; so a test is needed to verify this hypothesis.
For a large sample, the Bearque and Jera test could be used
In this case, due to the small size of the sample the test
did not perform very well 18 and gave such a poor result I
prefer not to record it at all. However, from the diagrams
it seems possible to assess that the distributions are not
normal so a nonparametric test might be used to compare
them. The second test reported in table 2 is the
Mann—Whitney test based on the ranking of the different
values for 0 and it shows that the two distributions do not
have the same ranking.
Another test can now be designed. If I assume that 131
is the lowest value of the (3 distribution derived using
equation (5) and 0 = threshold/GREA it is then possible to
derive the distribution for the g implicit in the incentive
scheme by substituting the relevant parameters in equation
(10). I can now compare this new distribution which I will
label f3b with the one I have derived using equation (5) and
that was labelled 13a . The summary statistics for both
distributions are recorded in table 3. These results show -
that the mean value of p implicit in the incentive scheme is
higher than the corresponding one in the price system and
18As	 I	 should	 have	 expected	 since	 it	 is	 valid
only asymptotically.
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that its variance is smaller. This conclusion has, however,
to be carefully interpreted since the g b distribution has
19been derived by implicitly assuming that the range of /3
used for the incentive was the one derived using the price
system and the validity of this hypothesis cannot be tested:
the tests that I will present can assess whether the two
distributions are consistent each other 20but they give no
insights for alternative behavioural hypotheses.
The tentative conclusion that can be derived is that Central
Government might have designed the incentive scheme in a
rather more general way by giving each authority a more
homogeneous incentive while the emphasis of the grant system
was on the price scheme, that is on a closer control of
expenditure by using a more personalized price for each
local authority. Again it is possible to compare the two
distributions using the same tests I used before. I have
summarized the results in table 4. As for the 6 distribution
it is possible to see that the two distributions are
different as the tests reported at the bottom of table four
show.
The second series of' tests concerns the consistency of
the value of the price on the second segments with the other
parameters of the system. This can be done by substituting
the relevant parameters in equations (6) to (9) and using
the pa and /3d for the parameter g. As I pointed out in
19
or at least the lowest value for /3.
20i.e. as they should be if the actual grant system was
designed according to the optimal grant allocation rule.
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chapter four Central Government sets the two prices system
before the start of the life cycle of local authorities, at
a stage at which it does know the range of values for p but
has no idea of what the true one will be. It Is then optimal
in this case to use the two extreme value of such
distribution for the price system. This assures, in fact
that all local authorities, irrespective of their
preferences will not overspend.
As it can be noted from the last set of diagrams in appendix
one the price derived using the P d distribution is perfectly
consistent with the actual price on the second segment,
while the one derived using the Pa distribution usually
leads to higher theoretical prices. This is mainly the
results of the already observed	 comparatively higher
variance of the g distribution. The new set of tests seem
a
to suggest that the price and incentive system are
consistent, at least on average. The main difference between
the two seems to lie in the price system on the first
segment for which the mean of 13 is assumed to be lower than
for setting the other parameters .
3.2.2 THE GRANT SYSTEM AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSES.
Let us now turn to the comparison between /3 implicit in
the grant distribution formula and the ones I have derived
from the estimations presented in the previous chapter.
In 1986-7 the average value of /3 implicit in the price
system was equal to .7 while in 1987-8 it was .66 and in
1988-9 it was .67. The range of f3 in the different years is
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between .62 and .75. If we compare those values with the
one derived from the estimation presented in the previous
chapter, i.e. the 13 revealed by local authorities through
their expenditure decisions, it is possible to note that the
preferences for local public services implicit in the grant
system are lower than those estimated. In both cases,
however it seems that the hypothesis of a life cycle
behaviour has to be rejected. The actual grant system proves
to be quite different from the optimal grant allocation rule
I presented in chapter four. This conclusion, however has to
be interpreted in the light of the problems that Central
Government has to solve to implement the grant formula that
optimally allocates resources. Again, the actual grant
system might be considered a good approximation of the
formula derived in chapter four and anyway both systems
seems to be inspired by the same principle.
Another interesting feature of the system can be
observed by recalling the pattern of p derived from table 7
in chapter five . There seems to be an inverse correlation
between the values of the estimated f3 and of the one
implicit in the grant system, but what is important to note
at this stage is that local authorities seem to adjust their
preferences according to the system ruling in any particular
year as well as to the resources available21 . •
The number of years taken into account is clearly too
limited to derive a clear cut conclusion but the hypothesis
21 This was the conclusion from the data examined in the last
model in the previous chapter, namely in table 8.
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that local governments adjust their preferences to the
system in force each year cannot be at least rejected.
This consideration reinforces the argument that it
might then actually be impossible to devise an optimal grant
system at all. The reason for this pessimistic conclusion is
based on the evidence that the preferences for local
services are adjusted according to the price system in force
each year. This behaviour clearly make impossible to devise
any optimal system at all: whatever the rules are and the
parameters are chosen, the system is bound to fail to reach
its objectives.
4. THE NEW GRANT SYSTEM: ADMISSION OF A FAILURE OR AN
EFFICIENT WAY TO ALLOCATE RESOURCES?
The Local Government Finance Act, which received its
Royal Assent in July 1988, introduces three main changes to
the system of local government finance in England and Wales.
First, the domestic property tax (known as 'the domestic
rates') is to be abolished, and is to be replaced by a
community charge. For most individuals the community charge
Is to be a flat rate tax, or poll tax, although there is a
sliding scale of tax eligibility for low income individuals,
but everybody is to pay at least 20% of the community charge
relevant to their local community. As with the property
tax, each local government will in general be free to set
the level of its community charge although the Act does give
the Secretary of State the power to limit both the level and
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rate of increase of community charges. The Secretary of
State has had this power with respect to the local property
tax since 1984, signaling a relatively recent change in the
administration of the local tax system, especially when one
considers that the local property tax was introduced in
1601.
The second provision of the Act concerns the administration
of the local non—domestic property tax. Whilst this tax is
to be retained it is to all intents and purposes to become a
central government tax. The rate of taxation is to be the
same in all localities and is to be set by the central
government. The yield of the tax is to go initially to
central government with the proceeds being paid to local
government as part of the grants—in—aid to local
governments. It is important to note, however, that the
grant is not to be paid out on a derivation principle, but
is instead effectively to be paid out on a per capita basis.
Thus there is to be no link between the amount of money
raised through non—domestic property taxation in an area and
the amount received back from central government.
The third part of the package of reforms concerns the nature
of the main central government grant—in—aid to local
governments which is to become a fixed grant in the sense
that the amount received by a locality is to be independent
of its expenditure. This grant, known as the Block Grant,
seeks to compensate for differences between localities in
expenditure needs and taxable resources.
As a result of this policy, the budget constraint for local
authorities will be written as:
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X = G ic + t i Il ii
where G .
 c is the lump—sum grant distributed from Central
Government which incorporates both the equalizing grant and
the revenue from non domestic taxation. The equalizing grant
is set in a way such that each local authority's taxpayer
bill would be equal if local authorities spent at their
GREAS. The non domestic taxation is the share, according to
adult population, of the total tax raised through the
uniform business taxation across the country.
A central objective behind the reforms is the achievement of
accountability in the system of local government finance.
To be accountable the government argues that two criteria
should be met within a system of local government finance.
First, all the eligible to vote in local elections should be
liable to pay local taxes, and second, the full marginal
cost of local expenditure should be met out of local taxes.
The background to the government's concentration on the
notion of accountability is its belief that throughout the
early and mid 1980s many local governments failed to
restrain their expenditure because the existing system of
local government finance did not encompass accountability.
The system of rate rebates and the increase of business
taxation are supposed to be the most important causes of the
failure of full accountability.
In recent papers 22 we showed which might be the possible
See Barnett et al., 1989 (a,b,c)
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effects of the introduction of the poll tax on the pattern
of local government expenditure according to the model used
to represent local government's behaviour; in this context I
want to explain the rationale behind the introduction of the
poll tax from the point of view of the optimal grant set.
The asymmetry of information which rationalizes the
existence of local government is also the main cause for the
failure of any efficient system for allocating resources.
If this is the case the likely response of Central
Government to this problem depends on its objectives. If
Central government policy is oriented towards expenditure
cuts and certainty in the amount spent the best way to
achieve this objective is to give any local authority a
lump sum grant and give to the local decision makers full
power as concerns the amount spent and the local tax to be
raised. The asymmetry of information problem that, at least
from efficiency, might require the existence of local
government is also the cause of a never ending contrast
between Central Government and the other level of decision
making and it is itself the cause of other inefficient
allocation of resources. Central Government has then to
trade off between local provision and inefficient allocation
of resources because 'its agents are cheating' and a central
provision of local public goods which cannot be optimal
because of a lack of information!
In synthesis then there does not seem a clear cut response
to the problem: as I suggested at the beginning of this
section it is Central Government's objectives that determine
the balance between the trade off. What I would like to
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point out is that the system of grants that has been in
force in the recent years might have failed to reach its
objective but it is hard to think that other systems rather
than this could be perform better, at least if we assume
that the parties involved behave optimally and that their
objectives can be represented within a neoclassical
framework.
The alternative way could be to derive from alternative
theories of government behaviour an optimal distribution
formula. This different approach could probably be developed
in a game theory framework but I think that it might be
still quite difficult to formalize local government's
objectives. While in abstract it might be easy to define
local objectives in terms of maximising the probability of
being reelected or to be relatively better off than other
local authorities, when it comes to formalize the models it
is even more difficult and arbitrary to restrict the agents
behaviour within an equation.
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TABLE 1
1986-87
Mean a Min Max n
e
a
1.0562 .0417 0.993 1.144 34
0b 1.0987 .0079 1.0747 1.109 34
1987-88
e
a
1.0977 .0248 1.0389 1.1678 33
0b 1.0979 .0070 1.0841 1.1081 33
1988-89
e
a
1.0276 .0226 0.9730 1.0998 33
eb 1.0973 .0072 1.0830 1.1078 33
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TABLE 2
Year t test for pa = pb
1986-7 5.84
1987-8 17.40
1988-9 16.89
Year MANN	 WHITNEY TEST S.L.
1986-7 594 99%
1987-8 1617 99%
1988-9 769 99%
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TABLE 3
1986-87
Mean	 cr	Min	 Max	 n
Pa 0.704 .0373 0.655 0.805 34
Pt) 0.740 .0081 0.716 0.752	 . 34
1987-88
Pa 0.666 .0253 0.620 0.751 33
13b
0.692 .0062 0.679 0.701 33
1988-89
13
a
0.674 .0177 0.638 0.734 33
fib 0.732 .0073 0.719 0.743 33
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TABLE FOUR
Year	 t test for p a =
 Pb
	
1986-7	 5.58
	
1987-8	 5.37
	
1988-9	 0.03
Year	 MANN WHITNEY TEST
	 S.L.
1986-7 636 99%
1987-8 769 99%
1988-9 92 13%
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INCENTIVE SCHEME DISTRIBUTION OF 6 and 6
a	 b to r,
1986-7
,
,
j
i
1
V
;
TETA (A)
TETA (B)
AUTHORITY
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INCENTIVE SCHEME
HISTOGRAM - TETA87A
PCT.
0.735
0.706
0.676
0.647
0.618
0.588
0.559
0.529
0.500
0.471
0.441
0.412
0.382
0.353
0.324
0.294
0.265
0.235
0.206
0.176
0.147
0.118
0.088
0.059
0.029
N
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
	
13
	
XXXXXXXXXX
	1
	
XXXXXXXXXX
	 1
	
XXXXXXXXXX
	1
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	9
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
8
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
7
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
6
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
5
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
4
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
3
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
2
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
HISTOGRAM -
PCT.	 N
I 	
1.08
TETA87B
I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I
1.08	 1.09	 1.10	 1.11	 1.11	 1.12
0.735 25 I
0.706 24 I
0.676 23 I
0.647 22 I
0.618 21 I
0.588 20 I
0.559 19 I
0.529 18 I
0.500 17 I
0.471 16 I
0.441 15 I XXXXXXXXXX
0.412 14 I XXXXXXXXXX
0.382 13 I XXXXXXXXXX
0.353 12 I XXXXXXXXXX
0.324 11 I XXXXXXXXXX
0.294 10 I XXXXXXXXXX
0.265 9 I XXXXXXXXXX	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.235 8 I XXXXXXXXXX	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.206 7 I XXXXXXXXXX	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.176 6 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.147 5 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.118 4 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.088 3 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.059 2 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.029 1 I XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I
0.931
	
0.973	 1.01	 1.06	 1.10	 1.14	 1.18
rj
INCENTIVE SCHEME DISTRIBUTION OF e 
a 
and 6 for 1987-8b
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INCENTIVE SCHEW:
HISTOGRAM - TETA88A
PCT.
	
0.394	 13	 I
	
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.182
	 6 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.182	 6 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.152	 5 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.121
	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.121
	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.091
	 3 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.061	 2 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.061	 2 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
HISTOGRAM
PCT.
-
1.08	 1.08	 1.09	 1.10	 1.10
TETA88B
1.11	 1.12
0.394 13 I
0.364 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.364 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.333 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.333 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.303 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.303 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.273 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.273 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.242 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.242 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.212 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.212 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.182 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.182 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.152 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.152 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.121 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.121 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.091 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.091 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.061 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
0.061 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
0.030 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
0.030 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
1.02	 1.05	 1.07	 1.10	 1.12	 1.15	 1.17
I 1,7•	 / 1	 •-•" I •
INCENTIVE SCHEME DISTRIBUTION OF 0 and e
b for 1988-9a
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INCENTIVE SCHEME
gISTOGRAM - TETA89A
	
PCT.	 N
	
0.394	 13 I
	
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.182	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.182	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.121	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.121	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.061	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.061	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I
1.08	 1.08	 1.09	 1.10	 1.10	 1 11	 1.12
HISTOGRAM - TETA89B
	
PCT.	 N
	
0.758	 25 I
	
0.727	 24 I
	
0.697	 23 I
	
0.667	 22	 I
	
0.636	 21	 I
	
0.606	 20 I
	
0.576	 19 I
	
0.545	 18 I
	
0.515	 17	 I
	
0.485	 16 I
	
0.455	 15 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.424	 14 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.394	 13 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.182	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.121	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.061	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I
0.960	 0.982	 1.01	 1.03	 1.05	 1.07	 1.10
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INCENTIVE SCHEME DISTRIBUTION OF 13, and Pb for 1986-7
AUTHORITY
INCENTIVE SCHEME
HISTOGRAM - BETA87A
	
PCT.
	
N
	
0.735	 25 I
	
0.706	 24 I
	
0.676	 23	 I
	
0.647	 22 I
	
0.618	 21	 I
	
0.588	 20 I
	
0.559	 19	 I
	
0.529	 18 I
	
0.500	 17	 I
	
0.471	 16	 I
	
0.441	 15	 I
	
0.412	 14 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.382	 13 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.353	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.324	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.294	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.265	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.235	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.206	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.176	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.147	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.118	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.088	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.059	 2 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.029	 1 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	 I
0.593	 0.630	 0.668	 0.705	 0.742	 0.780	 0.817
HISTOGRAM - BETA87B
	
PCT.	 N
	
0.382	 13 I
	
0.353	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.353	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.324	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.324	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
	
0.294	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.294	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.265	 9 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.265	 9 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.235	 8 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.235	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.206	 7 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.206	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.176	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.176	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.147	 5 I
	
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.147	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.118	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.118	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.088	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.088	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.059	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.059	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.029	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	
0.029	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
I
0.716
	
0.724	 0.732
	
0.740	 0.748
	
0.757	 0.765
INCENTIVE SCHEME DISTRIBUTION OF 13.
 and gb for 1987-8
I
I
1
1
1
I
BETA (A)
BETA (B)
AUTHORITY
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INCENTIVE SCHEME
HISTOGRAM - BETA88A
PCT.
0.758	 25	 I
0.727	 24 I
0.697	 23	 I
0.667	 22	 I
0.636	 21	 I
0.606	 20 I
0.576	 19	 I
0.545	 18 I
0.515	 17	 I
0.485	 16 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.455	 15 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.424	 14 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.394	 13 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.182	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.121	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.061	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.030	 1 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	 XXXXXXXXXX
	 I --I 	
0.591
	
0.616	 0.641	 0.667	 0.692	 0,717
	
0.743
HISTOGRAM - BETA88B
PCT.
0.394	 13	 I
0.364	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.364
	 12 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.333	 11 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.303	 10 I	 XXXXXXXXXX
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.273	 9 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.242	 8 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.212	 7 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.182	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.182	 6 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.152	 5 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.121	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.121	 4 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.091	 3 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.061	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.061	 2 I	 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.030	 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.673
	 0.680	 0.686	 0.692	 0.698	 0.705 0.711
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HISTUURAM -
PCT.	 N
INCENTIVE SCHEME
IA 9A
0.758 25
0.727 24
0.697 23
0.667 22
0.636 21
0.606 20
0.576 19
0.545 18
0.515 17 XXXXXXXXXX
0.485 16 XXXXXXXXXX
0.455 15 XXXXXXXXXX
0.424 14 XXXXXXXXXX
0.394 13 XXXXXXXXXX
0.364 12 XXXXXXXXXX
0.333 11 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.303 10 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.273 9 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.242 8 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.212 7 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.182 6 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.152 5 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.121 4 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.091 3 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
0.061 2 XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
0.030 1 IXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
	 I I 	
0.622	 0.639
	
0.657	 0.675
	
0.69P	 0.710	 0.728
HISTOGRAM - BETA89B
PCT.
	
0.394
	
13
	
0.364
	
12
	
0.364
	
12
	
0.333
	
11
	
0.333
	
11
	
0.303
	
10
	
0.303
	
10
	
0.273
	
9
	
0.273
	
9
	
0.242
	
8
	
0.242
	
8
	
0.212
	
7
	
0.212
	
7
	
0.182
	
6
	
0.182
	
6
	
0.152
	
5
	
0.152
	
5
	
0.121
	
4
	
0.121
	
4
	
0.091
	
3
	
0.091
	
3
	
0.061
	
2
	
0.061
	
2
	
0.030
	
1
	
0.030
	
1
0.711
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	 I ,
0.718	 0.725	 0.733	 0.740	 0.747 0.755
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INCENTIVE SCHEME PRICE ON THE SECOND SEGMENT 1988-9
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CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSION
The history of intergovernmental grants in Britain has
been characterized, expecially in the most recent years, by
dramatic changes in the grant distribution formula that some
commentators 1 have interpreted as a failure of the system
to reach its objectives. In my work I present a different
interpretation by explaining how, in my opinion the
different grant distribution formulae applied in the last
decades reflect the perception of the information asymmetry
problem that characterizes the relationship between Central
and local government. I focus my attention on the peculiar
relationship between central and local government.
The environment in which Government has to work is a very
difficult one; on one hand, in fact, it has to provide the
local authorities grants to ensure a minimum level of
services is provided; on the other hand it has to prevent
high spending. Those two objective are incompatible, at
least in the short run if local governments are better
informed than the central government about their needs,
preferences and resources. The grant system has to take
account of these circumstances and can be used as a device
to acquire relevant information from local authorities. To
study this very complicated problem, I study the underlying
model and the behaviour of the agents involved.
In chapter one, after reviewing briefly the economic reasons
for the existence of two level of government I examine some
models aimed at explaining the rationale for the existence
of grants from central to local governments.
1 See, for example, Gibson and Travers (1986)
328
I try to explain why from a theoretical point of view, some
services have to be provided locally. The main reason is, in
my opinion that the local authority is better informed than
the Central Government about the needs and preferences of
people within each locality.
This cause an asymmetry of information problem in the
Central — Local government relationship. Government has to
take account of this problem in setting the grant system and
this is the main reason why a first best policy cannot be
implemented in this context.
The system of grant has then to take account of this
Important element and its effectiveness has to be judged not
only in its aim of reducing expenditure but also as a device
to learn the true preferences and needs of each local
authority. Chapter one ends up with a very simple model that
explains what would be the first best optimal strategy in a
world in which all the agents share the same information.
In Chapter two I review some of the models in the asymmetry
of information framework while in chapter three and four I
present the theoretical model to be used to optimally
allocate grants to local authorities. I assume that local
authorities are utility maximisers and I present the optimal
grant allocation rule in both a static and a dynamic
framework. At the end of chapter four I examine some of the
possible failures of the optimal system . to reach its
objectives due to the assumption of possible alternative
behaviour.
In chapter five I present the empirical evidence for local
authorities behaviour under different assumptions. The aim
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of those empirical estimates is to derive a set of
parameters to assess the consistency of the optimal
theoretical model with the actual system by which grants are
allocated. Some tests will be devised for both assessing the
validity of a life cycle behaviour and of some of the
possible behavioural assumptions alternative to standard
utility maximisation.
In chapter six I deal with the summary of all the issues by
showing how the history of the changes in the grant system
can be interpreted as the response of Central Government to
the asymmetry of information problem it has to face.
The history of grants might, in my view divided into three
different phases:
1) Central Government is assumed to know all the parameters
necessary to give the right amount of grant to local
authorities.
2) Central Government realizes the problems caused by the
asymmetry of information characterizing the game and tries
to react accordingly.
3) Due to the peculiar characteristics of the agents
Involved in the play no optimal grant formula exists and the
grant is almost arbitrary. Central Government's objectives
determine the size of the grant and its amount
The dramatic changes in the grant system might then be
interpreted as an evidence of Central Government's
increasing awareness of the asymmetry problem that it has to
face. In this light also the new drastic change in local
government finance brought about by the introduction of the
poll tax might be seen as a response to a problem that, as I
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have argued in the previous chapter might not have a
solution. The Local Government Finance Act, which received
Its Royal Assent in July 1988, introduces three main changes
to the system of local government finance in England and
Wales. First, the domestic property tax (known as 'the
domestic rates') is to be abolished, and is to be replaced
by a community charge. For most individuals the community
charge is to be a flat rate tax, or poll tax, although there
is a sliding scale of tax eligibility for low income
individuals, but everybody is to pay at least 20% of the
community charge relevant to their local community.
A central objective behind the reforms is the achievement of
accountability in the system of local government finance.
To be accountable the government argues that two criteria
should be met within a system of local government finance.
First, all of those eligible to vote in local elections
should be liable to pay local taxes, and second, the full
marginal cost of local expenditure should be met out of
local taxes. The background to the government's
concentration on the notion of accountability is its belief
that throughout the early and mid 1980s many local
governments failed to restrain their expenditure because the
existing system of local government finance did not
encompass accountability. The system of rates rebates and
the increase of business taxation are supposed to be the
most important causes of the failure of full accountability.
In some recent papers 2 we showed what might be the possible
2See Barnett et al., 1989 (d,e,f,g)
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effects of the introduction of the poll tax on the pattern
of local government expenditure according to the model used
to represent local government's behaviour; in this context I
want to explain which is the rationale behind the
Introduction of the poll tax from the point of view of the
optimal grant set. The asymmetry of information which
rationalizes the existence of local government is also the
main cause for the failure of any efficient system for
allocating resources.
If this is the case the likely response of Central
Government to this problem depends on its objectives.
If Central government policy is oriented towards avoiding
local	 authorities	 to	 play	 strategic	 games	 the
straightforward way to achieve this objective is to give any
local authority a lump sum grant and leave to the local
decision makers full power as concerns the amount spent and
the local tax to be raised.
Central Government has to trade off between local provision
and inefficient allocation of resources because 'its agents
are cheating' and a central provision of local public goods
which cannot be optimal because of a lack of information!
The problem does not appear to have a simple solution and
some of the causes for the failure of the incentive system
in this case have been envisaged.
In synthesis then there does not seem a clear cut response
to the problem: as I suggested at the beginning of this
section it is Central Government's objectives that determine
the balance between the trade off. What I would like to
point out is that the system of grants that has been in
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force in the recent years might have failed to reach its
objective but it is hard to think that other systems rather
than this could be perform better, at least if we assume
that the parties involved behaves optimally and that their
objectives can be represented within a neoclassical
framework.
An alternative way could be to derive from alternative
theories of government behaviour an optimal distribution
formula. This different approach could probably be developed
in a game theory framework but I think that it might be
still quite difficult to formalize local government's
objectives. While on abstract it might be easy to define
local objective in terms of maximising their probability of
being reelected or to be relatively better off than other
local authorities, when it comes to formalize the models it
is even more difficult and arbitrary to restrict the agents
behaviour within an equation.
Finally it should be noted that Central Government's
objectives in designing the grant sytem could be rather
different from a mere resources maximisation. The allocation
of the grant total could pursue political discrimination
objectives in favour of the local authorities ruled out by
the same political party as Central Government. This aspect
is particularly important in the British experience since
after the elections in 1986-7 most of the Metropolitan
Districts and a large proportion of the Shire counties
became labour dominated. Those issues are quite important
and open a complete new field of analyisis.
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